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关店近800家、代理清零 昔日“中国鞋王”为何没接住彪马?

章航英 2026-10-11 09:33
章航英 2026/10/11 09:33

邦小白快读

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总1:鞋类消费风向已变,人们不再为正式体面买单,而更看重舒适、审美、个性和松弛感。

1.男人穿鞋方式被视作风向标,雷军穿昂跑和萨洛蒙,黄仁勋穿爱马仕休闲运动鞋,说明轻松风格正在上位。

2.皮鞋等于上班见客户的老规则松动,鞋也开始用来表达自己。

总2:奥康的失败给普通人的启发是,靠渠道和广告堆出来的品牌,如果不更新产品和定位,真会被消费者抛弃。

1.代理斯凯奇和彪马只是卖别人的货,品牌价值沉淀不到自己手里,合作一停便归零。

2.连续四年亏损、累计超9亿元,关店近800家,说明跟不上消费变化的企业没有护城河。

总3:普通消费者挑选鞋款可以关注中间空档。

1.运动鞋太运动、传统皮鞋太正式、大Logo易撞款、奢侈品太贵,所以舒服好看有设计感的鞋正在走俏。

2.PANE的德训鞋800-1000元仍排队限流,说明价格贵不是问题,懂我才是购买理由。

3.最有共鸣的一句话是:这双鞋很像现在的我。

总1:消费趋势和用户行为已改变。

1.鞋履从匹配身份变为表达自我,这双鞋很像现在的我更有说服力。

2.舒适、审美、个性和松弛感成为新购买理由,传统皮鞋和纯运动鞋之间出现空档。

3.安踏曾把FILA瞄准25-45岁城市消费者,重塑高端运动时尚定位,是趋势参考。

总2:品牌渠道建设的核心是沉淀资产。

1.代理模式天花板明显,奥康代理斯凯奇十年门店清零,彪马只剩个位数,品牌心智、产品研发和数据都不在自己手里。

2.品牌不能只靠开店铺货,要建立独立供应链、产品企划、品牌定位和零售体验。

3.安踏运营FILA用独立团队,集团只做支持,FILA年营收284.7亿元。

总3:定价和产品研发要围绕新消费逻辑。

1.奥康159元两双无人问,PANE 800-1000元排队,说明设计感和品牌定义才能带来溢价。

2.奥康运动皮鞋电商最高销量仅1000多件,说明只改造皮鞋没有看懂新逻辑。

3.德训鞋存在数十年,PANE却能激活它,关键在懂消费者要什么。

总1:消费需求变化带来明确增长机会。

1.运动鞋太运动、皮鞋太正式、大Logo撞款、奢侈品太贵,中间地带的舒适设计感鞋款是新市场。

2.PANE以800-1000元一双德训鞋在上海排队限流,卖成上海土特产,并获黑蚁资本投资,证明新品牌不靠低价也能成长。

总2:代理合作模式需要高度警惕风险。

1.奥康代理斯凯奇从160家到门店清零,十年合作终止;彪马也仅剩个位数,提醒卖家代理业务无法沉淀自有资产。

2.彪马战略重置大幅削减批发渠道、回收库存、减少折扣,直接造成奥康其他品牌毛利率仅8.37%,说明品牌方策略变化会瞬间冲击下游。

3.奥康连续亏损、关店近800家,传统渠道型鞋企的风险仍在释放,卖家要避免押注单一品牌或单一品类。

总3:可学习点与应对措施。

1.安踏收购FILA后重新定位、独立运营、重建供应链,五年后才扭亏,可作为重资产品牌运营的参考。

2.安踏刚成为彪马第一大股东,卖家可关注彪马渠道整合与产品调整带来的新机会,同时留意集团只做支持不插手具体运营的原则会如何落地。

3.星期六转向品牌授权和供应链服务轻资产模式,说明传统鞋企可探索转型路径,但哈森仍亏损也提示转型不易。

总1:产品设计和生产需求有明确转向。

1.消费者选鞋从身份导向转向舒适、审美、个性、松弛感,工厂不能只按正式和功能的旧要求开发产品。

2.运动鞋和皮鞋之间的中间品类,以德训鞋为代表,正在成为新增长空档,值得纳入设计方向。

3.奥康运动皮鞋迭代三年销量平平,说明只改名称和外观、不重定义场景,生产出来也难有市场。

总2:商业机会和模式借鉴。

1.PANE德训鞋高溢价排队,说明工厂可以为这类新锐品牌提供柔性制造和快速反应能力。

2.安踏为FILA重建供应链、改直营,显示品牌成功需要生产系统和零售体系协同,工厂可提升与品牌共创的能力。

3.代理订单风险高,彪马战略重置一度让奥康其他品牌毛利率仅8.37%,工厂应避免依赖单一品牌或单一客户。

总3:转型启示。

1.奥康从制造起家,靠渠道和广告做大,但转型时仍沿用皮鞋时代能力,说明工厂转型更需积累品牌运营和消费者认知。

2.消费模式正从制造到渠道、从渠道到品牌,再走向对需求与审美的定义,工厂可据此重新定位自己在价值链中的角色。

总1:行业趋势。

1.鞋履消费从制造和渠道驱动,转向品牌和审美驱动,最终落脚于对消费者需求和审美的定义。

2.传统皮鞋和运动鞋之间出现中间地带,强调舒服、好看、有设计感,德训鞋是代表,服务商可围绕此类新品类提供品牌与营销服务。

3.多品牌赋能模式成为大型鞋企方向,安踏对FILA独立运营、集团只做支持,带来组织和管理服务需求。

总2:客户痛点。

1.奥康连续亏损、门店继续下降,核心痛点是只会开店、铺货和卖货,没有形成真正的品牌运营能力。

2.代理国际品牌无法沉淀品牌资产,斯凯奇和彪马渠道清零,客户需要建立产品研发、品牌定位和消费者数据能力。

3.老品牌想年轻化,但运动皮鞋表现差,说明产品定义与消费心理错位,是服务商可切入的深层痛点。

总3:解决方案。

