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美团 在等一个拐点

关注新商业的 2026-07-03 14:01
关注新商业的 2026/07/03 14:01

邦小白快读

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本文核心讲了上市八年的美团市值回到发行价起点,交了千亿学费后进行战略调整,等待业绩拐点,核心干货如下:

1. 当前行业与企业基本情况:2026年6月美团股价跌破2018年69港元的发行价,王兴公开反思失误,美团手握超650亿元投资家底,通过回购股票稳住股价;监管出手叫停了持续一年多、烧掉2000亿的外卖补贴大战,行业结束无效内卷。

2. 美团的战略调整:关停亏损1118亿的美团优选社区团购业务,转型做发挥自身配送优势的小象前置仓即时零售,以及先跑通单店模型的快乐猴线下硬折扣超市;出海虽然起步晚错过窗口期,但目前在香港实现盈利,中东扩张速度快,已经覆盖主要海湾国家。

3. 美团的后续布局:持续进行股票回购,手握650亿投资布局硬科技与AI,AI投入全部围绕主营业务,没有激进烧钱,整体战略偏稳健。

本文梳理了当前本地生活零售领域的行业变化,能给品牌商的渠道布局、产品策略提供参考,干货如下:

1. 行业竞争趋势:此前持续一年的外卖补贴大战已经被监管叫停,行业确认禁止无序价格竞争,这场烧掉2000亿的战争没有带来行业增量,反而干扰了商家正常经营,未来恶性价格竞争会大幅减少,经营环境更稳定。

2. 新渠道合作机会:美团完成战略调整后,重点发力两大新零售赛道:一是覆盖55城的小象前置仓即时零售,收购叮咚买菜后补强了生鲜供应链,对各类快消、生鲜品牌开放合作;二是已经布局40余家门店的快乐猴线下硬折扣超市,走源头直采路线,品牌可以直接对接减少中间环节。

3. 客群适配方向:目前美团在高客单价外卖市场占据绝对优势,15元以上订单占比超三分之二,30元以上订单占比超70%,品牌商可以针对不同客群分层调整产品定价与规格,适配渠道需求。

本文梳理了外卖零售行业的最新政策与市场变化,能给卖家提供机会参考与风险提示,干货如下:

1. 政策与环境变化:监管已经引导头部平台达成行业共识,叫停外卖分钟级竞速和无序补贴大战,明确禁止无效内卷,恶性烧钱竞争成为过去式,卖家经营不会再被异常补贴打乱价格体系与订单节奏,经营稳定性大幅提升。

2. 市场机会方向:美团目前在新渠道扩张阶段,小象即时零售、快乐猴硬折扣超市都在快速拓城,卖家可以对接新渠道获得新的增量;美团推出的AI经营助手已经服务超340万商户,卖家可以借助工具提升自身经营效率,降低运营成本。

3. 风险提示:行业竞争水位已经被抬高,整体运营成本比之前更高,卖家需要避开过去靠补贴冲量的老路,调整经营节奏适配新的行业环境,优先验证单店盈利模型再扩量。

本文梳理了零售端的最新变化,能给工厂的生产设计、业务合作带来启发,干货如下:

1. 新商业合作机会:美团重点布局的快乐猴硬折扣超市,采用源头直采、精简SKU、压缩成本的模式,对工厂来说,直采模式可以砍掉中间流通环节,提升工厂的利润空间,同时要求工厂围绕高性价比开发精简款产品,适配硬折扣超市的定位。此外小象即时零售补强生鲜供应链,生鲜加工工厂可以获得直接的合作入口。

2. 产品设计需求:即时零售对产品的配送效率、保鲜能力要求更高,线下硬折扣对成本控制要求高,工厂可以针对性调整产品包装规格、生产流程,适配不同新渠道的需求。

3. 数字化转型启示:美团的经验显示,新技术要落地到核心业务才能产生价值,美团AI投入全部围绕本地生活主营业务,没有盲目烧钱追概念,工厂推进数字化也需要聚焦生产、流通等核心环节,避免脱离自身需求盲目布局新概念。

本文梳理了本地生活零售行业的最新发展变化,能给服务商带来行业趋势与客户需求的参考,干货如下:

