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巴奴第三次敲门港交所 这次是真的没钱了

关注新商业的 2026-06-25 16:37
关注新商业的 2026/06/25 16:37

邦小白快读

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本文拆解了火锅品牌巴奴三次冲击港交所IPO的背后真相,核心矛盾是极低的现金储备和激进的全直营扩张野心之间的冲突,核心干货信息如下

1. 事件层面:巴奴实控人在IPO前分红7000万元,实控人家族拿走超5800万元,分红后公司现金仅剩1.53亿元,前两次递表港交所均失效,2025年6月第三次递表,未来三年开新店需要近9亿元资金,极度依赖IPO募资。

2. 品牌操作层面:巴奴花60万元委托第三方机构定制划分了品质火锅细分赛道,在自定义赛道中以3.6%份额成为第一,但在整个火锅市场仅占0.4%,份额仅为海底捞的十六分之一,赛道含金量很低。

3. 经营层面:巴奴近年营收增长主要靠新开门店堆量,存量同店销售曾下滑,客单价三年连降11元,品质溢价持续压缩,当前现金储备仅0.39亿元,扩张风险很高。

本文对餐饮品牌的定位营销、扩张模式、财务规划都有参考价值,相关干货整理如下

1. 品牌营销:巴奴通过自定义细分赛道打造“品质火锅第一”的品牌认知,这种资本叙事方式可以给新品牌做定位参考,但也要注意自定义赛道集中度极低,很容易被竞争对手切入,品牌光环容易被稀释。

2. 定价与消费趋势:当前消费市场倾向质价比,巴奴客单价连续三年下滑,品质溢价被市场压缩,说明高端定位的品牌要适配当前消费分级下的需求变化,过高的品质定位不一定能转化为高盈利。

3. 扩张模式:巴奴坚持全直营扩张,所有风险都由品牌自身承担,在现金储备不足的情况下激进扩张,会直接触碰现金流红线,对比海底捞开放加盟分散风险的做法,品牌要根据自身财务情况选择合适的扩张路径。

本文对餐饮赛道卖家的扩张策略、财务规划、资本化运作都有诸多值得参考的干货内容,整理如下

1. 市场机会与风险:当前火锅市场整体集中度向头部集中,细分品质赛道集中度极低,没有形成垄断,新进入者只要调整定价就能切入该赛道,头部品牌的壁垒不高,对中小卖家来说存在切入机会,但也要注意,高端品质定位很难转化为高盈利,重资产模式现金流压力极大。

2. 经营策略参考:巴奴通过降价换翻台率和同店增长的策略短期见效,2025年同店销售恢复正增长,门店利润率提升,说明降价适配质价比消费趋势的做法可行。同时要注意,全直营模式需要持续大量资本投入,在当前环境下,开放加盟分摊风险是更稳妥的选择,不要在现金储备不足的情况下激进扩张。

3. 合规风险提示:巴奴IPO前大额分红引发证监会质疑,被要求补充分红合理性等相关材料,卖家做资本化运作要提前做好合规规划,避免触碰监管红线。

本文围绕火锅品牌巴奴的经营扩张,梳理出上游餐饮供应链工厂可以参考的干货信息如下

1. 产品生产设计需求:巴奴坚持产品主义,主打新鲜、无添加的产品,要求日配送、冷鲜运输,对食材的新鲜度、品质要求远高于普通火锅品牌,随着品质火锅赛道的发展,上游工厂可以针对性布局高品质鲜食食材的生产加工,匹配品牌端的品质需求。

2. 商业机会:巴奴计划未来三年新开近180家直营门店,门店数量将翻倍,需要新建中央厨房、扩建冷链配送网络,同时对高品质食材的需求也会大幅增长,上游生产、物流相关工厂可以抓住对接巴奴扩张的商业机会。

3. 数字化升级启示:巴奴通过数字化系统和规模效应抵消了客单价下滑带来的成本压力,说明餐饮品牌端越来越重视供应链的数字化管理,上游工厂可以推进自身的数字化升级,更好地匹配品牌端的效率需求,提升自身的合作竞争力。