1.借鉴安踏FILA经验,帮客户重新定位,保持独立团队,重建供应链和零售体验,集团层面做赋能而非干预。

2.帮助传统鞋企从卖身份转向卖自我表达,避免低价内耗,因为奥康159元两双无人问,PANE 800元排队。

3.新品牌PANE获黑蚁资本投资,服务商可为新锐鞋履品牌提供从品牌故事、产品定义到渠道运营的全链路服务。

总1:平台的机会在中间品类。

1.运动鞋太运动、皮鞋太正式、大Logo易撞款、奢侈品太贵,舒适好看有设计感的鞋款正成为新风口,平台可重点扶持。

2.PANE高价德训鞋排队限流并成为热点,可作为平台内容运营和商家招商的案例,吸引同类新品牌入驻。

总2:平台内品牌经营问题。

1.奥康运动皮鞋在主流电商平台旗舰店最高销量仅1000多件,说明老品牌即使投明星、迭代产品,若不懂内容表达和用户沟通,仍难转化。

2.传统皮鞋品类需求萎缩,奥康已连续关店近800家,平台应及时调整鞋类运营重心,从卖品类转向卖生活方式。

总3:风险规避和运营建议。

1.代理品牌商家的稳定性差,奥康代理斯凯奇和彪马先后清零,平台需关注商家的货源和授权风险,避免出现大量店铺瞬间断供。

2.安踏成为彪马第一大股东后可能重塑批发和DTC渠道,平台可留意品牌直营和分销结构变化,提前适配招商和管理规则。

3.星期六转向轻资产、哈森仍亏损,平台可根据品牌健康状况分配流量资源,减少对衰退品牌的过度扶持。

总1:产业新动向。

1.鞋履消费从身份匹配转向自我表达,舒适、审美、个性和松弛感主导购买。

2.消费模式沿制造、渠道、品牌、定义需求与审美递进,竞争重心转向消费者心智。

3.传统皮鞋和运动鞋之间出现空档,PANE激活德训鞋,展示新消费品牌高溢价路径。

总2:商业模式比较。

1.代理模式无法沉淀品牌资产,奥康十年代理斯凯奇和彪马门店归零。

2.安踏多品牌赋能模式经FILA验证,核心是独立运营、重新定位和集团支持,FILA年营收284.7亿元。

3.奥康买断万利威德后养不起来,与FILA对照,说明品牌整合能力比资金更重要。

总3:新问题与启示。

1.奥康累计亏损超9亿、家族累计套现超20亿,反映传统鞋企衰退与减持并存的公司治理问题。

2.一个月终止收购存储芯片,显示跨界需审视能力边界,避免动作变形。

3.PANE获黑蚁资本投资,新品牌可快速崛起,但同质化和可持续性待观察。

4.政策层面可关注品牌升级、代理经销关系规范、知识产权保护,为转型提供制度支撑。

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Quick Summary

Summary 1: The footwear consumption trend has shifted. People are no longer paying for formal appearances but instead value comfort, aesthetics, individuality, and a sense of ease.

1. How men wear shoes is seen as a bellwether. Lei Jun wears On and Salomon, while Jensen Huang wears Hermès casual sports shoes, showing that relaxed styles are on the rise.

2. The old rule that leather shoes are required for work and client meetings is loosening; shoes are now a means of self-expression.

Summary 2: Aokang's failure offers ordinary consumers a lesson: brands built on channels and advertising will be abandoned if they do not refresh their products and positioning.

1. Acting as an agent for Skechers and Puma only means selling others' goods; the brand value does not accrue to itself, and when cooperation ends, everything returns to zero.

2. Four consecutive years of losses totaling over 900 million yuan and nearly 800 store closures show that companies failing to keep up with consumption changes have no moat.

Summary 3: Ordinary consumers can target the mid-market gap when choosing shoes.

1. Sport shoes are too athletic, traditional leather shoes too formal, big-logo shoes easily duplicated, and luxury shoes too expensive, so comfortable, good-looking, and well-designed shoes are gaining popularity.