1. 行业发展趋势:本地生活零售行业已经结束了过去靠烧钱补贴换规模的阶段,监管叫停无效内卷后,行业转向价值竞争,即时零售、线下硬折扣、跨境拓展是当前核心增长赛道,AI赋能主营业务是行业共同的方向,概念性烧钱已经被行业抛弃。

2. 客户核心痛点:过去恶性竞争阶段,商家的经营节奏被补贴打乱,利润被不断压缩;新渠道扩张阶段,商家缺乏适配不同渠道的经营能力,对数字化经营工具的需求十分旺盛。

3. 业务解决方案方向:目前美团的AI经营助手已经覆盖超340万商户,验证了市场需求,服务商可以围绕即时零售、硬折扣超市等新渠道商家的需求,开发针对性的供应链管理、定价、用户运营工具,贴合商家降本提效的核心需求,抓住新渠道扩张带来的服务增量。

本文梳理了美团战略调整的经验教训,对平台商的运营管理、风险规避有较高参考价值,干货如下:

1. 战略布局的经验:美团拓展社区团购业务时,用重资产切入不符合自身核心能力的领域,最终六年亏掉1118亿以关停告终,后续调整为发挥配送优势做前置仓即时零售,用小单店可控模式做硬折扣,验证了聚焦自身能力边界的重要性,启示平台拓展新业务要贴合核心优势,避免盲目扩张。

2. 行业风向规避:监管已经明确禁止无效补贴内卷,恶性烧钱换规模的模式已经走不通,平台需要避开政策风险,优先跑通盈利模型再扩张,不要盲目追求规模忽视利润。

3. 平台运营的启示:美团预留650亿投资作为战略弹药,AI投入全部围绕核心主营业务,不激进烧钱追概念,同时通过回购、创始人公开表态稳定市场信心,启示平台需要保留充足的现金流应对行业变化,技术投入要贴合核心业务,战略出现失误要及时纠偏调整方向。

本文记录了国内本地生活服务行业的最新变化与头部平台的战略调整,对产业研究有较高的干货价值,核心内容如下:

1. 产业新动向:监管介入终结了平台行业的补贴内卷,行业整体从烧钱扩张转向盈利修复,头部平台开始收缩非核心业务,聚焦自身能力边界,美团放弃社区团购转做即时零售和硬折扣,就是这一轮调整的典型案例,反映了平台企业从规模优先到盈利优先的整体转向。

2. 行业新问题:新玩家入局外卖赛道抬高了全行业的竞争成本,头部平台的守城成本大幅上升;头部平台出海起步晚,错过早期窗口后如何在成熟市场突围,是行业面临的新问题,美团在中东的扩张给出了初步探索:本土能力可跨市场迁移,只要加快扩张速度仍能抢占份额。

3. 新商业模式探索:快乐猴硬折扣采用先跑通单店成本模型再扩张的路径,和此前社区团购先烧钱换规模的模式完全不同,是线下零售的新探索;头部平台布局大规模战略投资作为战略弹药的模式,也为头部企业的战略布局提供了新的研究样本。

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Quick Summary

This article centers on Meituan, which has returned to its IPO price level eight years after going public. After losing over 100 billion yuan from past missteps, the company has enacted a strategic overhaul and is now awaiting an inflection point in its operating performance. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Current industry and company status: In June 2026, Meituan's share price fell below its 2018 IPO price of HK$69. Founder Wang Xing publicly reflected on the company's missteps. Meituan holds over 65 billion yuan in cash reserves and has stabilized its share price through stock buybacks. Regulators have intervened to end a more than one-year-long food delivery subsidy war that burned through 200 billion yuan, putting a stop to unproductive cutthroat competition across the industry.