本文拆解巴奴的发展问题,给餐饮相关服务商带来不少行业干货,整理如下

1. 行业发展趋势:当前火锅行业进入消费分级阶段,质价比成为主流消费叙事,原本主打高端品质定位的品牌开始向下调整客单价,同时头部加速扩张的品牌对资本化运作的需求越来越高,相关服务需求持续增长。

2. 客户核心痛点:目前主打品质定位的餐饮品牌,普遍面临两个核心痛点:一是如何打造差异化品牌定位获得资本市场认可,提升估值;二是重资产扩张下的现金流压力,以及品质供应链扩张带来的成本非线性上涨问题。

3. 解决方案方向:针对品牌定位需求,服务商可以推出细分赛道定制研究服务,帮助品牌打造差异化认知;针对扩张痛点,服务商可以为品牌提供轻资产扩张方案设计、现金流管理咨询,以及供应链成本优化服务,帮助品牌平衡品质定位和规模化扩张的矛盾。

本文围绕巴奴冲击IPO的事件,梳理出资本化平台、连锁餐饮平台可以参考的干货内容如下

1. 品牌对平台的核心需求:当前处于扩张期的头部餐饮品牌,核心需求是通过上市募资支撑自身的重资产扩张计划,对融资的需求远高于其他需求,品牌会通过各种差异化定位的叙事方式,提升自身在资本市场的估值。

2. 平台需要规避的风险:部分冲击IPO的餐饮品牌存在自定义赛道抬高身价的情况,实际市场份额和盈利能力与宣传存在较大偏差,还有部分品牌实控人在IPO前大额分红,导致上市前公司现金储备不足,扩张计划存在断粮风险,平台审核需要重点关注分红合理性、现金流状况、赛道真实性等问题。

3. 平台运营方向:当前品质火锅赛道仍保持增长,赛道内品牌有较强的资本化需求,平台可以针对性挖掘细分赛道的优质品牌,同时做好风险管控,保护投资者利益。

本文对餐饮产业资本化、连锁餐饮扩张模式的研究,提供了典型案例和新的产业动向信息,干货整理如下

1. 产业新动向:当前消费分级背景下,火锅行业出现两个新变化,一是品牌纷纷通过自定义细分赛道的方式打造差异化认知,获取资本认可;二是头部直营品牌出现模式分化,海底捞开放加盟分摊风险,巴奴仍坚持全直营激进扩张,不同模式带来完全不同的发展风险。

2. 产业新问题:本次案例暴露了餐饮品牌IPO中的新问题,部分品牌通过付费定制行业报告自定义赛道,获取“第一”头衔美化估值,这种资本话术会误导投资者,同时实控人在IPO前置大额分红,大量转出公司现金,也会影响上市后企业的发展,值得监管和研究层面关注。

3. 商业模式研究价值:巴奴的案例呈现出品质定位+全直营模式的核心悖论,品质定位需要重资产供应链支撑,全直营扩张又需要持续大量资本投入,最终会陷入差异化推高成本、现金流紧张依赖IPO的循环,对研究连锁餐饮商业模式的平衡有重要参考价值。

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Quick Summary

This article unpacks the story behind hot pot chain Bannu's three attempts to IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX), identifying the core contradiction between the brand's extremely low cash reserves and its aggressive ambition for a fully company-operated expansion. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Timeline & background: Bannu's controlling shareholders paid out RMB 70 million in dividends ahead of its IPO, with over RMB 58 million going to the controlling family. This left the company with just RMB 153 million in cash after the payout. Its first two HKEX listing applications expired, and it filed for a third time in June 2025. Bannu needs nearly RMB 900 million to open new stores over the next three years, making it extremely dependent on IPO proceeds to fund growth.

2. Brand positioning: Bannu paid RMB 600,000 to a third-party firm to create a custom "premium hot pot" niche segment, where it claims the top position with a 3.6% market share. However, it holds just 0.4% of the overall Chinese hot pot market—one-sixteenth the share of industry leader Haidilao—making the custom niche largely insignificant in terms of scale.

