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巴奴上市 难在哪里?

定焦One团队 2026-06-30 14:22
定焦One团队 2026/06/30 14:22

邦小白快读

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本文核心梳理巴奴毛肚火锅三次递表港交所,上市申请失效后再次重递的历程,拆解了巴奴业绩增长却不被资本认可、上市难的核心原因,干货要点如下:

1. 巴奴表面业绩亮眼,2025年营收28.46亿元,同比增长23.4%,净利润2.06亿元同比增长67.5%,门店从86家扩张到200家,但资本并不认可其增长的可持续性,巴奴业务结构单一,全直营押注主品牌,没有子品牌、加盟等对冲风险的布局,成长性想象空间不足。

2. 巴奴自身存在多重待解问题:定位包装曾刻意框定“品质火锅”概念避开水下海底捞,多次曝出食安问题动摇“产品主义”的信任根基,83.5%非正式用工引发合规质疑,上市前突击分红给实控人,引发市场对突击套现的质疑。

3. 当前港股市场偏好AI赛道,餐饮消费股整体遇冷,多数上市火锅品牌股价跌幅较大,巴奴还要面对扩张的现金流缺口和2029年必须上市的对赌压力,上市之路难度极大。

本文分析巴奴的上市困境,给餐饮品牌的运营和资本化提供了多方面干货参考,核心要点如下:

1. 品牌营销层面:巴奴早期靠对标海底捞做差异化定位,借“鸭血之战”话题营销快速出圈,但始终没能摆脱海底捞的品牌影子,规模仅为海底捞的十五分之一;靠“产品主义”“好食材”建立的高溢价,因多次食安问题动摇品牌信任,差异化壁垒还被火锅供应链的内卷不断稀释。

2. 定价与消费趋势层面:巴奴客单价连续三年从150元降至139元,高溢价持续松动,同店销售曾经下滑近10%,说明消费收缩环境下,脱离产品力支撑的高溢价很难长期维持,降价也没能完全扭转老店增长乏力的趋势。

3. 业务布局层面:巴奴押注单一主品牌全直营模式,没有加盟、多品牌、外卖等对冲风险的布局,抗风险能力弱,也让资本看不到足够的成长性想象空间。

本文梳理巴奴上市的困境,给餐饮赛道经营者提供了明确的风险提示和经验参考,干货要点如下:

1. 资本化与政策环境层面:当前港股资本市场对餐饮消费股态度十分审慎,火锅赛道整体估值低迷,多家已上市火锅品牌股价大跌,大量餐饮品牌排队上市,融资难度远超以往,筹备上市的餐饮卖家需要提前做好预期管理。

2. 经营风险层面:消费收缩环境下,高客单价模式很难长期维持,单一业务结构抗风险能力极弱,巴奴没有加盟扩张、多品牌布局、外卖业务等对冲风险的渠道,一旦主品牌增长乏力,企业没有缓冲空间,卖家需要提前布局多元业务分散风险。

3. 资本合作风险层面:接受Pre-IPO融资时要谨慎对待对赌条款,巴奴约定若2029年12月前不能完成合格上市,就要按8%年利率回购股份,当前已有3.26亿元赎回负债,叠加三年新开177家门店的扩张计划,现金流缺口远超现有现金储备,压力极大。

本文分析火锅赛道品牌发展现状,给火锅供应链工厂提供了明确的需求方向和商业机会参考,干货要点如下:

1. 产品生产需求层面:当前中高端火锅品牌普遍想要打造差异化竞争力,巴奴早年就是靠和高校合作研发木瓜蛋白酶嫩化毛肚,建立起差异化产品优势,靠好食材支撑品牌溢价,说明消费者对高品质、标准化的特色火锅食材需求旺盛,供应链端的技术升级能帮助品牌建立竞争力,工厂有较大的研发升级空间。

2. 商业机会层面:当前火锅赛道供应链高度内卷,单一食材的差异化很容易被模仿稀释,巴奴也面临很难全品类把控源头品质的难题,因此能提供全品类稳定高品质供应的供应链工厂,更受品牌欢迎,能帮品牌解决差异化痛点,获得更多合作机会。

