还有3000多家店 CoCo为何让消费者觉得“消失”了？

Overview: CoCo has not disappeared; it continues to operate with low visibility, still running more than 3,100 stores in China across more than 200 cities in 30 provinces.

1. Store closures have occurred city by city and year by year, mainly to exit high-rent mall locations; in April 2026, shopping-center stores fell by a net 60 in a single month, down 7.12%.

2. What consumers miss most are classic products: the Fresh Passion Fruit Double Punch launched in 2008, Milk Tea Three Brothers, and Double Fresh Taro Milk Green Tea, along with the grainy texture of taro paste and the chewiness of pearls.

3. It is shifting toward four store formats—community locations, cultural-tourism districts, street stalls, and pedestrian streets—and opening single-store franchising from RMB 280,000, focusing on lower-tier markets such as Sichuan, Hunan, Shandong, and Jiangxi.

4. From January to August 2026, it launched 44 new products, or 5.5 per month; the autumn Pomegranate Orange Sea sold 400,000 cups within three days of launch. Consumers seeking the old taste can watch for the return of classic items and the red bean series.

Overview: CoCo trades low visibility for a stable base, focusing on fewer co-branding campaigns, slower launches, and long-term operation of classic products while shifting channels toward communities, lower-tier markets, and overseas markets.

1. Restrained marketing: it ran at most 16 co-branding campaigns in 2024, only 7 in 2025 and 5 in 2026, below Nayuki's 23 and Luckin Coffee's 22; its TV commercials avoid big scenes, promotions, and celebrities, featuring longtime CoCo drinkers as protagonists.

2. Product R&D: only 21 new products from January to August 2025, versus 44 in the same period of 2026, or 5.5 per month; the three classics drive traffic, with a strategy of 'periodic returns of classic items' plus 'annual minor upgrades and derivative products.'

3. Channels and users: in April 2026, shopping-center stores fell by a net 60 in a single month, down 7.12%, as the brand shifts to four store formats, lower-tier markets, and overseas; consumers express regret rather than complaint when stores close, indicating the brand has moved from 'being evaluated' to 'being part of consumers' routines.'

4. Risks: its share of voice is diluted by 10,000-store brands, new products have weak memorability, and it must guard against dilution of its 19-year consumer mindshare.

Overview: CoCo's franchise policy and channel adjustments create opportunities for sellers in lower-tier markets, communities, and overseas, but threshold, profitability, and mindshare risks remain.

1. Policy interpretation: the original regional authorization required a joint venture between headquarters and franchisees of RMB 1.5 million, at least 10 stores in two years, and locations in areas with a resident population of one million; in mid-2024 it opened single-store franchising, with initial total investment from RMB 280,000, excluding rent and initial inventory, focusing on untapped lower-tier markets such as Sichuan, Hunan, Shandong, and Jiangxi.

2. Growth markets: in 2026 it held its first franchisee conference in 29 years, setting a target of 200 single stores; the four store formats cover cultural-tourism districts, community street-front locations, street stalls, and pedestrian streets; overseas, it has more than 430 stores across 25 countries and 100 regions.

3. Opportunities and lessons: the franchisee renewal rate exceeds 50%; in 2025, 110 single-store franchises opened, covering 67 cities in 20 provinces; replacing new-product buzz with the certainty of classic products suits steady sellers.

4. Risk warning: in China it closed a net 1,446 stores over three years, more than 30% of its network, and mall stores are contracting; whether community, lower-tier, and overseas stores can sustain profitability, and whether the 19-year brand perception will be diluted, remains to be seen.

Overview: CoCo's product strategy is shifting toward minor upgrades of classic products, seasonal emotional products, and reduced-sugar grains, giving factories clear R&D and production directions.

1. Design needs: classic products return periodically with minor upgrades and derivatives—for example, the red bean series has extended into a freshly cooked red bean paste cassava bowl, and Red Fruit Miss has launched a sister product, Berry Miss; meanwhile, the grainy texture of taro paste and the chewiness of pearls are retained.

2. Ingredients and processes: increase the use of freshly cooked grains such as mung bean, highland barley, and fresh taro, and reduce the share of flavorings and syrups; the autumn Pomegranate Orange Sea uses Tunisian soft-seed pomegranate, citrus jelly, and jasmine green tea, and sold 400,000 cups within three days of launch.

