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一次消费超3万 复购率超80% 这门中产生意冲上市

沈嵩男 2026-10-09 08:49
沈嵩男 2026/10/09 08:49

邦小白快读

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总述:这篇文章对普通读者来说,最有用的信息是高端度假到底多少钱、怎么让人重复购买,以及在中国有哪些更适合周末的产品。

1. Club Med客单价很高,一笔订单平均超4000欧元(约3.1万元人民币),入住约5天;日均床位价格已从2023年220欧元涨到2025年235欧元,入住率约六成。

2. 想降低门槛,可关注其在中国推出的邻境和白日方舟产品,选址在安吉、千岛湖、太仓、南京仙林等城市周边,主打周末度假和亲子游,有人评价周末带娃后准备二刷。

3. 提前预订和会员积分是重要玩法:官网曾结合中秋国庆调休推“请3天年假连休13天”促销,住3晚以上送双倍积分;提前预订已锁定2026年上半年超过75%的营业额。

4. 消费者也要注意:旺季接待、早餐排队和服务响应可能影响体验,有住客明确表示不会再来。

总述:Club Med案例说明,高端化不只是卖高价,而是用品牌定位、渠道自持、会员复购和产品分层把一次性度假做成多次关系。

1. 高端定价:2004年启动高端化,2024年完成100%高端化;平均每日床位价格从2023年220欧元升至2025年235欧元,2026上半年261欧元。提价带来收入增长,但入住率在六成左右,说明高价有销量约束。

2. 渠道与客户关系:直销渠道贡献超70%营业额,背后是高端交易复杂,客人会关注儿童托管、餐饮、活动、交通、滑雪课程,甚至先和销售顾问聊完才下单,因此品牌有机会把入口留在自己手里。

3. 复购经营:金卡、白金卡复购率分别为66%和81%;提前预订锁定2026上半年75%以上营业额,证明会员分层和预售有效。

4. 产品延伸:中国新增邻境和白日方舟,覆盖安吉、千岛湖、太仓等短途城市周边场景,但周末产品要和大量亲子酒店、乐园竞争,服务口碑决定成败。

总述:卖家可以从Club Med的扩张和经营数据中看到高端度假、周边亲子游和会员直营模式里的机会,也要留意高客单背后的口碑风险。

1. 增长市场:Club Med在中国布局两条周边游产品线,邻境选址延庆、安吉、千岛湖、黑龙滩,白日方舟主打南京仙林、太仓、杭州龙坞;太仓项目在携程有7800余条点评,适合带娃是高频标签,周末带娃成为典型出游动机。

2. 消费需求变化:高端度假客单价高,一笔订单平均超3万元,但低频是天然难题;金卡和白金卡会员复购率分别到66%和81%,说明锁定高净值会员比只拉新更值钱。

3. 可学习点:Club Med用直销和预售锁客,2025年直销贡献超70%营业额,提前预订锁定2026上半年超75%营业额;卖家可借鉴官网官方渠道、会员积分、提前订房早鸟优惠等方式稳定订单。

4. 风险和机会提示:营销费用占收入15%,经营利润约8.2%,收入增速放缓,2026上半年收入几乎持平;轻资产管理合约是扩张方向,目的地规划、设施运营、品牌授权等服务会形成新的合作空间。

总述:工厂型或供应链型商家可以从Club Med看到,高端度假产品正在变成一套可复制、可输出的标准化体验,这会给产品设计、工程建设和数字化供应带来机会。

1. 产品生产与设计需求:一价全包模式平均订单超4000欧元、入住约5天,意味着产品要围绕住宿、餐饮、儿童托管、活动、交通、滑雪课程等完整旅程设计;面向中国市场的邻境和白日方舟则把使用场景压缩到周末,要求产品更适合短途、亲子度假。

2. 商业机会:Club Med计划从69家扩张到约85家,已有6家在建,且采用租赁或管理合约减少重资产投入;业主负责开发和资本投入,公司输出品牌与运营标准,这会带来度假村建设、设备、软装、运营物资等配套需求。