3. 配套需求层面:巴奴计划三年新开177家直营门店,行业内多数火锅品牌都在加速扩张,对供应链的交付能力、库存周转能力要求提升,工厂可适配品牌扩张节奏调整产能,获得更多增长机会。

本文拆解巴奴上市难的核心问题,折射出当前中高端餐饮品牌的普遍痛点,给餐饮相关服务商提供了行业趋势和业务方向参考,干货要点如下:

1. 行业发展趋势层面:当前火锅赛道市场集中度低,排名第二的巴奴市场份额仅0.4%,大量区域品牌正在向全国扩张,资本化上市需求强烈,但资本市场对餐饮品牌的合规性、成长性要求越来越高,多数筹备上市的品牌都存在能力短板。

2. 核心客户痛点层面:一是品牌想要建立差异化产品壁垒,但火锅食材品类多,很难全品类把控源头品质,差异化很容易被供应链内卷稀释;二是很多品牌为了控制成本,大量使用非正式用工,在合规层面存在漏洞,容易引发监管和资本质疑;三是扩张期品牌普遍面临现金流缺口,资本对赌又加大了压力。

3. 业务机会层面:服务商可针对这些痛点,开发供应链整合、上市合规咨询、资本对接、现金流管理等针对性解决方案,满足品牌需求,获得更大的市场空间。

本文从巴奴上市难出发,反映了当前餐饮品牌对接资本市场和线下扩张的需求,给相关平台的运营和风险规避提供了参考,干货要点如下:

1. 资本市场平台层面:当前港股资金偏好AI类科技企业,对消费餐饮标的关注度低,投资者对餐饮品牌的成长性、合规性、信息披露质量要求提升,多数拟上市餐饮品牌在公司治理、成长性故事打磨上不符合资本要求,平台可针对性加强拟上市消费企业的合规辅导,帮助企业完善信息披露,优化治理结构。

2. 线下餐饮招商平台层面:当前中高端火锅品牌正加速全国扩张,巴奴计划三年新开177家直营门店,存在大量的门店选址、场地租赁、供应链配套需求,平台可针对性优化招商服务,匹配品牌的扩张需求,吸引更多品牌入驻。

3. 风险规避层面:平台需要关注餐饮品牌快速扩张带来的现金流风险,以及对赌协议带来的经营不确定性,针对合作品牌做好风险提示,提前规避潜在的合作风险。

本文梳理巴奴三次递表港交所的历程,剖析了中高端餐饮品牌赴港上市难的深层原因,对研究餐饮产业资本化和行业发展有较高的参考价值,核心干货如下:

1. 产业新动向:当前港股IPO市场结构分化明显,AI成为募资主力,消费餐饮赛道整体遇冷,火锅行业整体估值下行,头部品牌普遍增长承压,区域头部品牌想要通过上市融资的难度大幅提升,火锅行业集中度极低,前五大品牌合计份额仅8%,市场格局还未稳定。

2. 行业新问题:定位中端偏高的火锅品牌普遍存在差异化瓶颈,靠产品故事支撑的溢价在消费收缩环境下持续松动,单一主品牌全直营模式抗风险能力弱,对赌上市给企业带来极大的现金流压力,公司治理层面的用工合规、分红合理性等问题,越来越受到监管和资本的关注。

3. 商业模式层面:巴奴对标头部品牌做差异化的营销模式能快速出圈,但很难建立长期稳固的品牌壁垒,全直营扩张对现金流要求高,缺乏对冲风险的业务布局,成长性故事不被资本认可,这种模式的局限性值得深入研究。

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Quick Summary

This article traces Banniu Hot Pot's three attempts to file for an IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, including its re-filing after its previous application lapsed, and breaks down the core reasons behind the hot pot chain's struggle to go public despite strong growth and its lack of endorsement from investors. Key takeaways:

1. While Banniu posts strong headline results, with 2.846 billion yuan in revenue in 2025 (up 23.4% year-over-year) and 206 million yuan in net profit (up 67.5% YoY), and expanded its footprint from 86 stores to 200, investors remain skeptical about the sustainability of its growth. Banniu relies entirely on a single full-direct-store model centered on its core brand, with no risk-mitigating expansions into sub-brands or franchising, leaving little room for growth upside to excite the market.