3. Operating performance: Bannu's recent revenue growth has been driven almost entirely by new store openings, while same-store sales at existing locations previously declined. Its average check size has dropped by RMB 11 over three years, eroding its quality-driven price premium. The company now holds just RMB 39 million in cash reserves, leaving it exposed to high risk as it pursues aggressive expansion.

This article offers valuable insights for food and beverage brands on brand positioning, marketing, expansion models and financial planning. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Brand marketing: Bannu built the perception of being "the leading premium hot pot brand" through a custom-defined niche segment. This capital-friendly storytelling approach can serve as a positioning reference for emerging brands, but brands should note that custom niches have extremely low concentration and are easy for competitors to enter, which can quickly dilute brand equity.

2. Pricing and consumer trends: Amid the current market shift towards value-for-money offerings, Bannu's three consecutive years of falling average checks and eroding quality premium show that high-end positioned brands must adapt to shifting demand amid current consumer segmentation. An overly premium positioning does not automatically translate into higher profitability.

3. Expansion strategy: Bannu's commitment to a fully company-operated model means it bears all expansion risk on its own balance sheet. Aggressive expansion with insufficient cash reserves directly puts its cash flow at risk. Compared to Haidilao's strategy of opening franchising to分散 risk, brands must choose an expansion path aligned with their own financial position.

This article provides actionable insights for food and beverage sellers on expansion strategy, financial planning and capital operations. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Market opportunity and risk: The overall hot pot market is increasingly concentrated among top players, while the niche premium segment remains highly fragmented with no dominant monopoly. New entrants can capture market share in this segment by adjusting pricing, as leading brands in the niche have weak moats, creating opportunities for small and medium-sized sellers. However, sellers should note that a premium positioning is difficult to convert into strong profitability, and asset-heavy models create enormous cash flow pressure.

2. Operating strategy reference: Bannu's strategy of cutting prices to drive table turnover and same-store growth delivered short-term positive results: same-store sales returned to growth in 2025 and store margins improved, proving that aligning pricing with the value-for-money trend works. At the same time, a fully company-operated model requires continuous large capital injections; in the current market environment, opening franchising to share risk is a more prudent approach, and aggressive expansion with insufficient cash reserves should be avoided.

3. Compliance risk reminder: Bannu's large pre-IPO dividend drew scrutiny from HKEX, which requested additional materials to justify the payout. Sellers pursuing capital market transactions must complete compliance planning in advance to avoid running afoul of regulatory requirements.

This article summarizes key takeaways for upstream food and beverage supply chain factories based on Bannu's operations and expansion. Key insights are as follows:

1. Product design and demand: Bannu positions itself as a "product-first" brand focused on fresh, additive-free ingredients, requiring daily cold-chain deliveries. Its standards for ingredient freshness and quality are far higher than those of average hot pot brands. As the premium hot pot segment grows, upstream factories can develop targeted production and processing capacity for high-quality fresh ingredients to meet the growing demand from brand clients.

2. Business opportunities: Bannu plans to open nearly 180 new company-operated stores over the next three years, doubling its current store count. This expansion requires new central kitchens and expanded cold-chain distribution networks, as well as a sharp increase in demand for high-quality ingredients. Upstream production and logistics factories can capitalize on this opportunity to partner with Bannu as it grows.

3. Insights for digital upgrading: Bannu leveraged digital systems and economies of scale to offset cost pressures from falling average checks. This shows that food and beverage brands increasingly prioritize digital supply chain management. Upstream factories can advance their own digital transformation to better meet brand clients' efficiency requirements and improve their competitiveness as partners.

This article unpacks Bannu's growth challenges and offers key industry insights for food and beverage-related service providers. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Industry development trends: The hot pot industry has entered an era of consumer segmentation, with value for money becoming the dominant consumer expectation. Brands originally positioned at the premium end are now adjusting their average check prices downward. At the same time, rapidly expanding leading brands have growing demand for capital market services, driving sustained growth in related service demand.

2. Core client pain points: Premium-positioned food and beverage brands generally face two core challenges: first, how to build a differentiated brand positioning to win capital market approval and boost valuations; second, cash flow pressure from asset-heavy expansion, as well as non-linear cost growth driven by scaling up a premium supply chain.