3. 数字化与电商启示:直销贡献超70%营业额、提前预订锁定下一期75%以上营业额,说明高客单、低频、长决策特点的产品,更适合用官网、会员、预售和复购沉淀订单,而不是只靠平台比价流量;服务体验的标准化和可复制是长期订单基础。

总述:服务商从Club Med案例中能看到高端度假行业的核心痛点:交易低频、客单价高、复购依赖关系和体验,服务机会集中在直销、会员、预订和口碑管理。

1. 行业趋势:Club Med按营业额是全球最大度假村品牌,但市场份额仅1.1%,行业高度分散;2023至2025年收入从18.62亿欧元增至19.49亿欧元,增速明显放缓,说明高端度假进入存量运营阶段。

2. 客户痛点:平均每日床位价格升至235欧元,入住率约六成;销售及营销开支占收入15.5%,相当于毛利一半,一般及行政开支占7.2%,经营利润率约8.2%;高获客成本和高服务要求同时存在。

3. 解决方案方向:直销渠道贡献超70%营业额,客人决策复杂,会咨询儿童托管、餐饮、活动、交通、滑雪课程,服务商可提供预约咨询、复杂产品预订、会员分层和留存工具;提前预订锁定75%以上下期营业额,说明预售和锁客功能很重要。

4. 机会提示:Club Med计划扩大管理合约模式,把品牌、销售、预订、定价经验和运营标准输出给业主,服务商可关注度假村运营数字化和品牌授权管理需求。

总述:平台商从Club Med和D-EDGE数据中能看出,越高端、交易越复杂的度假产品,品牌越倾向直销,平台需要从单纯流量匹配转向支持复杂交易和会员沉淀。

1. 品牌对平台的需求:Club Med直销渠道贡献超70%营业额,说明品牌希望把儿童托管、餐饮、活动、交通、滑雪课程等复杂决策留在自己的官方渠道;但携程、TripAdvisor等平台评论仍影响消费者选择。

2. 最新做法启示:D-EDGE显示欧洲5星酒店官网直订占线上收入接近40%,亚洲5星超过50%,Club Med更高;平台可以强化官方旗舰店、会员积分、预售、复杂咨询工具,而不是只按价格和距离筛选。

3. 招商与运营管理:中国周边游产品邻境和白日方舟覆盖延庆、安吉、千岛湖、太仓等,适合带娃成为高频标签;平台可围绕周末亲子、城市短途和高复购会员组织供给。

4. 风险规避:同一度假村点评页上出现准备二刷和再也不来,说明高客单消费对服务体验极敏感;平台需要做好真实评价与售后处理,避免差评集中影响高端产品转化。

总述:研究者可以从Club Med上市案例提炼出一个典型的高端度假品牌转型样本:高端化、会员复购、直销和轻资产扩张同时推进,但也遇到增长收窄和模式验证问题。

1. 产业新动向:按营业额计算,Club Med是全球最大度假村品牌,但市占率只有1.1%;公司计划从69家扩张到约85家,6家在建,并通过租赁和管理合约降低重资产依赖。

2. 新问题:高端化使价格从2023年220欧元升到2025年235欧元,但入住率一直在六成出头;收入增速从2024年3.3%降到2025年1.3%,2026上半年几乎持平,说明提价和会员运营难以持续提供增量。

3. 商业模式观察:收入99%以上仍来自度假村运营,目的地规划、设施运营、品牌授权等输出收入很小;公司试图让客人在Club Med覆盖范围内迁移选择,但新短途产品是否带来高频复购、会员是否迁移,招股书未披露。

4. 政策与合规启示:上市募集资金部分用于偿还重组借款,显示轻资产扩张需要资本市场支持;管理合约模式下品牌方与业主方的收益分配、关联交易和信息披露规范值得研究。

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声明:快读内容全程由AI生成,请注意甄别信息。如您发现问题,请发送邮件至 run@ebrun.com 。

我是 品牌商 卖家 工厂 服务商 平台商 研究者 帮我再读一遍。

Quick Summary

For general readers, the most useful information is what high-end vacations actually cost, how they drive repeat purchases, and which products in China are better suited for weekends.