2. PANE's German training shoes, priced at 800-1,000 yuan, still require queuing and capacity controls, proving that price is not the issue; the feeling of being understood is the reason to buy.

3. The most resonant statement: These shoes look like who I am now.

Summary 1: Consumption trends and user behavior have changed.

1. Footwear is shifting from matching identity to expressing self; the phrase "these shoes look like who I am now" is more persuasive.

2. Comfort, aesthetics, individuality, and a sense of ease are the new purchase drivers, creating a gap between traditional leather shoes and pure athletic shoes.

3. Anta repositioned FILA to target urban consumers aged 25-45 and rebuilt its high-end sport-fashion identity, serving as a reference for this trend.

Summary 2: The core of brand channel building is accumulating assets.

1. The agency model has an obvious ceiling: Aokang's decade-long Skechers agency ended with zero stores, and Puma was reduced to only single digits, leaving brand equity, product R&D, and data outside its control.

2. Brands cannot rely only on store openings and product placement; they must build independent supply chains, product planning, brand positioning, and retail experiences.

3. Anta operates FILA with an independent team while the group only provides support, and FILA's annual revenue reached 28.47 billion yuan.

Summary 3: Pricing and product development should follow the new consumption logic.

1. Aokang's 159-yuan-two-pairs offer goes unnoticed, while PANE's 800-1,000 yuan shoes attract queues, showing that design sense and brand definition drive premium pricing.

2. Aokang's sports leather shoes sold at most only about 1,000 units on e-commerce, indicating that merely modifying leather shoes does not reflect an understanding of the new logic.

3. German training shoes have existed for decades, yet PANE activated them; the key lies in understanding what consumers really want.

Summary 1: Changing consumption demand creates clear growth opportunities.

1. Sport shoes are too athletic, leather shoes too formal, big-logo shoes collide, and luxury goods are too expensive, so the middle ground of comfortable, design-driven footwear is a new market.

