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净利润暴跌38% 蔡衍明罕见自揭家丑:旺旺的好日子到头了?

付艳翠 2026-10-12 10:44
付艳翠 2026/10/12 10:44

邦小白快读

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总1:旺旺净利润暴跌38%的核心原因有三个:渠道内耗、管理僵化、产品老化。

1.渠道内耗:零食量贩店的零售价比传统批发渠道出厂价还便宜,量贩渠道收益占比快速升至约15%,但传统批发和现代渠道连续第二年下滑,部分经销商业绩腰斩,县级市场已经招不到经销商。

2.管理问题:一线员工工资一路走低,罚款、记小过、扣工资频繁,一天打卡近20次;产品停产往往只凭高层一句话,年营收数千万元的产品也会突然停产,经销商投入全部落空。

3.产品老化:旺旺的爆款多诞生于1983至1996年,三十多年没有新爆款;低糖低脂高钙的听劝版旺仔牛奶上市后官方旗舰店销量不足百件。

总2:普通消费者可以得到的实操提示:

1.买旺旺产品可多比价,零食量贩店通常比周边超市便宜,例如旺仔小馒头量贩店卖9.5元,超市卖10.5元。

2.健康消费趋势下,旺旺已推出低糖低脂高钙版本,但新品销量还不高,是否适合自己要看配料表和口味偏好。

总1:品牌渠道建设和价格竞争的最大教训是:全渠道扩张不能以牺牲原有渠道价格体系为代价。

1.旺旺把旺仔牛奶、仙贝等大单品铺进零食量贩店,量贩渠道收益占比快速升至15%,但传统商超只剩下雪饼、仙贝等少数单品,终端竞争力衰退。

2.量贩店零售价比传统批发渠道出厂价更便宜,旺仔小馒头售价9.5元,周边超市售10.5元,形成长期价格倒挂;为抢量贩渠道,旺旺推出低客单价产品并加大渠道让利,直接拉低整体毛利率。

3.传统批发和现代渠道连续第二年下滑,经销商业绩腰斩,县域市场招不到经销商,品牌渠道根基正在松动。

总2:产品研发和用户行为观察值得品牌商警惕。

1.健康化是明确消费趋势,但低糖低脂高钙的听劝版旺仔牛奶销量不足百件,说明简单改配方不等于新爆款;旺旺曾推出咖啡、无糖茶、电解质水等大量新品,仍缺现象级产品。

2.部分90后消费者觉得旺仔牛奶太甜,已不给孩子购买;年轻消费者被量贩店低价吸引,老经销商因产品突然停产而对新品失去信任。即便加大抖音、小红书和年轻化营销,也未能扭转品牌老化认知。

总1:渠道迁移带来的风险与机会。

1.增长市场:零食量贩渠道几乎覆盖旺旺全系大单品,收益占比升至15%;旺旺专门推出低客单价产品、加大渠道让利,这是可见的增量合作方式。

2.风险提示:量贩店零售价比传统批发出厂价还便宜,传统批发和现代渠道连续第二年下滑,部分经销商业绩腰斩,县城招不到经销商。

3.量贩渠道增长但低价会压缩毛利,经销商持续承压。

总2:消费需求变化和应对思路。

1.健康消费是主旋律,低糖低脂高钙有需求,但听劝版旺仔牛奶销量不足百件,说明不能只靠健康标签。

2.新品推广要评估厂家政策稳定性,避免投入进场费、条码费后产品突然停产。

3.一线员工低薪、罚款重,终端动销弱化,卖家应建立自己的选品和渠道组合,不能只依赖品牌老品。

总1:产品生产和设计需求正在变化,工厂可从中看到机会。

1.低糖、低脂、高钙等健康化方向有需求,但简单改配方并不能保证销量;工厂开发新品时要研究消费场景和消费者认知,而不是只追概念。

2.零食量贩渠道快速放量,需要高性价比、适合该渠道的产品,有机会但价格压力大;经典大单品仍被经销商和消费者认可,稳定大单品代工仍是基本盘。

总2:旺旺的库存和电商教训对工厂有两点启示。

1.年营收数千万元的产品可说停就停,经销商投入后大量库存报废,工厂接单要控制长周期备货,建立小批量、快速反应的生产机制,减少渠道依赖风险。

2.官方旗舰店的新品销量不足百件,说明线上不是上架就能起量;工厂借助电商需要内容营销、精准人群和渠道协同,而不是只挂链接。

总1:从旺旺案例可以看到行业趋势和客户痛点。

1.传统批发渠道持续收缩,零食量贩渠道收益占比快速升至15%但拉低毛利率;健康化新品需求上升却难成爆款,说明行业正处在渠道与产品双重重构期。

2.客户痛点包括新旧渠道价格倒挂、经销商业绩腰斩、基层员工低薪高罚款、打卡会议内耗严重、产品决策一言堂、新品研发与市场脱节,以及经销商投入后产品停产导致库存报废。