1. Club Med has a high average ticket: one booking averages over €4,000 (about RMB 31,000) for roughly five nights. The average daily bed price has risen from €220 in 2023 to €235 in 2025, with occupancy around 60%.

2. To lower the entry barrier, consider its China-specific product lines, Joyview and Urban Oasis, in destinations such as Anji, Qiandao Lake, Taicang and Nanjing Xianlin. These target weekend getaways and family trips; some guests say they are already planning a second visit after taking their kids for the weekend.

3. Early booking and membership points are important levers: the official website once ran a promotion tied to Mid-Autumn and National Day holiday scheduling, offering 13 consecutive days off with just 3 days of annual leave, and stays of 3+ nights earned double points. Early bookings have already locked in more than 75% of H1 2026 revenue.

4. Consumers should also be aware: peak-season reception, breakfast queues and service response times can hurt the experience, and some guests have explicitly said they will not return.

Overview: The Club Med case shows that premiumization is not just about charging high prices; it is about building an ongoing relationship from a one-time vacation through brand positioning, owned channels, membership repurchase and product tiering.

1. Premium pricing: Club Med began its premium repositioning in 2004 and completed 100% premiumization by 2024. The average daily bed price rose from €220 in 2023 to €235 in 2025 and €261 in H1 2026. Price increases drove revenue growth, but occupancy stayed around 60%, indicating a volume constraint at higher prices.

2. Channels and customer relationships: direct sales contributed over 70% of turnover. Behind this is the complexity of high-end transactions—guests pay attention to childcare, dining, activities, transport and ski lessons, and some even consult a sales advisor before booking. This gives brands the opportunity to keep the customer entry point in their own hands.

3. Repeat-purchase management: repeat rates for Gold and Platinum members are 66% and 81%, respectively. Early bookings locked in more than 75% of H1 2026 turnover, proving that membership tiering and pre-sales are effective.

4. Product extension: in China, Club Med added Joyview and Urban Oasis to cover short-haul suburban scenarios such as Anji, Qiandao Lake and Taicang. However, weekend products face intense competition from family hotels and theme parks, and service reputation will decide the outcome.

Overview: Sellers can identify opportunities in high-end resorts, nearby family travel and direct-sales membership models from Club Med's expansion and operating data, while also watching the reputation risks behind high-ticket purchases.

1. Growth markets: Club Med has deployed two short-trip product lines in China. Joyview is located in Yanqing, Anji, Qiandao Lake and Heilongtan; Urban Oasis focuses on Nanjing Xianlin, Taicang and Hangzhou Longwu. The Taicang project has more than 7,800 reviews on Ctrip, with "great for kids" a frequent tag, making weekend family trips a typical travel motivation.

2. Changing consumer demand: high-end vacations have high average order value—over RMB 30,000 per booking—but low frequency is a structural challenge. Gold and Platinum members have repeat rates of 66% and 81%, respectively, showing that retaining high-net-worth members is more valuable than simply acquiring new customers.

3. Lessons to learn: Club Med locks in customers through direct sales and pre-sales. In 2025, direct sales contributed over 70% of turnover, and early bookings locked in over 75% of H1 2026 turnover. Sellers can stabilize orders using official channels, membership points and early-bird booking discounts.

4. Risks and opportunities: marketing expenses account for 15% of revenue, operating margin is about 8.2%, revenue growth has slowed, and H1 2026 revenue is nearly flat. Asset-light management contracts are the expansion direction, creating new cooperation space in destination planning, facility operations and brand licensing services.

Overview: Factory or supply-chain oriented businesses can see from Club Med that high-end vacation products are becoming a replicable, exportable standardized experience, creating opportunities in product design, engineering construction and digital supply.

1. Product and design requirements: the all-inclusive model has an average order of over €4,000 and roughly five-night stays, meaning products must be designed around the full journey of accommodation, dining, childcare, activities, transport and ski lessons. The Joyview and Urban Oasis lines for China compress the usage scenario into weekends, requiring products that better suit short-haul, family-oriented vacations.