2. Meituan's strategic adjustments: The company shut down Meituan Select, its money-losing community group-buying business that accumulated total losses of 111.8 billion yuan. It has pivoted to two new growth areas: Xiao Xiang (Baby Elephant) instant retail with front warehouses, which leverages Meituan's core delivery strengths, and Happy Monkey offline hard-discount supermarkets, which follow a strategy of validating a profitable single-store model before scaling up. While Meituan's overseas expansion started late and missed the early window, it has already achieved profitability in Hong Kong, and is expanding rapidly in the Middle East, with coverage across major Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

3. Meituan's upcoming roadmap: The company will continue share repurchases. It holds 65 billion yuan in capital to invest in hard tech and AI, with all AI investments tied to its core existing businesses, avoiding reckless spending. Its overall strategy leans toward stability.

This article outlines the latest industry shifts in China's local living and retail sector, offering actionable insights for brands on channel strategy and product planning. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Industry competition trend: Regulators have called an end to the year-long food delivery subsidy war, formally banning disorderly price competition. This 200 billion yuan spending spree failed to drive overall industry growth and instead disrupted merchants' normal operations. Going forward,恶性 price competition will decrease significantly, creating a more stable operating environment.

2. New channel partnership opportunities: Following its strategic reset, Meituan is prioritizing two new retail tracks. First is Xiao Xiang instant retail with front warehouses, which operates across 55 Chinese cities; after acquiring Dingdong (Fresh) Grocery, it has strengthened its fresh produce supply chain and is open to partnerships with all types of FMCG and fresh food brands. Second is Happy Monkey, the chain of offline hard-discount supermarkets that already operates more than 40 stores. Happy Monkey sources directly from manufacturers, cutting out middlemen and enabling direct partnerships between brands and the retailer.

3. Customer segmentation alignment: Meituan holds a dominant position in the high average-order-value food delivery market, where orders above 15 yuan account for more than two-thirds of total orders, and orders above 30 yuan account for over 70%. Brands can adjust product pricing and specifications across different customer segments to match the channel's demand profile.

This article summarizes the latest policy and market changes in the food delivery and retail industry, offering opportunity insights and risk alerts for sellers. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Policy and environmental changes: Regulators have guided leading platforms to reach an industry consensus that ends both the minute-level delivery speed race and disorderly subsidy wars, formally banning unproductive cutthroat competition.恶性 money-burning competition is now a thing of the past, meaning sellers' pricing systems and order flows will no longer be disrupted by abnormal subsidies, and operational stability will improve significantly.

2. Market opportunity directions: Meituan is currently in an expansion phase for its new channels, with both Xiao Xiang instant retail and Happy Monkey hard-discount supermarkets rapidly expanding into new cities. Sellers can tap these new channels for incremental growth. Meituan's AI business assistant already serves more than 3.4 million merchants; sellers can leverage this tool to improve operational efficiency and reduce operating costs.

3. Risk alerts: The overall competitive bar for the industry has risen, pushing total operating costs higher than before. Sellers should abandon the old approach of chasing volume via subsidies, adjust their operating rhythm to fit the new industry environment, and prioritize validating a profitable single-store model before scaling up.

This article outlines the latest shifts on the retail end, offering insights for factories on production design and business cooperation. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. New business cooperation opportunities: Meituan's core new focus, Happy Monkey hard-discount supermarkets, operates on a model of direct sourcing, streamlined SKUs, and cost reduction. For factories, the direct sourcing model cuts out middleman distribution links and increases profit margins, while requiring factories to develop streamlined, cost-effective products that fit the hard-discount positioning. In addition, Xiao Xiang instant retail has strengthened its fresh produce supply chain, creating a direct cooperation gateway for fresh produce processing factories.

2. Product design requirements: Instant retail has stricter requirements for delivery efficiency and product freshness, while offline hard discount demands strict cost control. Factories can adjust product packaging specifications and production processes accordingly to fit the requirements of these different new channels.

3. Insights for digital transformation: Meituan's experience shows that new technologies only generate value when applied to core businesses. All of Meituan's AI investments are tied to its core local services businesses, and it does not blindly burn money chasing unproven concepts. For factories advancing digital transformation, this means efforts should focus on core links such as production and distribution, avoiding blind adoption of new concepts disconnected from actual business needs.

This article summarizes the latest developments in China's local living and retail industry, offering references on industry trends and customer demand for service providers. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Industry development trends: The local living and retail industry has exited the era of chasing growth via subsidy-fueled burning. After regulators put a stop to unproductive cutthroat competition, the industry has shifted to value-based competition. Instant retail, offline hard discount, and cross-border expansion are the core growth tracks today. AI赋能 of core businesses has become a shared industry priority, and concept-driven money burning has been widely abandoned.