总2:服务商可切入的解决方案方向。

1.提供渠道价格与库存数字化监测工具,帮助品牌识别量贩渠道对传统渠道的冲击,避免价格体系继续崩坏。

2.协助品牌建立分渠道产品区隔和经销商投入保护机制,降低渠道内耗。

3.用终端和消费者数据驱动新品研发,减少拍脑袋决策;把销售激励从罚款控制转为动销考核,修复基层执行力和经销商信任。

总1:平台的价值和最新做法。

1.好想来等零食量贩门店几乎实现旺旺全系大单品全覆盖,以明显低价分流周边商超客流,例如旺仔小馒头卖9.5元,超市卖10.5元。

2.量贩渠道收益已占旺旺总收益约15%,成为大品牌不可忽视的增量渠道,平台可以用全品类覆盖和价格优势吸引品牌入驻。

总2:平台商在运营和风险规避上可以借鉴三点。

1.低价是核心竞争力,但不能把品牌传统渠道彻底压垮;平台可与供应商协商渠道专供SKU或专供价,而不是简单要求全网最低价。

2.要警惕品牌为让利平台而降低品质或减少服务,影响消费者复购。

3.招商时留意品牌的渠道政策、组织稳定性和新品策略,避免因品牌方一言堂决策导致断供或库存风险。

总1:旺旺案例揭示了快消品产业的新动向和新问题。

1.传统批发渠道连续第二年下滑,零食量贩渠道快速放量并占旺旺收益约15%,分销格局正从层层批发转向高性价比零售平台。

2.健康消费成为产品升级主线,但低糖低脂高钙新品销量惨淡,显示企业创新与真实需求之间仍存在错配;家族式一言堂决策、基层员工激励扭曲、增收不增利则是企业内部的新问题。

总2:从产业治理和商业模式研究角度看,有三点启示。

1.新兴零售平台的低价策略与传统渠道价格倒挂,可能冲击经销商体系,需要关注渠道公平和经销商权益保护。

2.企业优化成本时不能只让基层员工承担,权责不对等的整改会损害组织信任,这一问题值得政策研究者关注。

3.旺旺三十多年没有新爆款的案例说明,大型企业仅靠增加研发数量和营销动作难以完成创新转型,需要研究如何建立市场导向的决策机制和家族企业治理改革路径。

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Quick Summary

Overall, Want Want's net profit plunged 38% due to three root causes: channel conflict, rigid management, and an aging product portfolio.

1. Channel conflict: Snack discount stores undercut the factory prices offered through traditional wholesale channels. Revenue contribution from the discount-store channel quickly climbed to roughly 15%, yet traditional wholesale and modern retail channels declined for the second consecutive year. Some distributors saw their sales halve, and in county-level markets, Want Want can no longer recruit distributors.

2. Management issues: Frontline employees face shrinking pay, frequent fines, demerits, and wage deductions, with nearly 20 clock-ins per day. Product discontinuations often hinge on a single executive's remark; even products generating tens of millions of yuan in annual revenue can be abruptly discontinued, wiping out distributors' investments.

3. Product aging: Most of Want Want's blockbusters date from 1983 to 1996. For over three decades, no new hit product has emerged. After launching a low-sugar, low-fat, high-calcium "listener-responsive" version of Want Want Milk, official flagship store sales were fewer than 100 units.

Practical takeaways for ordinary consumers:

1. Compare prices when buying Want Want products. Snack discount stores are usually cheaper than nearby supermarkets. For example, Want Want Mini Steamed Buns cost 9.5 yuan at discount stores versus 10.5 yuan at supermarkets.

2. Given the health consumption trend, Want Want has introduced low-sugar, low-fat, high-calcium versions, but sales of these new products remain low. Whether they suit you depends on ingredient labels and taste preferences.