2. Business opportunities: Club Med plans to expand from 69 to about 85 resorts, with 6 under construction. It uses leases or management contracts to reduce heavy-asset investment, with owners handling development and capital expenditure while the company exports its brand and operating standards. This creates supporting demand for resort construction, equipment, soft furnishings and operating supplies.

3. Digital and e-commerce implications: direct sales contribute over 70% of turnover, and early bookings lock in more than 75% of next-period turnover. This shows that high-ticket, low-frequency, long-decision products are better served by official websites, membership, pre-sales and repeat purchases than by platform price-comparison traffic. Standardized and replicable service experience is the foundation for long-term orders.

Overview: Service providers can see the core pain points of the high-end resort industry from the Club Med case: low transaction frequency, high average order value, and repeat purchases that depend on relationships and experience. Service opportunities are concentrated in direct sales, membership, booking and reputation management.

1. Industry trends: Club Med is the world's largest resort brand by turnover, but its market share is only 1.1%, reflecting a highly fragmented industry. Revenue grew from €1.862 billion in 2023 to €1.949 billion in 2025, with growth clearly slowing, indicating that the high-end resort sector has entered a phase of managing existing stock.

2. Customer pain points: the average daily bed price has risen to €235, but occupancy is about 60%. Sales and marketing expenses account for 15.5% of revenue—about half of gross profit—while general and administrative expenses account for 7.2% and operating margin is about 8.2%. High customer acquisition costs coexist with high service requirements.

3. Solution directions: direct sales contribute over 70% of turnover, and guests make complex decisions, consulting about childcare, dining, activities, transport and ski lessons. Service providers can offer appointment-based consultation, complex product booking, membership tiering and retention tools. Early bookings locking in more than 75% of next-period turnover shows the importance of pre-sales and customer locking.

4. Opportunity notes: Club Med plans to expand its management-contract model, exporting brand, sales, booking, pricing experience and operating standards to property owners. Service providers should watch for digitalization of resort operations and brand licensing management needs.

Overview: Platform operators can see from Club Med and D-EDGE data that the more premium and transactionally complex a resort product is, the more brands tend to favor direct sales. Platforms need to shift from simple traffic matching to supporting complex transactions and member retention.

1. Brand demand for platforms: Club Med's direct sales contribute over 70% of turnover, showing that brands want to keep complex decisions—childcare, dining, activities, transport and ski lessons—in their own official channels. However, reviews on platforms such as Ctrip and TripAdvisor still influence consumer choices.

2. Lessons from latest practices: D-EDGE data shows that direct bookings via official websites account for nearly 40% of online revenue at five-star hotels in Europe and over 50% in Asia; Club Med is even higher. Platforms can strengthen official flagship stores, membership points, pre-sales and complex consultation tools rather than filtering only by price and distance.

3. Merchant recruitment and operations: China's short-trip products Joyview and Urban Oasis cover Yanqing, Anji, Qiandao Lake, Taicang and other locations, with "great for kids" a frequent tag. Platforms can organize supply around weekend family trips, urban short breaks and high-repeat members.

4. Risk avoidance: the same resort review page can contain both "planning a second visit" and "never coming back," showing that high-ticket consumers are extremely sensitive to service experience. Platforms need to manage authentic reviews and after-sales handling to prevent concentrated negative reviews from hurting high-end product conversion.

Overview: Researchers can draw from the Club Med listing case a typical sample of high-end resort brand transformation: premiumization, membership repurchase, direct sales and asset-light expansion are pushed simultaneously, but the company also faces narrowing growth and model validation issues.

1. New industry dynamics: by turnover, Club Med is the world's largest resort brand but holds only 1.1% market share. The company plans to expand from 69 to about 85 resorts, with six under construction, and uses leases and management contracts to reduce reliance on heavy assets.

2. New problems: premiumization raised prices from €220 in 2023 to €235 in 2025, but occupancy has hovered at just over 60%. Revenue growth fell from 3.3% in 2024 to 1.3% in 2025, and H1 2026 is nearly flat, showing that price increases and membership operations can hardly sustain incremental growth.