3. Solution directions: For brands' positioning needs, service providers can develop custom niche market research services to help brands build differentiated perception. For expansion-related pain points, providers can offer light-asset expansion strategy design, cash flow management consulting, and supply chain cost optimization services to help brands resolve the tension between quality positioning and large-scale expansion.

This article summarizes key insights for capital market platforms and chain restaurant platforms based on Bannu's IPO attempt. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Core brand demands from platforms: Leading expanding restaurant brands' top priority is raising capital via IPO to fund their asset-heavy expansion plans, so demand for financing outpaces all other needs. Brands will use all types of differentiated positioning narratives to boost their capital market valuations.

2. Risks platforms need to mitigate: Some brands pursuing IPO define custom niche segments to inflate their perceived value, leaving a large gap between their actual market share, profitability and their public claims. In other cases, controlling shareholders pay out large pre-IPO dividends that leave the company with insufficient cash ahead of listing, putting expansion plans at risk of funding shortfalls. Platforms should prioritize reviewing the reasonableness of pre-IPO dividends, cash flow positions and the validity of claimed market segments during due diligence.

3. Platform operation priorities: The premium hot pot segment continues growing, and brands in the segment have strong demand for capital market access. Platforms can proactively source high-quality brands in niche segments while implementing strict risk controls to protect investor interests.

This article provides a典型 case and new industry insight for research on restaurant industry capitalization and chain restaurant expansion models. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. New industry trends: Against the backdrop of consumer segmentation, the hot pot industry has seen two key new developments: first, brands increasingly build differentiated perception via custom-defined niche segments to win capital approval; second, leading fully company-operated chains have diverged in their strategies: Haidilao has opened franchising to分散 risk, while Bannu continues to pursue aggressive fully company-operated expansion, creating very different risk profiles for the two models.

2. New industry issues: This case exposes new problems in restaurant IPOs: some brands pay for custom industry reports to create self-defined niches, claiming a "first place" title to inflate their valuation. This capital-focused storytelling misleads investors. In addition, large pre-IPO dividends that drain significant cash from the company hurt post-listing growth potential, making this a key issue worth attention from regulators and researchers.

3. Research value for business model study: Bannu's case highlights the core paradox of the "quality positioning + fully company-operated" model: quality positioning requires asset-heavy supply chain investment, and fully company-operated expansion requires continuous large capital injections, ultimately trapping brands in a cycle where differentiation drives up costs, creates cash shortages, and forces dependence on IPOs. This case offers valuable reference for research on balancing business model tradeoffs in chain restaurants.

Disclaimer: The "Quick Summary" content is entirely generated by AI. Please exercise discretion when interpreting the information. For issues or corrections, please email run@ebrun.com .

I am a Brand Seller Factory Service Provider Marketplace Seller Researcher Read it again.

三闯港交所,能撑起直营扩张野心吗?

文|郭梦仪

2025年1月,郑州巴奴总部。杜中兵坐在办公室里,面前放着两份文件:一份是公司账簿,现金储备2.23亿元;另一份是分红决议,7000万元即将派发给股东。

按他和妻子83%的持股比例,其中约5836万元(精确值)由实控人家族获得。派完这笔钱,账上还剩1.53亿。

三个月后,他第一次向港交所递表。招股书里的扩张计划写得气吞山河:未来三年,每年新开50多家直营门店,单店前期投入上限500万元,仅开店就要近9个亿。

1.53亿现金,9个亿野心。这不是在吃火锅,这是在玩火。而且,是用1.53亿的现金储备,去点燃9个亿的扩张野心。

不出所料,第一次递表六个月后失效。第二次递表,再次失效。今年6月,杜中兵第三次站在港交所门口敲门。

但门内的投资者只看到巴奴一个越来越尖锐的悖论:当一家公司想为自己量身定制一个“品质火锅”赛道,但当账上的现金只有3900万,它还能撑得起这场全直营的扩张赌局吗?