Overall, the key lesson from Want Want's channel building and price competition is that omni-channel expansion should never come at the expense of the existing price system.

1. Want Want placed volume-driving products like Want Want Milk and Rice Cracker into snack discount stores. The discount-channel revenue contribution quickly rose to about 15%, but traditional supermarkets now carry only a few items such as Rice Cracker and Senbei, weakening terminal competitiveness.

2. Discount-store retail prices are even lower than the ex-factory prices of traditional wholesale channels: Want Want Mini Steamed Buns sell for 9.5 yuan in discount stores versus 10.5 yuan in nearby supermarkets, creating persistent price inversion. To win over discount chains, Want Want introduced low-ticket products and increased channel rebates, directly dragging down overall gross margin.

3. Traditional wholesale and modern channels declined for a second straight year. Some distributors saw their sales halve, and county-level markets now struggle to attract distributors. The brand's channel foundation is visibly eroding.

Overall, two areas should alarm brand owners: product development and consumer behavior observation.

1. Health consciousness is a clear consumption trend, but the low-sugar, low-fat, high-calcium variant of Want Want Milk sold fewer than 100 units. Simply modifying a formula does not create a blockbuster. Want Want previously launched coffee, sugar-free tea, electrolyte water, and many other products, yet still lacks a phenomenon-level offering.

2. Some post-90s consumers feel Want Want Milk is too sweet and no longer buy it for their children. Younger consumers are drawn to discount-store low prices, while veteran distributors lost trust after sudden product discontinuations. Despite increased marketing on Douyin and Xiaohongshu and attempts to project a younger image, the brand's aging perception remains largely unchanged.

Overall, there are both risks and opportunities in channel migration.

1. Growth market: Snack discount stores now carry nearly all of Want Want's major products, with revenue contribution rising to 15%. Want Want has launched low-ticket items and increased channel incentives, presenting visible incremental partnership opportunities.

2. Risk warning: Discount-store retail prices are lower than traditional wholesale ex-factory prices. Traditional wholesale and modern channels declined for the second consecutive year, some distributors saw performance halve, and county-level markets cannot recruit distributors.

3. The discount channel is growing, but low prices compress margins and distributors remain under sustained pressure.

Overall, consumer demand shifts and adaptive strategies:

1. Health consumption is the dominant theme, and low-sugar, low-fat, high-calcium options have demand. However, the "listener-responsive" Want Want Milk sold fewer than 100 units, showing that a health label alone is insufficient.

2. When promoting new products, sellers should assess manufacturer policy stability to avoid paying entry fees and barcode fees only to see products abruptly discontinued.

3. Frontline employees suffer from low salaries and heavy fines, and terminal sell-through is weakening. Sellers should build their own product selection and channel mix rather than relying solely on established brands' legacy items.

Overall, product production and design requirements are changing, creating opportunities for factories.

1. There is demand for health-oriented attributes such as low sugar, low fat, and high calcium, but simply tweaking formulas does not guarantee sales. Factories developing new products should study consumption scenarios and consumer perceptions rather than just chasing concepts.

2. The snack discount store channel is scaling rapidly and requires high-cost-performance products tailored to that channel. Opportunities exist, but price pressure is intense. Classic blockbuster products remain recognized by both distributors and consumers, so stable OEM production of legacy items still forms the base business.

Overall, Want Want's inventory and e-commerce lessons offer two takeaways for factories.

1. Products generating tens of millions of yuan in annual revenue can be discontinued on a whim, leaving distributors with massive obsolete inventory after their investments. Factories should control long-cycle stocking, build small-batch, fast-response production mechanisms, and reduce channel dependency risk.

2. The official flagship store sold fewer than 100 units of a new product, showing that online listing alone does not generate volume. Factories entering e-commerce need content marketing, precise targeting, and channel coordination, not just product links.

Overall, the Want Want case reveals industry trends and client pain points.

1. Traditional wholesale channels continue to contract, while snack discount stores' revenue contribution quickly reached about 15% but compressed gross margins. Demand for health-oriented new products is rising, yet few become blockbusters, indicating the industry is undergoing simultaneous channel and product restructuring.

2. Client pain points include price inversion between new and old channels, distributors' halved performance, low frontline pay with heavy fines, inefficient meetings and check-ins, one-person decision-making, new product development disconnected from market needs, and distributors suffering inventory losses when products are discontinued.