2. Core customer pain points: During the era of恶性 competition, merchants' operating rhythm was disrupted by subsidies and their profit margins were continuously squeezed. In the current new channel expansion phase, merchants lack the operational capabilities to adapt to different channels, and demand for digital operational tools is very strong.

3. Business solution directions: Meituan's AI operational assistant already covers more than 3.4 million merchants, validating strong market demand. Service providers can develop targeted tools for supply chain management, pricing, and user operation tailored to merchants on new channels such as instant retail and hard-discount supermarkets. By aligning with merchants' core goal of cutting costs and boosting efficiency, service providers can capture incremental service growth driven by new channel expansion.

This article summarizes the lessons from Meituan's strategic adjustment, offering valuable reference for marketplace operators on management and risk mitigation. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Lessons for strategic expansion: When Meituan entered community group buying, it adopted an asset-heavy approach in a sector misaligned with its core capabilities, ultimately shutting down the business after six years and 111.8 billion yuan in losses. Its subsequent adjustment—leveraging delivery strengths for front-warehouse instant retail, and pursuing hard discount via a controllable small-store model—validates the importance of focusing on one's core competency boundaries. The lesson for platforms expanding into new business is to align new initiatives with core advantages and avoid blind expansion.

2. Mitigating regulatory and industry risks: Regulators have explicitly banned unproductive subsidy-fueled cutthroat competition, and the model of chasing scale via恶性 money burning is no longer viable. Platforms need to avoid policy risks, prioritize validating a profitable business model before expanding, and not blindly chase growth at the expense of profits.

3. Insights for platform operations: Meituan has reserved 65 billion yuan in capital as strategic ammunition, ties all AI investments to its core businesses, avoids reckless spending chasing unproven concepts, and stabilizes market confidence via buybacks and founder public communications. This teaches platforms that they need to maintain sufficient cash flow to adapt to industry changes, align technology investments with core businesses, and correct course promptly when strategic missteps occur.

This article documents the latest changes in China's local services industry and the strategic adjustments of its leading platform, offering valuable insights for industry research. Key core content is as follows:

1. New industry trends: Regulatory intervention has ended subsidy-fueled cutthroat competition in the platform industry. The overall industry has shifted from money-burning expansion to profit restoration. Leading platforms are now shrinking non-core businesses and refocusing on their core competency boundaries. Meituan's abandonment of community group buying to pivot to instant retail and hard discount is a typical case of this round of adjustment, reflecting the broader shift from growth-first to profit-first among platform companies.

2. New industry challenges: New entrants to the food delivery track have pushed up industry-wide competition costs, significantly increasing the defense costs for leading platforms. With leading platforms starting overseas expansion late and missing the early window, how to break through in mature markets is a new industry-wide challenge. Meituan's expansion in the Middle East offers an early test case: core domestic capabilities can be transferred across markets, and market share can still be captured with accelerated expansion.

3. New business model exploration: Happy Monkey hard-discount follows a path of validating a single-store cost model before expanding, a complete departure from the previous community group buying model of burning money for scale, representing a new exploration in offline retail. Additionally, the model of leading platforms holding large strategic investment pools as strategic ammunition provides a new research sample for large enterprises' strategic planning.

Disclaimer: The "Quick Summary" content is entirely generated by AI. Please exercise discretion when interpreting the information. For issues or corrections, please email run@ebrun.com .