巴奴的IPO叙事,本质上是一场关于“定义权”与“现金流”的双重博弈。

1

一场赛道切割手术

翻开巴奴的招股书,“第一”这个词出现的频率,甚至比菜单上的“毛肚”还高。

根据弗若斯特沙利文的资料,按2025年收入计,巴奴是中国品质火锅市场最大品牌,市场份额约3.6%。

但鲜少有人追问:这个“品质火锅”赛道,到底是谁定义的?

答案藏在招股书第90页的一行小字里:“我们同意就编制弗若斯特沙利文报告向弗若斯特沙利文支付费用人民币60万元。”

相当于,巴奴花了60万元,委托第三方机构为自己量身定制了一份行业研究报告,而这份报告的核心任务之一,就是将火锅市场按人均消费拆分为品质火锅(120元以上)、大众火锅(60-120元)和平价火锅(60元以下)三个子赛道。

在这个由巴奴付费定义的细分框架里,巴奴以3.6%的份额顺理成章地成为了第一。

这种“自我定义+自我夺冠”的资本话术,在消费品牌IPO中并不罕见。但巴奴的问题在于,这个赛道的集中度低到令人咋舌。

数据显示,2025年品质火锅市场CR5(行业集中度前五名指标)仅9.1%,意味着即便是所谓的“第一名”,对市场的掌控力也微乎其微。

相比之下, 巴奴在整个中国火锅市场的份额仅有0.4%,而排名第一的海底捞占据了6.5%的份额——是巴奴的16倍。

一个连前十名都凑不齐、集中度极低的细分市场,其“第一名”的含金量,与“整体市场第二名”的实际地位之间,横亘着一道巨大的认知鸿沟。

但资本市场的规则是:概念可以花钱买,账本却骗不了人。 当我们把“品质火锅第一”的光环暂时搁置,翻开巴奴过去三年的核心财务数据,一个更为复杂的图景浮现出来。

根据招股书数据显示,2023年-2025年,巴奴的营收从21.12亿元增至28.46亿元,复合年增长率约16.1%,增速确实亮眼。

但拆开来看,这16.1%的增长里,有多少来自单店的内生增长,有多少来自不断新开门店的堆量?

招股书给出的答案是:同店销售在2024年下滑了9.9%,直到2025年才恢复4.8%的正增长。

这意味着,2023年至2024年的营收增量(从21.12亿到23.07亿),几乎完全依赖新开门店的贡献,而非存量门店的提效。

这本身就是对品质叙事的一种“打脸”: 一家靠“品质”立身的品牌,其增长引擎竟然是门店数量的物理扩张,而不是单店模型的质量提升。

更微妙的是客单价的持续下探。

数据显示,巴奴的顾客人均消费从2023年的150元降至2024年的142元,2025年进一步下探至139元,三年连降11元,降幅7.3%。

不过,降价换来了翻台率的提升,从3.1提升到3.6,同店销售也在2025年回正。但这恰恰说明:巴奴的“品质溢价”正在被市场压缩。

毛利率的数据提供了另一个观察维度。

2023年-2025年,巴奴的毛利率从66.8%提升至67.9%再到69.8%,在客单价下滑的背景下逆势提升,这通常被视为供应链效率改善的信号。

但当我们把毛利率与净利率放在一起看,就会发现一个问题:毛利率接近70%,但经调整净利率仅为11.1%(2025年)。中间近60个百分点的差距,被租金、人力、折旧和营销费用吞噬。

作为对比,海底捞2024年的净利率约为12.6%(光大证券),而客单价远低于巴奴。

摊开来说,巴奴赚的是辛苦钱,却披上了品质的外衣。 它的“高品质”并没有转化为与之匹配的高盈利能力,反而因其重资产、全直营、日配送的运营模式。

这种财务表现与赛道定位的背离,最终指向一个尴尬的事实:当竞争对手将客单价从100元上调至120元以上,它们就可以瞬间进入品质火锅赛道,稀释巴奴的“第一光环”。

弗若斯特沙利文的报告还预测,品质火锅市场将以6.7%的复合年增长率增长至2030年。

但这份基于“未来十年中国经济平稳增长”假设的预测,能否经受住消费分级时代的考验?