Overall, service providers can address these areas with solution-oriented offerings.

1. Provide digital tools to monitor channel pricing and inventory, helping brands identify how discount chains impact traditional channels and prevent further deterioration of the price system.

2. Assist brands in establishing channel-specific product differentiation and distributor investment protection mechanisms to reduce channel friction.

3. Use terminal and consumer data to drive new product development, reducing arbitrary decisions. Shift sales incentives from punitive controls to sell-through-based assessments to restore frontline execution and distributor trust.

Overall, this is the platform's value and latest practice.

1. Snack discount chains like Haoxianglai have achieved near-complete coverage of Want Want's major products, using significantly lower prices to divert foot traffic from nearby supermarkets. For example, Want Want Mini Steamed Buns sell for 9.5 yuan at discount stores versus 10.5 yuan at supermarkets.

2. The discount channel now accounts for about 15% of Want Want's total revenue, making it an incremental channel that major brands cannot ignore. Platforms can attract brands through full-category coverage and price advantages.

Overall, platform operators can draw three lessons for operations and risk avoidance.

1. Low price is a core competitiveness, but it should not completely crush brands' traditional channels. Platforms could negotiate channel-exclusive SKUs or exclusive pricing with suppliers rather than simply demanding the lowest price across all channels.

2. Platforms should be wary of brands lowering product quality or reducing service to fund platform concessions, which would hurt repeat purchases.

3. When recruiting brands, pay attention to channel policies, organizational stability, and new product strategies, to avoid supply disruptions or inventory risk caused by one-person decision-making at the brand.

Overall, the Want Want case reveals new trends and problems in the FMCG industry.

1. Traditional wholesale channels declined for the second straight year, while snack discount stores scaled rapidly and accounted for about 15% of Want Want's revenue. The distribution landscape is shifting from multi-tiered wholesale to value-for-money retail platforms.

2. Health consumption has become the main line of product upgrades, yet the low-sugar, low-fat, high-calcium new product sold poorly, indicating a mismatch between corporate innovation and actual demand. Family-style one-person decision-making, distorted frontline incentives, and revenue growth without profit growth are emerging internal problems.

Overall, from the perspective of industrial governance and business model research, there are three implications.

1. The low-price strategies of emerging retail platforms and the price inversion with traditional channels may destabilize distributor systems, raising the need to address channel fairness and distributor rights protection.

2. When optimizing costs, companies should not let only frontline employees bear the burden. Rectification measures with imbalanced rights and responsibilities damage organizational trust, an issue worthy of policy researchers' attention.

3. The case of Want Want producing no new blockbusters for over 30 years shows that large enterprises cannot complete innovation transformation simply by increasing R&D volume or marketing activities. Research is needed on how to establish market-oriented decision-making mechanisms and reform paths for family business governance.

Disclaimer: The "Quick Summary" content is entirely generated by AI. Please exercise discretion when interpreting the information. For issues or corrections, please email run@ebrun.com .

I am a Brand Seller Factory Service Provider Marketplace Seller Researcher Read it again.

时间回到2024年底,旺旺推动组织变革,增加多个产品事业部,设立专门的单位针对新老产品提供营销方案、拓展更多渠道,曾经只在商超、小卖部、夫妻店里打转的旺仔牛奶、仙贝等一众国民大单品放下“身段”,大举铺进零食量贩店的货架。

“零食店的零售价比传统批发渠道的出厂价都便宜,直接把传统批发渠道拖入困境,雪上加霜。”曾在旺旺工作十余年的一线业务人员陈涛向「创业最前线」坦言。

陈涛透露,他负责的区域内,不少经销商业绩近乎腰斩,部分经销商的销售额甚至下滑三分之二;下沉市场危机更甚,多个县城区域已经招不到愿意合作的经销商。

事实上,旺旺赖以生存的传统批发渠道正在持续收缩。

旺旺最新发布盈利预警中,旺旺直言,占集团总收益超过一半的传统批发渠道受到终端销售节奏放慢的负面影响。经销商遭遇经营挑战,对部分主要产品造成压力,因此截至2026年6月30日止三个月,传统批发渠道收益较上一财年同期衰退双位数。