2. PANE sells German training shoes at 800-1,000 yuan a pair, with queues and capacity controls in Shanghai, turning them into a local specialty, and has secured investment from Hei Ant Capital, proving that new brands can grow without relying on low prices.

Summary 2: Agency partnerships require heightened risk awareness.

1. Aokang's Skechers agency went from 160 stores to zero after a decade; Puma also shrank to just single digits, reminding sellers that agency operations cannot cement owned assets.

2. Puma's strategic reset, which sharply cut wholesale channels, recovered inventory, and reduced discounts, directly caused Aokang's other-brand gross margin to fall to only 8.37%, showing that a brand's strategy shift can hit downstream players instantly.

3. Aokang's continuous losses and nearly 800 store closures mean the risks of traditional channel-based shoe companies are still unfolding; sellers should avoid betting on a single brand or category.

Summary 3: Takeaways and countermeasures.

1. Anta repositioned FILA after acquisition, operated it independently, and rebuilt the supply chain; it took five years to turn profitable, serving as a reference for heavy-asset brand operations.

2. Anta has just become Puma's largest shareholder; sellers can watch for new opportunities from Puma's channel integration and product adjustment, while noting how the group's principle of support without micromanaging operations will play out.

3. Saturday shifted to brand licensing and supply-chain services as a light-asset model, showing that traditional shoe companies can explore transformation paths, but Hansen's continued losses also signal that transition is difficult.

Summary 1: Product design and production demand have clearly shifted.

1. Consumers now choose shoes based on comfort, aesthetics, individuality, and ease rather than identity-driven status, so factories cannot keep developing products under old formal and functional requirements.

2. The mid-category between athletic shoes and leather shoes, represented by German training shoes, is becoming a new growth gap and deserves inclusion in design directions.

3. Aokang's sports leather shoes showed flat sales after three years of iteration, indicating that changing only the name and appearance without redefining the usage scenario leaves even manufactured products without a market.

Summary 2: Business opportunities and model references.

1. PANE's high-premium German training shoes attract queues, meaning factories can provide flexible manufacturing and rapid-response capabilities for such emerging brands.

2. Anta rebuilt the supply chain and switched FILA to direct operations, showing that brand success requires coordination between production systems and retail systems, so factories should enhance their ability to co-create with brands.

3. Agency orders carry high risk; Puma's strategic reset once dragged Aokang's other-brand gross margin to just 8.37%, so factories should avoid relying on a single brand or single customer.

Summary 3: Transformation insights.

1. Aokang started in manufacturing, grew through channels and advertising, yet relied on leather-shoe-era capabilities during transformation, showing that factories need to build brand operations and consumer insight capabilities.

2. The consumption model is moving from manufacturing to channels, from channels to brands, and then to defining demand and aesthetics; factories can accordingly reposition their role in the value chain.

Summary 1: Industry trends.

1. Footwear consumption is shifting from manufacturing- and channel-driven to brand- and aesthetics-driven, ultimately landing on defining consumer demand and aesthetics.

2. A middle ground between traditional leather shoes and athletic shoes has emerged, emphasizing comfort, appearance, and design; German training shoes are a representative example, and service providers can offer branding and marketing services around such new categories.

3. The multi-brand empowerment model is becoming a direction for large shoe companies. Anta runs FILA independently with group-level support only, creating demand for organizational and management services.

Summary 2: Client pain points.

1. Aokang's continuous losses and store decline stem from a core pain point: it only knows how to open stores, distribute goods, and sell, without building true brand operation capabilities.

2. Acting as an agent for international brands cannot accumulate brand assets; Skechers and Puma channels went to zero, so clients need to build product R&D, brand positioning, and consumer data capabilities.

3. Old brands want to become younger, yet their sports leather shoes perform poorly, showing a mismatch between product definition and consumer psychology—a deep pain point service providers can address.

Summary 3: Solutions.

1. Draw on Anta's FILA experience: help clients reposition, maintain an independent team, rebuild the supply chain and retail experience, and empower rather than intervene at the group level.