当“质价比”成为主流叙事,巴奴的“产品主义”很可能从溢价能力变成成本负担——而它的账本,已经提前写出了这个伏笔。

2

从2.23亿到0.39亿:

直营模式的现金流赌局

如果说“品质火锅第一”是巴奴对外讲的故事,那么现金流数据则是它无法回避的账本。

招股书显示,巴奴的经营活动现金流净额从2024年的4.95亿元下降至2025年的3.93亿元,同比减少20.6%。

更触目惊心的是现金及现金等价物的变化:2024年末尚有2.23亿元,到2025年末仅剩0.39亿元,同比暴跌82.4%。

与此同时,公司却在2025年1月宣派了7000万元的股息——按照杜中兵夫妇83.37%的持股比例,这笔分红中有约5836万元流入了实控人家族的口袋。

一边是大额分红,一边是现金储备逼近警戒线,巴奴的扩张计划却丝毫没有减速的意思。

招股书披露,公司计划在2026年至2028年分别新开约52家、61家和64家门店,按每家门店前期投入不超过500万元计算,未来三年仅开店就需要约8.85亿元的资本开支。这还不包括中央厨房的扩建、数字化系统的投入以及品牌建设的费用。

全直营模式的本质,是品牌方自己承担了加盟商本应承担的所有扩张风险。

巴奴用资本的钱给自己“加盟”,每开一家店都是一次重资产押注。

加盟已经是连锁餐饮的标配。连海底捞也在2024年开放加盟,呷哺呷哺也在通过多品牌矩阵分散风险。

巴奴200家门店全部直营,在餐饮行业中本就罕见,而巴奴的计划是将这一数字在三年内推至400家以上——这意味着它需要持续不断地输血,而输血的唯一来源就是IPO募资和经营现金流。

问题在于,2025年巴奴的现金储备断崖式下跌。下跌的部分原因是资本开支和分红的双重挤压,但也反映出公司在高速扩张中对现金的吞噬速度远超预期。

如果,此次的IPO募资不及预期,或者港股市场给予的估值低于管理层的心理价位,巴奴的直营扩张计划很可能在第二年就面临断粮的风险。

去年8月,中国证监会出具补充材料要求,涉及股权架构、分红合理性、用工模式及社保公积金缴纳等多项问题。

3

巴奴的第三条路在哪?

结合上述的两个事件,我们能看到巴奴到底想干嘛:用“产品主义”的精致叙事,来掩盖直营扩张的粗糙财务模型。

它越是强调差异化,就越需要重资产投入来支撑这种差异化,从而进一步加剧现金流的紧张。

这个悖论的核心在于,巴奴的“产品主义”高度依赖一套反效率的供应链体系。

“能冷鲜不冷冻,能天然不添加,能当天不隔夜”的日配送承诺,需要5个中央厨房和覆盖600公里半径的冷链网络来支撑。目前5个央厨服务200家门店,平均每个央厨覆盖40家门店。

如果未来,巴奴的门店数翻倍至400家,要么新建央厨(投入巨大),要么延长配送半径(牺牲新鲜度),要么提高央厨产能(考验管理极限)。

无论哪种选择,都意味着成本的非线性上升。

不过巴奴并非没有亮点。

在客单价持续下滑的情况下,其门店经营利润率也从21.3%提升至24.9%。

这说明公司在供应链效率和成本控制上确实具备一定能力——它用规模效应和数字化系统,部分抵消了降价带来的压力。2025年同店销售增长4.8%,也证明降价策略在短期内有效。

但资本市场的耐心是有限的。

港股市场不会因为”产品主义“的情怀而给予溢价,它要看到的是:这套模型在规模化之后,能否产生稳定的自由现金流?

巴奴需要证明,“产品主义”不只是杜中兵的个人信仰,而是一个可以脱离创始人魅力、独立运转的商业系统。

当“品质火锅”的赛道定义权遭遇直营模式的现金流天花板,巴奴必须找到第三条路——既不是放弃产品主义向大众市场投降,也不是固守直营模式被资本拖垮,而是在两者之间建立一个可规模化的、有纪律的增长模型。

注:文/关注新商业的,文章来源:商业数据派(公众号ID:business-data),本文为作者独立观点,不代表亿邦动力立场。

文章来源:商业数据派

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