2. Banniu also faces multiple unresolved issues. Its early positioning deliberately framed itself as a "quality hot pot" alternative to market leader Haidilao, but repeated food safety scandals have shaken consumer trust in its core "product-first" brand promise. Additionally, 83.5% of its workforce are non-formal employees, raising compliance concerns, while a special pre-IPO dividend payout to its controlling stakeholders has fueled market suspicions of opportunistic cash extraction ahead of the listing.

3. The current Hong Kong stock market overwhelmingly favors AI-related stocks, and the entire consumer dining sector is out of favor, with most listed hot pot brands seeing steep share price declines. Banniu also faces a large cash flow gap from its expansion push and a mandatory listing clause in its investment agreement requiring it to go public by 2029, making its path to an IPO extremely challenging.

This article analyzes Banniu's listing predicament and offers actionable insights for catering brands on operations and capitalization, with core takeaways as follows:

1. On brand marketing: Banniu gained early traction by positioning itself as a differentiated alternative to Haidilao and went viral through the "duck blood war" publicity campaign, but it has never escaped Haidilao's shadow, with its total scale only one-fifteenth of the market leader. The premium it built around its "product-first" and "premium ingredients" positioning has been severely undermined by repeated food safety incidents, and its differentiation barrier is also being continuously eroded by intensifying competition in the hot pot supply chain.

2. On pricing and consumer trends: Banniu's average check per customer has dropped for three consecutive years from 150 yuan to 139 yuan, with its premium eroding steadily, and same-store sales once fell by nearly 10%. This shows that in an environment of shrinking consumer spending, high premiums unsupported by genuine product strength are difficult to sustain long-term, and even price cuts have failed to fully reverse weak growth at mature stores.

3. On business layout: Banniu bets entirely on a full-direct-store model focused on a single core brand, with no risk-diversifying布局 in franchising, multi-brand operations, or takeout. This weakens its抗风险能力 and leaves investors with little expectation of meaningful long-term growth.

This article sorts out Banniu's listing predicament, provides clear risk warnings and experience references for catering industry operators, with key takeaways as follows:

1. On capitalization and policy environment: The Hong Kong capital market is currently extremely cautious about catering and consumer stocks, valuations across the hot pot sector are depressed, most listed hot pot brands have seen sharp share price drops, and a large backlog of catering brands are waiting to go public, making financing far more difficult than in previous years. Catering operators preparing for IPO should manage their expectations accordingly in advance.

2. On operational risks: In an environment of shrinking consumer spending, high average-check business models are difficult to sustain long-term, and single-structure business models have very weak risk resistance. Banniu has no risk-mitigating channels such as franchised expansion, multi-brand布局, or takeout business, meaning the company has no buffer if its core brand hits a growth plateau. Operators should proactively build diversified businesses to分散风险.

3. On capital partnership risks: Operators should treat valuation adjustment (VAM) clauses cautiously when accepting Pre-IPO financing. Banniu has agreed to repurchase shares at an 8% annual interest rate if it fails to complete a qualified IPO before December 2029, and it already carries 326 million yuan in repurchase liabilities. Combined with its expansion plan to open 177 new stores over three years, its cash flow gap far outpaces its existing cash reserves, leaving the company under extreme pressure.

This article analyzes the current development status of hot pot brands and provides clear guidance on demand direction and business opportunities for hot pot supply chain factories, with key insights as follows:

1. On product development demand: Mid-to-high end hot pot brands are now broadly seeking to build differentiated competitiveness. Banniu built its early differentiated product advantage by partnering with universities to develop papain tenderization for its signature tripe, supporting its brand premium with high-quality ingredients. This shows strong consumer demand for high-quality, standardized specialty hot pot ingredients; technical upgrades on the supply chain end help brands build competitive edges, leaving significant room for R&D upgrading for factories.

2. On business opportunities: The current hot pot supply chain is intensely competitive, and differentiation based on a single ingredient is easily copied and eroded. Banniu also struggles to control source quality across its full product range. As a result, supply chain factories that can deliver stable, high-quality supply across full product categories are far more favored by brands, as they solve core pain points around differentiation and win more cooperation opportunities.