3. Business model observations: more than 99% of revenue still comes from resort operations, while revenue from destination planning, facility operations and brand licensing is very small. The company tries to get guests to migrate among Club Med's portfolio, but the prospectus does not disclose whether new short-trip products generate high-frequency repeat purchases or whether members migrate.

4. Policy and compliance implications: part of the listing proceeds will be used to repay restructuring loans, showing that asset-light expansion needs capital market support. Under the management-contract model, the revenue split between brand and property owner, related-party transactions and disclosure standards deserve further study.

Disclaimer: The "Quick Summary" content is entirely generated by AI. Please exercise discretion when interpreting the information. For issues or corrections, please email run@ebrun.com .

I am a Brand Seller Factory Service Provider Marketplace Seller Researcher Read it again.

全球第一高端度假村,市场份额只占1.1%。

国庆前几天,Club Med中国官网先替中国打工人算了一道请假题。

9月28日至30日请3天年假,中秋和国庆可以连成13天。促销页面往下,是丽江、桂林、长白山,也有普吉岛、民丹岛和马尔代夫;指定度假村住3晚以上,再送双倍会员积分。[1]

一个1950年创立于法国的度假品牌,对“中国式调休”已经相当熟练。

近期,Club Med Lifestyle Group(地中海度假集团)向港交所递交上市申请,拟把以Club Med为核心的度假业务单独上市。[2]

复星与Club Med的关系已经持续十几年。复星1992年起家于上海,2010年,复星首次战略投资Club Med;2015年完成私有化;2018年,Club Med随复星旅文登陆港股。2025年3月复星旅文退市,大约一年半后,Club Med又回到港交所门口。

按招股书援引的灼识咨询数据,2025年Club Med按营业额计是全球最大的度假村品牌,也是全球最大的一价全包度假村品牌;放到整个度假村市场里,它的份额又只有1.1%。

截至招股书统计日期,Club Med在全球经营69家高端度假村。往绩记录期里,一笔订单平均超过4000欧元(约合人民币3.1万元),平均入住大约5天。在中国,其在丽江、桂林、亚布力、北大湖、长白山,延庆、安吉、千岛湖、太仓等地都有项目。

超过4000欧元的客单价可谓奢旅,但麻烦在于,度假很难高频——咖啡可以天天喝,衣服一年能买很多次,五天长假却不能隔三差五来一遍。Club Med卖掉一场假期以后,下一单如何、何时续上呢?

一张床越来越贵,下一单却越来越远

2004年,Club Med启动高端化战略。到2024年,公司宣布全球度假村已经实现100%高端化。

二十年的品牌改造,最后还是要落到一个很实在的数字上:一张床能卖多少钱。

2023年、2024年和2025年,Club Med平均每日床位价格分别为220欧元、232欧元和235欧元;同期床位入住率分别是62.8%、61.4%和62.5%。

价格逐年抬高,入住率基本停在六成出头。2024年公司收入增长3.3%,招股书把提价和部分度假村容量增加列为原因;2025年收入只增长1.3%,价格继续升到235欧元,入住率回到62.5%。2026年上半年平均每日床位价格达到261欧元。

涨价不是全部,却一直在起作用。高端化把一单生意做贵。另一头,Club Med花了很长时间琢磨怎样让客人一次次地返回。2025年,Club Med定义的直销渠道贡献超过70%的营业额(包含第三方平台的官方渠道);到2025年底,提前预订已经锁定2026年上半年超过75%的STS营业额。金卡和白金卡会员的2025年复购率分别达到66%和81%(只包含金卡和白金卡会员,不代表全部客人)。

Club Med这70%的直销,放进酒店行业并不容易。D-EDGE按酒店星级拆过2022年的线上预订收入:欧洲2星酒店的官网直订不到线上收入的20%,5星接近40%;亚洲2星不到10%,5星超过50%。[3]D-EDGE只统计官网线上直订,口径比Club Med窄,但星级之间的斜率很清楚:越往高端,直订越高。

把一家中低端酒店放进OTA,房间很快会被压成同一套筛选项:离地铁多远、评分多少、今晚多少钱。高端度假的交易更长,客人还会问儿童托管、餐饮、活动、交通、滑雪课程,甚至先和销售顾问聊一轮再下单。交易越复杂,品牌越有机会把入口留在自己手里。Club Med的70%,价值不只在少给OTA多少佣金,也在于大部分客户关系也没有先落到平台手里。