2. Help traditional shoe companies shift from selling identity to selling self-expression, avoiding low-price internal attrition, because Aokang's 159-yuan two-pair offer is ignored while PANE's 800-yuan shoes have queues.

3. PANE, a new brand, secured investment from Hei Ant Capital, so service providers can offer end-to-end services for emerging footwear brands covering brand story, product definition, and channel operations.

Summary 1: The platform opportunity lies in the mid-category.

1. Sport shoes are too athletic, leather shoes too formal, big-logo shoes can clash, and luxury goods are too expensive; comfortable, good-looking, and design-driven shoes are becoming a new trend, which platforms can support as a priority.

2. PANE's high-priced German training shoes, with queues and capacity controls, have become a hot topic and can serve as an example for content operations and merchant recruitment to attract similar new brands.

Summary 2: Brand management issues on platforms.

1. Aokang's sports leather shoes achieved at most just over 1,000 units in flagship-store sales on major e-commerce platforms, showing that even with celebrity endorsements and product iterations, old brands still fail to convert if they do not understand content expression and user communication.

2. Traditional leather shoe demand is shrinking; Aokang has closed nearly 800 stores. Platforms should adjust their footwear operation focus from selling categories to selling lifestyles.

Summary 3: Risk mitigation and operational suggestions.

1. Agency-based merchants are unstable: Aokang's Skechers and Puma agencies ended with near-zero stores. Platforms should monitor merchants' sourcing and authorization risks to avoid sudden supply shortages across many stores.

2. After Anta becomes Puma's largest shareholder, it may reshape wholesale and DTC channels, so platforms should watch changes in brand direct-operation and distribution structures and adapt recruitment and management rules in advance.

3. Saturday has shifted to a light-asset model while Hansen still suffers losses; platforms can allocate traffic based on brand health and reduce excessive support for declining brands.

Summary 1: New industrial dynamics.

1. Footwear consumption is shifting from identity matching to self-expression; comfort, aesthetics, individuality, and a sense of ease now dominate purchases.

2. The consumption model evolves along manufacturing, channels, brands, and defining demand and aesthetics, with the competitive focus moving toward consumer mindsets.

3. A gap has emerged between traditional leather shoes and athletic shoes; PANE's activation of German training shoes demonstrates a high-premium path for new consumer brands.

Summary 2: Business model comparison.

1. The agency model cannot accumulate brand assets; Aokang's decade-long agency for Skechers and Puma ended with store counts falling to zero.

2. Anta's multi-brand empowerment model, validated by FILA, relies on independent operations, repositioning, and group support, with FILA generating annual revenue of 28.47 billion yuan.

3. Aokang acquired the license for Vivaldi but failed to nurture it, contrasting with FILA and showing that brand integration capability matters more than capital.

Summary 3: New issues and implications.

1. Aokang has accumulated losses exceeding 900 million yuan while its founding family has cashed out over 2 billion yuan, reflecting a governance problem in traditional shoe companies where decline coexists with insider selling.

2. The abandonment of a memory-chip acquisition within a month shows that cross-industry moves require assessing capability boundaries to avoid distorted execution.

3. PANE has received investment from Hei Ant Capital, allowing new brands to rise quickly, but homogenization and sustainability remain to be seen.

4. On the policy front, attention can be paid to brand upgrading, regulation of agency-distribution relationships, and intellectual property protection to provide institutional support for transformation.

Disclaimer: The "Quick Summary" content is entirely generated by AI. Please exercise discretion when interpreting the information. For issues or corrections, please email run@ebrun.com .

I am a Brand Seller Factory Service Provider Marketplace Seller Researcher Read it again.