3. On supporting demand: Banniu plans to open 177 new directly operated stores over three years, and most hot pot brands in the industry are accelerating expansion. This has raised requirements for supply chain delivery and inventory turnover capabilities. Factories that can adjust production capacity to match brands' expansion timelines will capture more growth opportunities.

This article breaks down the core reasons behind Banniu's listing struggles, reflects common pain points for current mid-to-high end catering brands, and provides references on industry trends and business directions for catering-related service providers, with key insights as follows:

1. On industry development trends: The hot pot industry currently has low market concentration, with Banniu, the second-largest player, holding only 0.4% market share. A large number of regional brands are expanding nationwide and have strong demand for capital market listing, but capital markets are raising increasingly high requirements for the compliance and growth potential of catering brands, leaving most pre-IPO brands with significant capability gaps.

2. On core client pain points: First, while brands aim to build differentiated product barriers, the wide range of hot pot ingredients makes it difficult to control source quality across all categories, and differentiation is easily eroded by supply chain competition. Second, many brands rely heavily on non-formal employment to control costs, creating compliance gaps that attract regulatory and investor scrutiny. Third, expanding brands commonly face cash flow gaps, which are exacerbated by listing requirements in capital VAM agreements.

3. On business opportunities: Service providers can develop targeted solutions to address these pain points—including supply chain integration, pre-IPO compliance consulting, capital connection, and cash flow management—to meet brand demand and capture larger market share.

Starting from Banniu's listing difficulties, this article reflects current demand from catering brands for capital market access and offline expansion, and provides references for operation and risk prevention for relevant platforms, with key insights as follows:

1. For capital market platforms: Currently, Hong Kong stock funds overwhelmingly favor AI and other technology companies, with little attention on consumer and catering assets. Investors have raised requirements for the growth potential, compliance, and information disclosure quality of catering brands, and most pre-IPO catering brands do not meet capital requirements in corporate governance and growth narrative building. Platforms can provide targeted compliance guidance for pre-IPO consumer companies, helping them improve information disclosure and optimize governance structures.

2. For offline catering investment platforms: Mid-to-high end hot pot brands are currently accelerating national expansion, with Banniu planning to open 177 new directly operated stores over three years, creating strong demand for site selection, venue leasing, and supply chain supporting services. Platforms can optimize their investment promotion services to match brands' expansion needs and attract more brand clients.

3. For risk prevention: Platforms need to pay attention to cash flow risks brought by rapid catering brand expansion and operational uncertainty from VAM agreements, provide risk warnings for cooperating brands, and proactively avoid potential cooperation risks.

This article traces Banniu's three filing attempts for a Hong Kong IPO and analyzes the underlying reasons why mid-to-high end catering brands struggle to list in Hong Kong, offering high reference value for research on catering industry capitalization and industry development, with core insights as follows:

1. New industry trends: The current Hong Kong IPO market is sharply split, with AI emerging as the main source of fundraising, while the entire consumer catering sector is out of favor. Valuations across the hot pot industry have declined, head brands face broad growth pressure, and it has become far more difficult for leading regional brands to raise capital via IPO. The hot pot industry remains extremely fragmented, with the top five brands holding a combined 8% market share, meaning the market structure has not yet stabilized.

2. New emerging industry problems: Mid-to-premium hot pot brands broadly face differentiation bottlenecks; the premiums they built around product narratives have continued to erode amid shrinking consumer spending, the single core brand full-direct-store model has weak risk resistance, and VAM-enforced IPOs put enormous cash flow pressure on companies. Issues such as employment compliance and dividend rationality in corporate governance are also receiving increasing attention from regulators and investors.

3. On business model: Banniu's differentiated marketing strategy that positioned itself against the industry leader allowed it to gain rapid market attention, but it has struggled to build long-term, stable brand barriers. Full-direct-store expansion places extremely high demands on cash flow, and the lack of risk-mitigating business布局 leaves its growth narrative unconvincing to investors. The limitations of this model are worthy of in-depth research.

Disclaimer: The "Quick Summary" content is entirely generated by AI. Please exercise discretion when interpreting the information. For issues or corrections, please email run@ebrun.com .