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千亿学费换来的清醒,和美团的下一程。

文|段泽钰

编|郭梦仪

一家上市八年的公司,市值却兜兜转转回到了起点。

2018年9月20日,美团在港交所上市,发行价69港元。八年后,2026年6月26日,美团股价盘中最低跌至63.65港元。

但转折,往往始于谷底。

美团股东大会上,一向强势的CEO王兴罕见低头。他坦承“过去几年股价不理想,我个人深感责任重大”,反思出海“应该更早”、复盘“优选”模式有问题,更直言“过去一年不合理的竞争耽误了整个行业几乎整整一年”。

话音落下,美团首席财务官陈少晖首次对外亮出投资家底,总值超过650亿元。三天后,美团斥资近1亿港元买入146万股,股价应声回到67.65港元。

更大的变化在行业层面发生。6月,监管出手,用一纸文件锁死了那场烧掉2000亿的战争被重启的可能性。

但战争结束只是修复的开始。优选与出海的昂贵学费,650亿投资家底,给了美团重新整理自己的空间。

八年扩张之后,它再一次站在了全新的起点。

1

2000亿的战争

美团换回了什么?

这场战争被叫停的时候,各方其实已经快打不动了。

2026年6月29日,在北京市市场监督管理局的引导下,美团、淘宝闪购、京东外卖三大平台与餐饮商家、行业协会达成五项共识,承诺“不搞分钟级竞速”。

一纸协议,给这场持续一年多的行业混战,按下了暂停键。

事实上,退潮的信号早在监管出手前就已经出现。

今年一季度,补贴大战首次出现缓和迹象。美团经营亏损也在此时从2025年Q4的161亿元收窄至65亿元,核心本地商业从亏损100亿元收窄至20亿元。

但市场对此的反应却是分裂的。

高盛在Q1数据后将目标价从112港元上调至116港元,摩根大通则维持"中性",认为需等Q2、Q3确认拐点可持续性。

这份分歧的核心在于:当补贴被外部力量强行暂停后,美团的利润究竟能不能回来?

在股东大会上,美团CFO陈少晖给出了这样一个数字:过去一年多,整个外卖行业的总补贴投入大约2000亿。

他给这笔钱的定义是“无效内卷”——除了补贴本身,没有给行业带来任何增量价值,反而干扰了商家经营。

换句话说,这笔钱烧出去,换来的只是数字上的亏损。

2000亿烧完之后,美团的财务数据是这样的:2025年全年净亏损234亿元,而前一年是盈利358亿元。这一正一负之间,差了将近600亿。

这一年,美团核心本地商业从2024年的盈利524亿元转为经营亏损69亿元,经营利润率从20.9%降至-2.6%;销售及营销开支暴增60.9%至1029亿元,相当于每赚100元收入就要拿出近30元用于补贴。

分季度来看,亏损的节奏与这场外卖大战的烈度高度吻合。二季度利润暴跌89%拉响警报,三季度核心本地商业亏损141亿元触达峰值,四季度亏损100亿元环比收窄。

但钱烧得最凶的时候,恰恰是美团与对手差距拉开最大的时刻。

竞争最激烈的2025年第三季度,被美团CFO陈少晖称为“最坏的时候”。

王兴在当季电话会上给出了两组数据,实付超过15元的订单,美团占有三分之二以上的份额;实付超过30元以上的,美团占有70%以上,整体市占率稳步回升。

“在这个过程中,友商与我们在单位经济模型上的差距,事实上是在拉大而不是在缩小。”

也就是说,2000亿的补贴烧下去,外卖市场的格局并没有被资本颠覆,美团依旧牢牢把握着高客单价用户,他的护城河依然在。

不过,随着淘宝闪购和京东外卖的入局,竞争的成本已经被抬高了。更高的“守城税”意味着美团难再回到过去的舒适区,但也同样意味着后来者想复制同样的路径,需要付出同等高昂的成本。

美团要做的,是在这条新水位上找的自己的节奏。

02

王兴的两个反思:

一个做错了,一个太晚

守城税变高,是外卖大战留下的账单。但美团今天的被动,不全是这场战争造成的。

在股东大会上,王兴复盘了美团过去几年的两件事。一件关于优选,一件关于出海。

先说做了,但做错了的美团优选。

2020年7月,美团优选在济南上线。9月推出“千城计划”,目标在年底前实现全国覆盖。

三个月后,这个目标超额完成。截至2020年第四季度,美团优选已覆盖了全国90%以上的市县,数量超2000个,日单量峰值突破2700万。

高光之后是持续失血。

2019年至2024年,美团优选所属的“新业务”板块(含美团优选、快驴、小象等)累计经营亏损高达1118亿元。其中,优选是亏损的大头。2025年12月,美团优选全国撤仓,千城版图彻底归零。