159元两双没人进店,880元一双老外排队,中国鞋市变天了。

消费风向的变化,有时先从男人的鞋上看出来。雷军多次穿着昂跑(On)和萨洛蒙出现在公众视野,黄仁勋在中国行时被拍到,脚上穿的是爱马仕Game休闲运动鞋。

过去,一双皮鞋意味着上班、见客户、参加正式场合,穿得体面是社会规则;今天,舒适、审美、个性和松弛感,正在成为新的购买理由。鞋不再只是为了匹配身份,也开始用来表达自己。

这对曾经的温州“皮鞋大王”奥康来说,不是一个轻松的变化。

据公司披露的业绩,2026年上半年,奥康在连续四年全年亏损之后,首次实现半年度归母净利润转正:营收7.69亿元,同比下降28.88%;归母净利润1757万元,扣非后仍亏损661万元。账面转正了,主营生意却还没有真正走出困境。过去四年,公司累计亏损超过9亿元。

另一边,安踏2026年上半年营收达到435.1亿元,同比增长12.9%。更具戏剧性的是,安踏刚刚花费15.055亿欧元(折合人民币122.78亿元)完成对彪马(PUMA)母公司PUMA SE 29.06%股权的收购,成为这家德国运动品牌的第一大股东。

丁世忠在接受第一财经访谈时表示,安踏看中的是PUMA的品牌价值、产品资产和全球价值链。彪马在巅峰时期的销量仅次于耐克和阿迪达斯,曾被称为全球第三大运动品牌。但如今,这个位置已被安踏取代。

而奥康,曾经代理过PUMA近十年。

2017年,奥康也曾手握斯凯奇和PUMA两张牌,试图从传统皮鞋跨进运动鞋市场。到了2025年年末,斯凯奇代理门店归零,PUMA只剩下个位数门店,奥康自己的渠道也在持续收缩,2025年,奥康关闭门店767家,净减少399家,到2026年上半年又关店150家,国内门店降至1757家。

同样是鞋的生意,一家企业开始买下全球品牌,另一家却连曾经代理的品牌都留不住。

奥康究竟错过了什么?

“联姻”斯凯奇、彪马,运动转型梦碎

1988年,王振滔在温州创办奥康。那是中国制造业品牌崛起的年代,消费者从“有没有鞋穿”,开始进入“穿什么牌子”的阶段。

奥康靠制造、渠道和广告一路做大,“穿奥康,走四方”成为那个时代最有知名度的国产鞋广告之一,2012年奥康登陆上交所。

成功的路径往往会被延续,但也容易成为桎梏。当运动鞋消费风潮崛起时,奥康的转型思路是找一个已经成功的品牌,再把它放进自己的渠道。

2015年,奥康与斯凯奇签署战略合作协议,取得部分区域的拓展经营权。当时王振滔把这称为奥康布局鞋业市场的“一个全新开始”,公司还组建了专门团队负责市场营销、品牌推广、客户维护和渠道拓展。

但合作过去三年,奥康实际只开出了145家斯凯奇门店,距离1000家的目标不到五分之一。到了2019年,奥康自己推出“N系列”运动鞋,在外界看来,其中部分产品在设计上带有当时斯凯奇爆款老爹鞋的影子。

王振滔在当时说的是:“奥康不会涉足斯凯奇的生产,我们要做的是品牌运营。”

今天回头看,奥康当时做的“品牌运营”,更多仍然是渠道意义上的运营——开店、推广、维护消费者、拓展市场。真正决定一个品牌“是谁”的产品企划、品牌定位和消费者心智,并不在奥康手里。

这也是代理模式天然的天花板。代理商可以把一个品牌卖得很好,却很难把品牌价值沉淀成自己的资产。今天卖斯凯奇,明天也可以卖PUMA;合作结束,门店和货架还在,但品牌心智、产品研发、消费者数据乃至品牌故事,并没有沉淀为奥康自己的品牌资产。

2021年,奥康运营的斯凯奇门店达到阶段性高点160家;到2024年缩至125家,到了2025年,奥康代理的斯凯奇收入同比“腰斩”至约1.14亿元,线下门店全部关闭,双方10年合作宣告终止。

类似的剧本也发生在彪马身上。2025年下半年,彪马启动了“战略重置计划”,核心动作包括削减批发渠道不良业务、从分销商处回收大量库存、减少DTC(直面消费者渠道)折扣以及裁员。这套改革对奥康的冲击是直接的。奥康2025年财报显示,彪马所属的“其他品牌”业务毛利率仅为8.37%。