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业绩上涨,故事失灵。

定焦One(dingjiaoone)原创

作者 | 李梦冉

编辑 | 魏佳

巴奴第三次站在了港交所门前。

6月17日,港交所官网显示,巴奴国际控股有限公司(简称“巴奴”)的上市申请再次失效。同一天,这家以“毛肚+菌汤”为招牌的火锅品牌,再次递交招股书。从2025年6月16日首次递表至今,每六个月一次的“过期-重递”,已经成了一种循环。

单看账面,巴奴2025年全年收入28.46亿元,同比增长23.4%;净利润2.06亿元,同比增长67.5%;经调整利润3.17亿元,增幅高达88.7%。门店从2023年初的86家扩张到200家,翻台率从3.1次/天提升到3.6次/天。

在餐饮寒冬里,这本是一份体面的成绩单。作为参考,同期海底捞收入同比仅微增1.1%,净利润下滑14%。

但资本市场给出的回应是沉默。一个净利润持续增长、自称“中国品质火锅第一”的品牌,为什么拿不到港交所的入场券?

问题并不在报表上的数字,巴奴账面上的增长,和资本市场需要看到的“可持续性”,是两回事。

01.业绩攀升,资本不买账

2001年,杜中兵在河南安阳开出第一家巴奴火锅。彼时毛肚用火碱发制是行业普遍行为。2002年,杜中兵选择与高校合作,引入木瓜蛋白酶嫩化技术处理毛肚,从食品端建立自己的标准。这让巴奴有了一定的差异化竞争力,直到今天,毛肚依然是巴奴最鲜明的品牌符号。

但回溯巴奴的早期路径,真正让它率先出圈的,是它屡次“蹭”上了海底捞的流量。

2009年,巴奴进入郑州,正面撞上海底捞。那几年,巴奴跟着海底捞学服务,杜中兵后来坦言,“惯性让你觉得海底捞做了,你也必须做”。

但没人会关心追随者。2012年是转折点,巴奴正式更名“巴奴毛肚火锅”,把广告语换成“服务不是巴奴的特色,毛肚和菌汤才是”,主动放弃追赶海底捞的服务路线。2015年,杜中兵首次提出“产品主义”的概念,对外强化巴奴的定位。

到了2021年,巴奴将广告语换成“服务不过度,样样都讲究”,不再单独强调毛肚和菌汤,但矛头依然暗指海底捞。

火药味不止在标语上。

那场著名的“鸭血之战”至今仍是餐饮营销的经典案例。2017年,海底捞发文坦言鲜鸭血品控之难,并提到“我们很认真”;巴奴则立刻接招,以一篇《巴奴为什么能卖鲜鸭血?》针锋相对,连标语都是“我们更认真”......

这套打法确实让它出了名,但也让它始终活在海底捞的影子里。

2025年,海底捞收入432.25亿元,是巴奴28.46亿元的15倍多;净利润40.42亿元,是巴奴2.06亿元的近20倍。营收和利润规模上,二者完全不在一个量级。

巴奴唯一能超过海底捞的指标是客单价,巴奴为139元,海底捞为97.7元。

不过,这个溢价开始松动。

招股书显示,巴奴人均消费从2023年的150元降至2024年的142元,再到2025年的139元,三年连降11元。招股书将这一变化解释为“战略调整价格,以顺应不断变化的市场趋势、吸引更广泛的客户群”。但市场上有观点认为,根本原因是在消费收缩的环境下,巴奴撑不起这么高的客单价。

同店数据印证了这一点:2023年至2024年,巴奴同店销售额下降9.9%,意味着不是新店拖累,是老店本身在下滑。虽然2024年至2025年同店销售回升4.8%,但客单价的下行趋势没止住。

海底捞同样承压。2025年财报显示,同店销售额同比下降约6.8%,平均日销售额从8.52万元降至7.95万元;翻台率从4.1次/天降至3.9次/天,仅微高于巴奴的3.6次/天。

虽然海底捞自己也在走下坡路,但它有缓冲区。它可以用外卖、20多个子品牌和加盟模式来对冲压力。2025年,其外卖业务收入26.58亿元、同比增长111.9%,子品牌矩阵从内部孵化转向市场扩张,其他餐厅收入15.21亿元、同比增长214.6%。但巴奴只有200家全直营门店,没有加盟,且超岛假羊肉事件后,子品牌关停,所有筹码都押在主品牌一张牌上。