王兴说,优选是在美团“大零售”方向上的尝试。但社区团购的竞价逻辑会把非标品的价格越卷越低,最后卷到底线以下,“我们又不希望做底线以下的事情”,所以这场仗打到最后,美团的优势并没有发挥出来。

优选关停之后,美团换了两条路。

一条是小象超市,做前置仓即时零售。用户通过APP下单,骑手从社区附近的仓库直接取货,30分钟送达。

这套模式的核心就是“快”,这正是美团做了十几年的基本功。配送网络、骑手管理、算法调度,这些能力几乎都可以从外卖平移过来。

截至2026年第一季度,小象超市已覆盖全国55座城市。今年2月,美团以约7.17亿美元的对价,全资收购了叮咚买菜中国业务100%的股权。收购完成后,美团系在自营前置仓赛道布局进一步提升。

收购的意图也很明显,就是在小象的即时零售体系里,补强生鲜供应链这一环节。

另一条是快乐猴,做的是线下硬折扣超市。

2025年8月,快乐猴在杭州开出首店。王兴说,“快乐猴在一定程度上延续了优选想干的事情,但换了一种模式。”

与社区团购“先烧钱换规模”的逻辑相反,快乐猴是先跑通单店的成本模型,通过精简品类、源头直采、压缩成本来实现长期低价,再放量复制。

这种体量决定了它的管理半径可控、库存压力小、单店模型更容易跑通。

截至2026年6月,快乐猴全国门店已突破40家,完成了华南、华北、华东三大区域布局。

把这三条路放在一起看,差异就清晰了。

优选的问题,是它用最重的资产去做一件需要极致供应链效率的事。这既不是美团擅长的“快”,也不是它擅长的“轻”。

小象回到美团擅长的“快”的领域,快乐猴则把“省”的生意做得更可控。两条路都绕开了优选踩过的坑。

第二件,是该做,但做的太晚的出海。

王兴的反思是“出海应该更早”,2018年底或2019年就该推进,结果错过了疫情期间外卖渗透率快速提升的窗口。

2018年美团上市时,海外外卖市场正处于爆发前夜。等到美团开始推进出海时,欧洲、中东、东南亚的卡位战早已结束。

但晚不等于没机会。2023年5月,Keeta在香港正式上线,仅用29个月就实现了单月UE转正。

有了香港的经验,Keeta开始向更大的市场推进。2024年9月进入沙特,不到五个月市占率突破10%,此后40天内连开卡塔尔、科威特、阿联酋三国,完成中东海湾主要国家覆盖。

扩张的速度,正在补全时间差。

Keeta在沙特有望年底前实现单月UE转正,速度比香港更快。虽然Talabat、Deliveroo等巨头仍占据中东七成份额,但Keeta正在跑出属于自己的节奏。

优选六年亏掉的1118亿,换来了小象和快乐猴两条更清醒的路;出海错过了五年窗口期,但Keeta在香港和中东的表现证明,美团的验证过的能力可以跨市场迁移。

接下来市场要看到的,是这些验证过的能力能否转化为实实在在的利润。

03

美团留了650亿后手

优选和出海留下的教训已经转化为方向上的纠偏,但代价的兑现还有另一种形式:股价。

6月26日,美团股东大会召开当天,股价盘中触及63.65港元,跌破18年上市时69港元的IPO发行价。一家上市八年的公司,市值兜兜转转又回到了起点。

王兴在大会上罕见地正面回应了股价问题,他说“过去几年股价不理想,我个人深感责任重大”。

股价跌到这个份上,任何关于创始人的风吹草动都会被放大。

王兴在股东大会上特意澄清了外界对美团股价减持的猜测,“我从公司成立到现在一股都没有卖过,而且没有卖股的计划。”

但个人背书能稳住的东西有限,市场需要的是一个更实在的答案:美团究竟还能不能值回这个价?