值得注意的是,奥康曾在2010年收购意大利皮鞋品牌VALLEVERDE万利威德。这个品牌以“呼吸鞋”技术闻名,球王贝利曾为其代言,巅峰期全球2300家店、年销1.2亿欧元。2008年,奥康与万利威德签署全球战略合作协议,2010年索性买断其在中国市场的商标以及专利等相关权益。王振滔放话投5-6亿、进300家高端商场、代理期间年销从7000万冲到1.8亿。

但2012年后,万利威德从年报中消失,不再单独披露收入和门店。巅峰时期万利威德曾进入全国200多个高端商场,但如今早已鲜有身影。

在2026年半年报中,奥康已将品牌分类精简为“以奥康、康龙为主的双品牌战略”,奥康倾力打造的运动品牌代理“第二曲线”宣告梦碎。

买下容易,养起来难

万利威德是奥康唯一真正“买下来”的品牌,也是它最接近安踏式实验的一次。

它和FILA的时间线几乎重叠。安踏2009年接手FILA,奥康2010年买断万利威德。安踏为FILA建供应链、改直营、花五年等到扭亏,去年做到284亿元年营收;奥康建了团队、进了商场,然后停下了。

买下来容易,养起来难,向来是品牌生意的底色。

2009年,安踏收购FILA中国业务时,FILA当时并不是一台现成的“印钞机”,中国业务此前连续亏损,门店规模也只有几十家。

安踏没有简单地把FILA塞进自己的渠道。2011年,FILA中国重新确立“高端运动时尚”定位,瞄准25—45岁的城市消费者,同时保持相对独立的团队和运营体系。后来安踏内部对这段经验的总结是:不是把FILA做成第二个安踏,而是让FILA成为FILA。

在最近的采访中,丁世忠把安踏定义为“一家多品牌赋能型的企业”,多品牌的价值不是为了拥有品牌的LOGO,集团的作用是激活和唤醒,充分释放优秀品牌的价值和潜力。集团与品牌的权责边界清晰,只做支持和保障工作,绝不插手品牌具体的运营。

再来看奥康的操作,拿到斯凯奇后,用的还是皮鞋时代那套能力,开店、铺货、卖货。没有为斯凯奇重建供应链、重新定义品牌定位,也没有建立独立的零售体验体系。

2017年,王振滔曾在接受懒熊体育采访时说:“以后生意只会越来越差,单一品牌都在下降,如果没有新的品牌增加,下降趋势会很厉害。”这时,王振滔无疑意识到了市场的寒意,但仅仅线性地把品牌当成可以叠加的业务线,而非需要独立运营的资产,很难让增加的品牌与原有集团共同成长。

在最初几年,奥康确实把一个国际运动品牌的中国渠道做出了规模,也给自己贡献了真实的收入增量。但这些增长最终没有变成奥康自己的能力以及对于市场和消费者的理解。十年后,奥康代理的斯凯奇门店已清零,彪马门店也仅剩7家。

但FILA却成为了安踏集团的另一块支柱。2025年FILA营收284.7亿元,占集团收入35.5%,已经成为和安踏主品牌并肩的第二增长曲线。

安踏后来可以把这套经验继续用于DESCENTE(迪桑特)、KOLON SPORT(可隆)等品牌。这一套实战经验会在PUMA身上重新验证。

无法从走过的路中获得沉淀和经验、形成核心能力的结果便是动作变形。2024年,奥康曾尝试收购存储芯片企业联和存储,一个月后终止。

皮鞋卖不动了,但鞋王的钱包从来不愁。2026年9月,王振滔父子拟协议转让12%股份,交易金额约3.93亿元。按公开报道统计,上市以来王振滔家族通过减持等方式累计套现超过20亿元,高于奥康同期约18.6亿元的归母净利润总和。