关注餐饮行业的投资人柠檬告诉「定焦One」,巴奴的业务结构相对单一,对资本市场来说成长性的想象空间不大。

02.开店、对赌,巴奴等不起

早几年,巴奴对外说的是“不急于上市”。2020年拿了番茄资本近亿元投资时,杜中兵说“其实还没想法去拿投资”,入股“也并不意味开始着手准备上市”。

但几年间,外部环境震荡、餐饮行业持续低迷,到了2025年2月,杜中兵改口:“上市是巴奴未来重要发展方向。”四个月后便递交了第一份招股书。

如今市场不给回应,巴奴为什么还要硬闯?

从巴奴的招股书来看,它并不是一家有盈利焦虑的公司:营收净利连续增长,毛利率自2023年至2025年稳步攀升,分别为66.8%、67.9%、69.8%。

但按照它现在的发展节奏,“差钱”是可以预见的下一步:

2025年,巴奴净利润2.06亿元,同比增长67.5%。只看利润表,这是一家高速奔跑的公司。但翻到现金流量表,会发现另一个故事。

2025年,巴奴经营活动现金净流入3.93亿元,较2024年的4.95亿元下降了20.6%。期末现金及现金等价物从2024年的2.23亿元降低到2025年末的仅3932万元,是三年来的最低点,同比减少82.4%。

这个反差的根源在于巴奴正在加速开店。

2025年,巴奴新开44家门店。反映在报表上,2025年预付款、应收款和租赁按金增加了9650万元,存货增加了6790万元。门店开得越快,这个“垫资”的缺口就越大。

当然,3932万元不是巴奴的全部家底。截至2025年末,公司另有4.89亿元理财产品和约5283万元定期存款。但当装修款、租金和工资账单如期而至,这些钱未必能解燃眉之急。

而且开店计划还没有停。招股书披露,2026年至2028年将分别新开约52家、61家、64家直营门店,三年合计177家,门店数量接近翻倍。

香颂资本执行董事沈萌告诉「定焦One」,“像餐饮这样的传统行业,为了吸引更多投资者,只能寄希望于规模扩张,因为没有其他故事可讲。”

按招股书中每家新店前期投入“不超过500万元”计算,这一扩张计划的上限约8.85亿元。这个数字远超现金流支撑能力。沈萌补充,“餐饮行业的扩张计划,往往是为了彰显信心,不完全是财务的账。倒在这条路上的品牌,比比皆是。”

数据之外,对赌的合约压力也是主要原因。

招股书显示,巴奴在历次融资过程中与投资方签订了包含股份回购条款的协议。若巴奴未能在2029年12月1日前完成合格上市,天使轮及A轮投资者均有权要求巴奴以年利率8%的价格回购其持有的全部或部分股份,这不是一笔小数目。截至2026年4月,巴奴还有3.26亿元的赎回负债。

这意味着,每一次招股书失效都是一次倒计时。

沈萌和柠檬都向「定焦One」表示,这种带赎回权的Pre-IPO对赌条款结构,通常出现在投资方占据强势谈判地位的项目中,只有缺少议价筹码的公司,才会接受这种高风险条件。如果上市一再延期、大股东又找不到新的资金来接盘,对巴奴而言压力极大。

前有扩张吞金,后有对赌压力,巴奴除了叩门港交所,已无退路。

03.巴奴上市,难在哪儿?

2025年,港股IPO市场异常热闹。据统计,这一年港股有119家新股挂牌,募资总额2858亿港元,重新夺回了全球新股市场募资额榜首。

但真正的主线是AI产业,阿里腾讯的AI业务推进、智谱MiniMax等大模型公司的赴港上市,阶段性引领大盘上涨。消费板块只是阶段性主题,且个股表现差异化明显。

茶饮赛道里,蜜雪集团、古茗上市后股价涨幅明显,茶百道股价较发行价跌幅超七成、奈雪的茶股价更是暴跌96%;火锅赛道更冷清,海底捞股价较高点跌去超八成,呷哺呷哺连亏五年,股价创历史新低,市值从近300亿港元到现在仅剩不到3亿港元,锅圈股价同样腰斩......