3. Launch cadence: 44 new products from January to August 2026, or 5.5 per month, double the 21 in the same period of 2025; factories need small-batch rapid-response capability.

4. Business opportunities: support standardized output for the four store formats—cultural-tourism districts, community street-front locations, street stalls, and pedestrian streets; the article mentions the 'CoCo Franchise' mini-program, which can serve as an observation point for online franchise recruitment and order coordination.

Overview: The CoCo case reveals two types of demand for tea-beverage service providers: restoring the share of voice of incumbent brands, and implementing community, lower-tier, and overseas channels.

1. Industry trend: as of April 2026, 47 brands operated 27,085 stores in mainstream shopping centers, accounting for 15.02% of the total store base, indicating that mall-based tea-beverage retail is nearing saturation; CoCo's shopping-center stores fell by a net 60 in a single month, down 7.12%, making it the brand with the sharpest contraction that month.

2. Customer pain points: slow store openings, slow product launches, and slow marketing compound to leave the brand with low visibility; consumers express regret only when stores close, with strong recall of classic products but weak recall of new ones; in China it closed a net 1,446 stores over three years, more than 30% of its network.

3. Solutions: lighter co-branding, fan-focused TVCs, periodic returns of classic items plus minor upgrades, seasonal emotional storytelling, and reduced-sugar grains; use a single-store franchise mini-program to lower the threshold, and enter communities, cultural-tourism districts, and lower-tier markets through four store formats.

4. Opportunities: provide brands with share-of-voice management under low visibility, classic-product operation, community site selection, and overseas expansion implementation services.

Overview: CoCo's channel migration offers implications for commercial property and online platforms in merchant recruitment and operations, chiefly in responding to mall tea-beverage saturation and low brand visibility.

1. Platform needs and problems: as of April 2026, 47 brands operated 27,085 stores in mainstream shopping centers, accounting for 15.02% of the total, and mall-based tea-beverage retail is nearing saturation; CoCo's net decline of 60 stores in a single month, down 7.12%, shows pressure on high-rent mall stores.

2. Platform recruitment opportunities: CoCo has opened single-store franchising from RMB 280,000, focusing on untapped lower-tier markets such as Sichuan, Hunan, Shandong, and Jiangxi, and in 2026 set a target of 200 single stores; the four store formats correspond to cultural-tourism districts, community street-front locations, street stalls, and pedestrian streets.

3. Operational approach: use the 'CoCo Franchise' mini-program to handle franchise applications, and maintain brand warmth through lightweight co-branding and fan-focused TVCs; platforms can adjust their tea-beverage tenant mix accordingly and watch community, lower-tier, and overseas brands.

4. Watchouts: low brand visibility weakens a mall's traffic draw; store closures prompt regret rather than complaint, so short-term reputation risk is low, but the brand must prevent longtime fans' goodwill from being exhausted.

Overview: CoCo offers a case study of 'survival with low visibility' and channel migration by a mature brand, worthy of research on share of voice, franchise models, and consumer mindshare.

1. New industry dynamics: tea-beverage retail has entered a 10,000-store race; Mixue Bingcheng leads by a wide margin, Guming has 14,351 stores and Auntea Jenny 13,155, while CoCo has fallen out of the leading tier; mall-based tea-beverage retail is saturated, with 47 brands operating 27,085 stores, or 15.02% of the total, and CoCo's shopping-center stores fell by a net 60 in a single month, down 7.12%.

2. New questions: CoCo still has more than 3,100 stores in China, covering more than 200 cities in 30 provinces, yet consumers perceive it as 'disappeared'; when stores close, the response is regret rather than complaint, suggesting the brand has shifted from 'being evaluated' to 'being a habit.'

3. Business model: regional authorization requires a RMB 1.5 million joint venture and at least 10 stores in two years; it has shifted to single-store franchising from RMB 280,000, a target of 200 stores, and four store formats, while increasing investment in lower-tier markets and more than 430 overseas stores.

4. Implications: slow store openings, slow product launches, and slow marketing dilute share of voice; returns of classic products with minor upgrades, seasonal emotional storytelling, and reduced-sugar grains can provide a counterbalance of certainty; whether the 19-year brand mindshare will be diluted remains to be seen.