一边是量贩等新兴渠道放量增长,一边是基本盘传统渠道持续失血,新旧渠道价格倒挂引发的内耗,正在撕裂旺旺沿用数十年的经销体系。

更令人忧心的是,多位一线业务人员反映,公司内部管理僵化、决策近乎“一言堂”,基层员工待遇持续走低。

当渠道内耗与管理失控叠加,这个拥有三十余年历史的食品帝国,正站在转型与信任的双重悬崖边缘。

01 旺旺“患疾”

今年以来,在旺旺工作10余年的陈涛,每月到手平均工资从5000元腰斩近一半。

他看着工资条上越来越少的数字,再对照财报里持续下滑的利润,怎么都想不通——站在一线员工的视角,员工工资也降了,利润本该增长才对。

陈涛回忆,旺旺的一线员工工资一路走低,罚款、记小过、扣工资成了家常便饭,业务体系加班也从没有加班费。

以他所在的事业部为例,一天打卡接近20次——8:30、9:30、11:30、14:00、16:30、17:30各一次,两次例会、拜访经销商、每天至少10家终端拜访,全都要打卡,“忘打第一次扣当天工资,第二次记小过,一次小过扣6天工资。”

业绩考核更严苛:每月1号起不能挂零,一旦挂零就开会威胁记小过;客户不打款,小过单直接生效,主管每天打电话要求业务自己掏钱买货,再拿出去卖。

“以前还有绩效,平均能到5000元,现在罚款越来越离谱。”陈涛说。

不过,陈涛又不太意外。

旺旺在管理上至今仍带有鲜明的家族企业色彩。不仅创始人蔡衍明仍是唯一的话事人,他的四个儿子也在集团中各自身居要职,分割业务板块、把控经营大权。

陈涛所在的事业部由蔡衍明第四子蔡旺祖分管,据说内部员工私下称其为“王子”,他们一线市场人员则称他为“小老板”“四公子”。

在陈涛的描述中,他所在的事业部内勤几乎都围着四公子运转,产品上市或停产往往只凭一句话,“销管团队不太关心市场和产品本身,更像是围着内部权力转,一线业务向上反馈问题,得到的回复常常是‘四公子不同意’。”

实际上,基层待遇持续走低,旺旺整体营业费用(分销成本与行政费用合计)却在走高。

其中,2025财年旺旺分销成本同比增长16.9%至35.40亿元,行政费用同比增长11.4%至33.52亿元。旺旺在年报中解释,行政费用增长主要系集团优化内部组织、分设各产品事业部后相应岗位人员增加,导致人力成本上升。

成本和费用的双重影响之下,旺旺2025财年营收244.01亿元,同比增长3.8%;归母净利润38.37亿元,同比下滑11.5%,陷入增收不增利的局面。

进入2026财年第一季度(4-6月),危机进一步加剧。2026财年第一季度(4-6月)预警,旺旺收益同比下滑约6%,净利润更是暴跌约38%。

7月26日发布盈利预警后不久,一封出自董事长蔡衍明的内部公开信向外流传。

信中,蔡衍明罕见将业绩失速定性为“重大经营危机”,坦言公司“靠着几只拳头产品过了近30年的好日子,一直未能创新求变”,并明确表示“没有产出、没有功劳的,都会需要被淘汰”。

随后,整改细则快速落地,压力尽数传导至基层员工。

据悉,公司要求全员提交年度自评报告,复盘全年工作成果与不足,并限定8月21日前完成提交,唯独各级最高主管无需参与自查复盘。权责不对等的整改规则、向下施压的优化方式,引发内部员工普遍不满。

与此同时,多名旺旺离职员工集中在社交平台爆料,曝光企业内部等级森严、派系林立、职场需站队依附的家族化管理乱象,让这家国民品牌深陷舆论争议。

在社交平台上,有人质疑旺旺将经营压力转嫁给员工,甚至有消费者喊话抵制相关产品。

从短期来看,裁员优化、压降基层薪资福利、加大罚款力度,确实能够快速缩减人力成本、短暂修饰财报数据。但对于旺旺而言,裁员可以缓解短期成本压力,却很难解决长期经营问题。

02 渠道内耗

雪上加霜的是,新渠道扩张带来的连锁反噬,正在从价格体系蔓延至整个经销生态,并对旺旺赖以生存的传统经销商市场形成颠覆性冲击。

当旺仔牛奶、仙贝、雪饼等国民级经典大单品,放下数十年的品牌身段,涌入零食量贩赛道的“价格修罗场”,旺旺深耕多年的传统渠道主导地位被持续瓦解,新旧渠道的内耗裂痕彻底公开化。