再往近看,2025年5月,五次递表的绿茶餐厅终于上岸但首日破发,年底上市的遇见小面股价已经腰斩,老乡鸡、钱大妈、袁记云饺、比格比萨等已经交表,但还在排队中。所以,巴奴现在面对的,是一个对消费股更为审慎的港股。

除了资本市场环境的变化,巴奴自身也有问题待解。

第一重来自定位。

2025年巴奴在招股书中自称“中国品质火锅市场最大品牌,市场份额约3.1%”。这个“第一”有一个前提——所谓“品质火锅”,被刻意框定在人均120元以上。海底捞因客单价之差,便被巧妙地从竞争对手名单中剔除。

但反观海底捞2018年上市时,招股书写的是“中国火锅餐厅市场第一”,不需要加任何定语。

这一包装形式引起媒体和投资者质疑,直到2026年6月的第三版招股书,巴奴才首次披露了不加定语的排名:“按收入计,2025年中国火锅市场第二名”,市场份额约0.4%。火锅行业集中度极低,前五大品牌合计市场份额仅约8%,海底捞6.5%,巴奴和七欣天、凑凑这些品牌共同分食剩下的1%多。

第二重是产品。在定位之外,巴奴一直标榜“产品主义”,但在执行层面,已经多次曝出问题。

前几年,巴奴子品牌“超岛自选火锅”被曝羊肉卷里含鸭肉,巴奴富硒土豆未达到农业部的富硒合格线。当一个以“产品主义”立身、靠食材故事支撑溢价的品牌,接连在食安与宣传上失守,其赖以生存的信任根基便开始松动。

柠檬向「定焦One」表示,火锅赛道的供应链高度内卷,“火锅食材品类太多,很难做到所有单一食材都从源头做起。”巴奴靠“好食材”建立的差异化壁垒,正在被整个供应链的内卷所稀释。

第三重在于公司治理层面。

其中,最老生常谈的是巴奴的用工结构。

招股书显示,截至2025年末,巴奴合计员工12732人,其中全职正式员工仅2106人,占比16.5%;兼职员工4127人,外包员工6499人,非正式用工合计占比高达83.5%。作为对比,海底捞非正式用工占比远低于此,通常在40%左右。

证监会明确要求巴奴说明“公司非全职人员(兼职人员、外包人员)社保公积金缴纳情况,以及劳动用工合法合规的结论性意见”。

巴奴的解释是:餐饮行业流动性高、灵活用工是常态。

有从业者评价,外包和兼职本身不违法,但83.5%这个比例已经超出了“灵活用工”的合理范畴。

沈萌向「定焦One」解释,“只要不违法违规,都不是红线,港交所不会过度审核,但港交所就是放行,投资者也未必买账,这种结构可能会影响经营人员稳定性,对投资者带来潜在的波动风险。”

另一项值得追问的是分红。

2025年1月,就在首次递表前5个月,巴奴向股东派息7000万元,按杜中兵夫妇83.38%的持股比例计算,约5836万元流入了实控人家族的口袋。

2023年和2024年,巴奴连续两年没有任何分红记录。7000万相当于巴奴2024年净利润近六成;此外,2024年巴奴资产负债率达60.08%,2025年一季度仍维持在60.46%。

一家亟需资金扩张的公司,却将账上六成利润作为股息派向实控人家族。这种左手融资、右手分红的操作,很难不被市场视为上市前的“突击套现”。

回到上市层面,资本市场买的是未来的确定性。而巴奴的招股书,留下了太多问号。正如沈萌总结,巴奴真正的短板,是成长故事的吸引力。港股从不缺赚钱的公司,缺的是能让资本相信“未来会更值钱”的企业。

也因此,即便通过了聆讯,也不意味着股价能一路走高。上市不是终点,毕竟海底捞、呷哺呷哺走过的路,就摆在那里。

注:文/定焦One团队,文章来源:定焦One,本文为作者独立观点,不代表亿邦动力立场。

文章来源:定焦One

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