美团CFO陈少晖说:“今天的股价,我认为是严重低估了公司基本面的价值。”

为了证明这句话,美团做了两件事:

第一件,是回购。

6月29日,股东大会后的第一个交易日,美团斥资近1亿港元回购146.27万股。三天前盘中刚触及63.65港元,三天后股价回到了67.65港元。

按照美团的原本的计划,每年回购至少覆盖公司增发的长期激励部分,大约是1%的比例。2024年1月到2025年5月,美团已累计回购了占公司股本约4%、接近36亿美元的股份。

之所以去年5月份之后暂停了股票回购,是因为外卖战事吃紧,公司将现金优先用于主业竞争。

陈少晖说“公司股价最后的表现不是靠回购做出来的”,这句话既是在提醒市场不要过度解读回购本身,也是在引出美团真正的后手:

650亿的投资版图。

截至2026年3月31日,美团持有理想汽车12.73%、智谱AI 3.86%、宇树科技7.61%的股权,加上其他非上市投资,美团的对外投资规模总计超过650亿元。

这是什么概念?美团在股东大会当天市值约为3967亿港元,这650亿,大约相当于市值的17%。

一家主营业务仍在亏损的公司,却在硬科技赛道上积累了一个将近五分之一市值的投资组合。

这些浮盈中,虽然有相当一部分没有成为利润,但它们是实实在在的资产。这也说明,美团在利润表之外积累,真实的回报远大于利润表上的数字。

那么这笔资产,美团打算怎么处理?

陈少晖表示,“已上市投资标的,过了解禁锁定周期后,我们会积极考虑变现”。但他也强调,变现需综合评估流动性、市场环境、资金需求等因素。

言下之意是,这笔钱是弹药,但什么时候打、怎么打,要看时机。

值得关注的是,这笔650亿中相当一部分来自AI领域的投资——宇树科技、智谱AI,都是这一轮AI浪潮中最受关注的。

于是,一个不可回避的问题摆在面前:美团手里拿着这些AI资产,自己会不会在AI上激进烧钱?

对此,王兴的回答很克制。他说,“AI带来的变化是巨大的”,但“短期内我认为AI入口还不会成为美团最颠覆性的事情”。

2025年,美团研发投入260亿元,AI助手“小团”在五一期间服务过亿人次用户,已有超过340万商户使用AI经营助手。这些钱,都花在了主营业务上,没有偏离轨道。

到这里,美团的后手就逐渐清晰了。

回购是短期的,稳住的是眼前的股价;650亿投资提供的是战略纵深,而AI加固的,是未来的护城河。

2000亿的战争,美团守住了份额,但守城的税从此变高了;两个战略失误,美团交了千亿学费,终于看清了自己能力的边界在哪里;650亿的后手,美团能否把对AI的战略眼光,真正转化到核心业务上。

美团的棋局,还没下完,但终究都要回到那张利润表上。

注:文/关注新商业的,文章来源:商业数据派(公众号ID:business-data),本文为作者独立观点,不代表亿邦动力立场。

文章来源:商业数据派

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FAQ回顾

美团当前的对外投资总规模是多少?

截至2026年3月31日,美团持有理想汽车12.73%、智谱AI3.86%、宇树科技7.61%的股权,加上其他非上市投资,对外投资总规模超过650亿元,约相当于其2026年6月股东大会当天市值的17%。

美团关停优选业务后推出了哪些新的零售业务?

美团关停社区团购业务优选后,布局了两条新的零售路径:一是主打前置仓即时零售的小象超市,截至2026年一季度已覆盖全国55座城市,还收购叮咚买菜中国业务补强生鲜供应链;二是线下硬折扣超市快乐猴,截至2026年6月全国门店已突破40家。

美团的出海外卖业务发展情况如何?

美团出海外卖平台Keeta2023年5月在香港上线,仅用29个月就实现单月UE转正;2024年9月进入沙特,不到5个月市占率突破10%,后续40天内连开卡塔尔、科威特、阿联酋三国,已完成中东海湾主要国家覆盖。

2025年前后外卖行业补贴大战总投入是多少?

据美团CFO披露,2024到2025年持续一年多的外卖行业补贴大战总投入约2000亿元,属于无效内卷,未给行业带来任何增量价值,反而干扰了商家经营,2025年美团全年净亏损达234亿元。

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