「创业最前线」走访好想来门店与周边商超发现,零食量贩门店几乎已实现旺旺全系大单品全覆盖,旺仔牛奶、O泡果奶、旺旺雪饼、仙贝、旺仔小馒头、小小酥等核心爆款整齐陈列、品类齐全。

反观街边传统小商超,旺旺产品布局极度单薄,大多仅保留雪饼、仙贝两款基础单品,品类断层严重,终端竞争力肉眼可见的衰退。

从价格对比更为直观,好想来门店的售价明显低于周边超市。例如,某规格旺仔小馒头在好想来门店的售价为9.5元,而周边超市同规格产品售价为10.5元,差价达1元。

常态化的低价优势,让零食量贩门店牢牢锁住年轻消费群体,持续分流传统渠道客流,不断挤压传统经销商的生存空间,也悄悄动摇了旺旺传统经销体系的根基。

2025财年,公司的传统批发和现代渠道全年收入出现高个位数下滑,这已是该渠道自2024财年起连续第二年下滑。

为抢占零食量贩新赛道,旺旺不惜颠覆原有成熟价格体系,专门针对量贩渠道推出低客单价产品、加大渠道让利力度。

虽然零食量贩渠道的收益占比已快速提升至15%,成为重要的增长点,却直接拉低了集团整体毛利率。

旺旺2025财年财报同时指出,集团2025财年分销成本(即销售费用,涵盖广告投放、品牌联名、终端促销、渠道让利等所有市场支出)大幅上涨,成为利润缩水的核心诱因之一。

但在多位一线员工看来,比渠道内耗、利润下滑更可怕的,是家族式一言堂管理引发的资源空耗。

在一线老员工王岩的亲历视角中,事业部的产品生死、市场布局,完全脱离终端实际,仅凭高层个人意愿随意决策。

“之前我们有一款产品,一年可创造数千万元营收,经销商们也准备着线下铺货,且已经投入了门店进场费、条码入驻费、终端试吃推广费等。但后来该产品却突然停产,一线业务和经销商的努力全部付诸东流,大量库存产品过期报废、只能直接销毁。”王岩透露。

对此,他收到的消息只是简单的一句“小老板觉得不赚钱”,这也让不少经销商对旺旺的新品策略产生不信任。

不仅如此,事业部推出新品,都需要业务部门配合向经销商和终端铺货。有员工明显感觉到,销售对于推新品的积极性并不高。

“我们月薪到手只有两千多,根本没人愿意拼命推新品。”陈涛坦言,当下一线业务的工作重心早已不是拓市场、做动销、服务经销商,而是机械打卡、应付会议、规避罚款。

“频繁的打卡管控、无意义的内部会议、随时到来的扣分扣款、无端施压的业绩考核,让基层员工身心俱疲。对月薪两千多的一线人员而言,做好日常打卡、少挨骂、不被扣薪,已是最大诉求。”陈涛表示。

陈涛在接触经销商时也发现,老牌经销商的心态也在转变。从主动拓品、全力铺货、深耕市场,变成“佛系经营、量力而为”,“能卖多少就卖多少。”

当渠道失活、团队失力、人心失守,旺旺昔日稳固的食品帝国渠道根基正日渐松动。

03 系统性困境

“维持现状就是落伍,不进步就代表已经退步。”在2025财年致股东信中,旺旺行政总裁蔡衍明写下这句话,并强调2026年既要有“士气”,也要有“底气”。

最新的变化首先来自产品。

对于无数90后、00后而言,旺旺是刻在童年里的时代记忆。

但细数旺旺的明星产品,多是三十多年前的杰作:旺旺仙贝诞生于1983年、旺旺雪饼诞生于1984年、旺仔小馒头诞生于1994年、连最热门的旺仔牛奶也诞生于1996年。

三十年没有爆款新单品出现的旺旺,一直被外界诟病产品老化。

“小时候我会觉得我妈给我买旺仔牛奶就是爱我。”90后露露向「创业最前线」直言,以前能吃大礼包都是被羡慕的崽,但现在她却从不给孩子购买旺旺,“我儿子我都不给他喝,太甜、太齁了。”

消费端的口味变迁,旺旺并非毫无察觉。为适配健康化消费趋势,8月19日,中国旺旺首席营运官蔡旺家在微博宣布,“听劝版”旺仔牛奶即将上市,“不止低糖、低脂,还高钙!”