但入口握在自己手里,不等于就能省营销费。2023年至2025年,Club Med销售及营销开支占收入的比例分别是15.1%、15.4%和15.5%,三年几乎没变。把毛利和这些经营费用摆在一起更直观——2025年,每100欧元收入形成30.3欧元毛利;销售及营销花掉15.5欧元,相当于毛利的一半,一般及行政约7.2欧元。其他收入及收益净额补回约0.7欧元后,经营利润约8.2欧元。

同一时期,收入增速已经慢下来:2023年18.62亿欧元(约137.74亿元人民币),2024年19.23亿欧元(约145.05亿元人民币),2025年19.49亿欧元(约147.01亿元人民币);2026年上半年10.83亿欧元(约81.69亿元人民币),去年同期10.81亿欧元(约81.54亿元人民币),几乎持平。

2025年Club Med接待159万名客人,规模已经不小;只是高端化、提价和会员经营做得越成熟,下一块增量越难再从旧办法里挤出来。

从长白山住五天,到太仓过周末

丽江、桂林、亚布力、北大湖、长白山,属于Club Med在中国的传统“一价全包”度假村。为把度假拉近到城市周边和周末,Club Med在中国又发展出“地中海·邻境”(Joyview)和“地中海·白日方舟”(Urban Oasis)两条周边游产品线:前者选址大型城市集群的近郊,如北京延庆、湖州安吉、千岛湖、黑龙滩;后者主打城市度假,如南京仙林、太仓、杭州龙坞。[4]

飞去马尔代夫住五天,要认真腾出一段假期;开车去安吉、千岛湖或者太仓,两三天甚至一个周末就够。招股书给这个方向的说法是“创造更高频的触点”。

太仓的点评区里,“周末带娃”已经成了典型的出游动机。截至10月4日,携程上的Club Med白日方舟·太仓页面显示有7800余条住客点评,“适合带娃”是出现最多的标签之一。一位住客写自己“周末带娃去太仓”,结尾是四个字:“准备二刷”。但另一位住客对旺季接待、早餐排队和服务响应很不满意,留下的也是一句很短的话:“再来一次是不可能了”。[5]

“准备二刷”和“再来一次是不可能了”,出现在同一个点评页上。距离缩短以后,消费者比较的不再只是另一场昂贵长假,还包括江浙沪密密麻麻的亲子酒店、乐园和短途目的地。Club Med过去在雪山和海岛等场景旅游上形成的品牌溢价,在周末游产品上,还要重新过服务和性价比这一关。

Club Med已经把旅游产品放到周末里了,频次却还没法从招股书里看出来。邻境或白日方舟有没有把第一次体验Club Med的人带去长途度假,老会员会不会从传统度假村迁移到新的城市项目,这些数字都没有披露。

度假村生意,也想要轻资产化运作

Club Med现在有69家度假村,计划到2030年做到约85家;已有6家新度假村在建设,多16家不是重点——重点是谁出钱,这也是Club Med目前扩张的关键。

如今,Club Med已有19家度假村采用管理合约模式——公司既不拥有、也不租赁物业,业主负责开发和主要资本投入;Club Med负责运营,并提供品牌、销售、营销、预订、分销等服务,再收管理费和相关服务费。类似于过去万达商管所采用的“轻资产模式”,房子可以是别人的,Club Med留下的是名字、客源、会员、预订系统、定价经验和一套经营标准。

这种“跟着品牌换地方”的行为,在用户社区里已经能看到零星样本。2026年7月,一位Reddit用户说,全家当年刚去过Club Med Cancun(坎昆,墨西哥旅游城市),体验不错,下一年准备在Punta Cana和Miches(蓬塔卡纳和米切斯,均为多米尼加共和国旅游城市)之间再选一家Club Med;另一段讨论里,有家庭说自己通常去Punta Cana,也已经去过Miches两次。Club Med长白山页面展示的一则Trip Advisor住客点评里,也有人写“除了桂林,其他几个俱乐部都去过了”。[6]