PANE或许提供了另一种答案

在这股消费转型的浪潮中,“考砸”的不止奥康。

同一代成长起来的鞋企,路径也大同小异。星期六已经在逐步退出鞋类销售,计划出售鞋类业务和资产,转向品牌授权、品牌管理和供应链服务的轻资产模式。哈森长期坚持“自有品牌+代理品牌”,现在仍代理西班牙品牌PIKOLINOS等,2025年归母净利润仍亏损5036万元。

事实上,那些靠渠道红利吃胖的规模型选手,进入一个审美多元、需求跳跃的供给溢出时代,都会水土不服。

聚光灯下的德训鞋品牌PANE或许给出了另一个时代的新答案。

杭州城市中心奥莱门口的奥康活动点位,打出159元两双仍然门可罗雀,但PANE上海门店,800-1000一双的德训鞋并不便宜,门口却排起了长队,甚至需要限流,队伍里一半还是外国人,硬生生把一双鞋买成了“上海土特产”。

最近,有媒体披露,这个2022年才成立的鞋履品牌还获得了黑蚁资本的投资,后者投出过泡泡玛特和袁记云饺。

值得注意的是,德训鞋并不是一个新事物,甚至存在了数十年,阿迪达斯、PUMA、Maison Margiela都做过。PANE的爆火,或许就是奥康们缺的那部分东西——对今天消费者想要穿什么的理解。

PANE占住的是一块空地。运动鞋太运动,传统皮鞋太正式,大Logo太容易撞款,奢侈品牌又太贵,于是中间出现了一块空地:舒服、好看、有设计感,但又不用把“我很会穿”写在脸上。

这背后也刻画出一条鞋履消费模式的迁移路径:从制造到渠道,从渠道到品牌,再从品牌走向对消费者需求和审美的定义。

事实上,奥康也曾推出过行业首创的“运动皮鞋”,找来陈伟霆、章若楠等明星站台,还连续迭代三年,试图重塑品牌形象。但奥康运动皮鞋的表现平平,在主流电商平台旗舰店销量最高的一款也只卖了1000多件,主力还是靠婚鞋在支撑。

当消费者对鞋的定义已经改变,奥康仍停留在对“皮鞋”的改造中,在市场中越来越被动。奥康虽然看到了运动鞋的趋势,或许并没有看懂背后那套新的消费逻辑。消费者显然不需要在皮鞋和运动鞋中做选择。

过去,品牌们卖的是“这双鞋适合我现在的身份”。现在,“这双鞋很像现在的我”才是一个更打动人的理由。

注:文/章航英,文章来源:天下网商(公众号ID:txws_txws),本文为作者独立观点,不代表亿邦动力立场。

文章来源:天下网商

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FAQ回顾

奥康为什么转型运动鞋市场失败?

奥康转型失败主要因为沿用皮鞋时代的渠道运营思维。它虽然代理了斯凯奇和彪马,但没有重建供应链、重新定义品牌定位,也没有建立独立零售体验,品牌价值始终沉淀在品牌方手里。十年合作结束后,斯凯奇门店清零,彪马门店仅剩7家,运动转型未能成为第二增长曲线。

安踏收购彪马股权后对运动鞋行业有什么影响?

安踏以15.055亿欧元收购彪马母公司PUMA SE 29.06%股权,成为第一大股东,有望把FILA多品牌运营经验复制到彪马。这一收购将提升中国运动品牌在全球市场的价值链参与度,同时改变全球运动品牌竞争格局。

传统鞋企转型面临哪些问题?

传统鞋企普遍面临路径依赖问题:把新品牌当业务线叠加,而非独立运营的资产。奥康、星期六、哈森等企业都因此陷入困境。它们缺乏对消费者新需求的理解、产品企划和品牌心智建设能力,在审美多元的供给溢出时代出现水土不服。

PANE德训鞋为什么在上海爆火?

PANE成立于2022年,定位在运动鞋和传统皮鞋之间的空白地带:舒适、好看、有设计感。其上海门店800-1000元的德训鞋吸引大量消费者排队购买,甚至需要限流,并获得黑蚁资本投资。它的爆火反映出当下鞋履消费正从身份匹配转向自我表达。

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