官宣许久,这款新品终于在近期登陆旺旺官方旗舰店上架销售。但「创业最前线」查询京东旺旺官方旗舰店页面看到,这款全新推出的旺仔牛奶,销量还不到百件。

实际上,旺旺并非没有尝试过创新。

公开资料显示,2017年,旺旺一度推出了50多个新产品,覆盖了咖啡、果汁、米酒、能量饮料等大类,甚至还包含芥末味奶糖等口味奇特的产品。

2019年,旺旺又加大产品创新研发力度,研发团队超过150人,每年产生的新品超过100个,是十年前的三倍以上。此后几年,从低GI零食、无糖茶,到黑咖啡、电解质水,市场上流行过的低糖、健康化方向,旺旺几乎都有相应产品上线。

不过,尽管推出了百余种新品,甚至将旺仔牛奶做得没那么甜,多推出几个健康新品,进入更多零食量贩店,加大抖音、小红书和年轻化营销,但旺旺依旧缺乏现象级新品。

陈涛透露,旺旺的新品常常变成“员工福利”,“每年大概发三次福利,五一、中秋节、过年,分公司把各事业部堆在仓库的临期产品汇总,每个事业部都出一点,每人一百块钱左右发下去。”

相比之下,旺仔牛奶、雪饼、仙贝已经卖了几十年,经销商愿意进,消费者也认,销售完成KPI自然更容易。于是,推老品比推新品省力,守旧比创新安全。

在健康消费成为主旋律的今天,曾经称霸零食赛道、陪伴几代人成长的国民品牌,正面临增长困境。在这背后,看似是产品老化的表层问题,实则是品牌、产品、渠道、组织的系统性困境。

显然,旺旺需要的不只是一瓶“听劝版”牛奶,而是一场真正面向市场的自我革新。

注:文/付艳翠,文章来源:创业最前线(公众号ID:chuangyezuiqianxian),本文为作者独立观点,不代表亿邦动力立场。

文章来源:创业最前线

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FAQ回顾

旺旺净利润为什么暴跌38%?

旺旺2026财年第一季度(4-6月)收益同比下滑约6%,净利润暴跌约38%。蔡衍明在内部公开信中将其定性为“重大经营危机”,归因于近30年靠拳头产品过好日子未创新求变。传统批发渠道收益衰退双位数、分销成本与行政费用上升、量贩渠道拉低毛利率是利润缩水的核心原因。

零食量贩渠道对旺旺经销体系有什么影响?

零食量贩店以低于传统渠道的价格销售旺旺全系大单品,基准价格比周边超市低1元左右,导致新旧渠道价格倒挂。2025财年旺旺传统批发和现代渠道收入连续第二年下滑,部分经销商销售额下滑三分之二,多个县城已招不到经销商;量贩渠道收益占比虽提升至15%,但直接拉低了集团整体毛利率。

旺旺为什么被形容为面临系统性经营困境?

旺旺当前困境覆盖品牌、产品、渠道、组织四个层面:仙贝、雪饼、旺仔牛奶等明星产品均是1983至1996年间诞生的老品,缺乏爆款新品;传统批发渠道持续收缩,量贩渠道扩张冲击经销生态;家族式一言堂管理、基层考核僵化、员工薪资走低,叠加净利润暴跌38%,构成系统性经营危机。

旺旺推出的听劝版低糖旺仔牛奶是什么?

听劝版旺仔牛奶是旺旺为适配健康化消费趋势推出的新品,由首席营运官蔡旺家于8月19日在微博官宣,主打“低糖、低脂、高钙”。新品已在旺旺官方旗舰店上架,但京东旗舰店销量不足百件,反映旺旺健康化新品上市初期仍面临动销和消费者认可度挑战。

旺旺为什么会陷入增收不增利的局面?

旺旺2025财年营收244.01亿元,同比增长3.8%,归母净利润38.37亿元,同比下滑11.5%,原因是分销成本同比增长16.9%至35.40亿元,行政费用同比增长11.4%至33.52亿元。成本上涨主要源于组织变革增设事业部带来人力成本上升,以及量贩渠道让利等市场投入加大,最终拖累利润表现。

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