这些零星评论写出了一种Club Med试图达成的用户信任:上一次先选目的地,下一次直接在Club Med覆盖范围内挑下一个。

公司希望把这条路径继续做大。69家向85家扩张时,会灵活采用租赁或管理模式,在继续复制主营度假村业务的同时,减少对重资产投入的依赖。除此之外,公司还希望把目的地规划、设施运营、品牌授权等能力向外输出,尝试获得度假村运营之外的收入。

2025年,Club Med度假村运营收入19.39亿欧元(约146.26亿元人民币),占集团总收入99.5%;2026年上半年仍占99.4%。也就是说,现阶段收入几乎仍全部来自度假村运营,其他业务距离真正成为第二条增长曲线还很远。此次IPO募集资金也不只为了新项目,其中一部分将用于优化资本结构,包括偿还重组时取得的部分银行借款。

Club Med能不能从一家度假村公司继续往品牌和运营能力输出走,最终还得看客人是不是愿意跟着它换目的地、换场景。一个家庭住过Club Med长白山,下一次会因为Club Med去北海道吗?去过北海道以后,又会不会因为这个名字到太仓过一个周末?仍有待验证。

注释

[1]Club Med中国官网《2026中秋国庆·Club Med度假精选》,检索于2026年10月4日。

[2] 地中海度假集团港股上市申请版本,2026年8月28日;复星集团官网有关公司沿革资料。除特别注明外,本文涉及Club Med经营、财务、渠道、会员、项目及扩张计划的数据均据申请版本。

[3]D-EDGE Hospitality Solutions,《2023 Hotel Online Distribution Trends:Europe&Asia》,2023年4月27日。

[4]Club Med中国官网《中国·邻境/白日方舟度假村》《中国度假村》,检索于2026年10月6日。

[5] 携程《Club Med地中海白日方舟·太仓度假村》住客点评页,检索于2026年10月4日。

[6]Reddit r/Club_Med“Club Med Miches vs Punta Cana”“Dominican Republic- Punta Cana vs Miches”;Club Med长白山页面展示的TripAdvisor住客点评,检索于2026年10月4日。

注:文/沈嵩男,文章来源:天下网商(公众号ID:txws_txws),本文为作者独立观点,不代表亿邦动力立场。

文章来源:天下网商

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FAQ回顾

Club Med是什么品牌?主要做什么?

Club Med是1950年创立于法国的度假村品牌,按2025年营业额是全球最大的度假村品牌,也是全球最大的一价全包度假村品牌。截至招股书统计日期,它在全球经营69家高端度假村,往绩记录期订单平均超过4000欧元(约人民币3.1万元),平均入住约5天。

Club Med为什么要赴港上市?

Club Med Lifestyle Group(地中海度假集团)已向港交所递交上市申请,计划把以Club Med为核心的度假业务单独上市。此次IPO发生在复星旅文2025年3月退市约一年半后,募集资金部分用于度假村扩张,部分用于优化资本结构,包括偿还重组时取得的部分银行借款。

Club Med为什么这么贵?

Club Med定位高端度假村,2004年启动高端化,2024年宣布全球度假村实现100%高端化。往绩记录期一笔订单平均超过4000欧元(约人民币3.1万元),平均入住约5天;2026年上半年平均每日床位价格达到261欧元。提价是其收入增长的原因之一。

Club Med的复购率和直销表现怎么样?

2025年Club Med直销渠道贡献超过70%的营业额,包含第三方平台上的官方渠道;到2025年底,提前预订已锁定2026年上半年超过75%的STS营业额。金卡和白金卡会员2025年复购率分别为66%和81%,该口径仅统计这两类会员,不代表全部客人。

Club Med在中国有哪些度假村和产品线?

Club Med在中国有三类产品:传统一价全包度假村位于丽江、桂林、亚布力、北大湖、长白山;地中海·邻境周边游产品线位于北京延庆、湖州安吉、千岛湖、黑龙滩;地中海·白日方舟城市度假产品线位于南京仙林、太仓、杭州龙坞。

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