茶颜悦色退出酒馆 古茗卖起鲜啤：鲜啤是茶饮新答案？

Summary: Bubble tea brands are branching into alcohol, with two approaches and two outcomes. Key takeaways:

1. Chayan Yuese launched Day and Night Poetry Wine Tea · Arts Little Bistro in 2024, concentrated in Changsha. In September 2026 it announced the closure of more than ten stores, to be completed by October 31. The reasons were an unproven business model and demand mismatch: drinkers did not see it as a bar, while non-drinkers still faced a large alcohol menu; adding non-alcoholic drinks did not generate sustained healthy cash flow.

2. Guming piloted two draft beers at one store in Hubin Intime in77, Hangzhou: Classic Draft and Triple Yuzu Lager, in 500ml cups, at promotional prices of RMB 12 and RMB 15, with a beer machine; the mini-program shows product information and drinking reminders. Currently it is a single-store pilot only.

3. Industry data: in the first half, nationwide tea beverage stores had a net decrease of 43,200 over a year, with a closure rate of 16.2%; Guming's GMV rose 40% year on year, but net store additions in the half-year were 797, versus 1,265 in the same period last year; almost no hit products emerged in the past year.

4. Beer's benefit is off-peak timing plus repeat purchase: the milk tea peak is in the afternoon, while the beer peak is at night, so rent and labor from 6pm to closing are not wasted.

5. The most practical judgment: start with the lightest pilot, then look at three numbers—how many beer buyers already bought milk tea, how many return a week after trying it, and how long it takes for a beer machine to pay back.

Summary: This article offers three hard reminders for brand extension and product development.

1. Brand mind cannot be borrowed casually. Consumers liking Chayan's milk tea does not mean they are willing to make a special trip to its bistro to drink; they are willing to pay a beverage price for an ordinary drink, but not a bar price for the word bistro. Non-alcoholic drinks later sold better than alcohol, which shows the demand was for a tasty beverage.

2. Product development should move toward low alcohol, low price and beverage-like formats. Fulu Jia's main products are tea beer and fruit beer at 2.3%–6% ABV, accounting for more than 60%, tasting like fruity tea with alcohol; priced at RMB 6–10, exactly within Mixue's price band; Guming's two 500ml products sell for RMB 12 and RMB 15.

3. Consumption trends have changed: new products do not drive sales; co-branding and launches mostly bring one-time trials; acquiring new customers is increasingly expensive, and brands need stickiness. Beer's value lies in non-overlapping time slots and high-frequency repeat purchase; habitual evening drinkers feel uncomfortable if they do not drink for a week.

4. Channels are clearly divided into light and heavy: standalone stores require new space, staff and habits; adding products to existing stores reuses space, staff, ordering systems and customer traffic. After the single-store model works, spinning off an independent brand to take on supply chain and franchising is the more stable path.

Summary: The opportunity is in fresh beer, the risk is in heavy investment, and the path must be light.

1. Risk warning: the tea beverage market had a net loss of 43,200 stores in a year, with a closure rate of 16.2%; Guming's GMV rose 40% year on year, but store openings fell from 1,265 in the half-year to 797; hit products are missing and new launches are ineffective. Chayan spent two and a half years and more than ten stores to get an answer, at too high a cost.

2. Opportunity: the nighttime period is ready incremental space; no more people or stores are needed, just fill the hours from 6pm to closing; beer has strong repeat purchase and can supplement the stickiness that milk tea lacks. The fresh beer track has been validated: Mixue spent RMB 297 million in October 2025 to acquire 53% of Fulu Jia, which then had about 1,200 stores; by the end of May this year it had over 3,000 stores covering more than 300 cities, with 1,800 new stores in seven months, and one German wheat beer sold 100 million jin a year.

3. What to learn: test in the lightest scenario, with one beer machine and a few stores; if it works, go further; if not, the loss is limited. After proving it, spin off an independent brand to take on supply chain and franchising; Mixue incubating Lucky Cup and acquiring Fulu Jia follows this route.

4. Collaboration and operating model: start at 15 square meters, with almost no dine-in, mainly takeaway, operations simplified to the point that anyone who can open a tap can pour beer, and pricing at RMB 6–10, preparing for scalable replication.

5. Risks to watch: the peak seasons for tea and fresh beer both run from March to October, and winter is a low season for both; alcohol compliance and storage management are added costs.

Summary: The implications for production and design center on product form and replicability.

1. Product design needs are clear: tea beer and fruit beer at only 2.3%–6% ABV account for more than 60% of Fulu Jia's products and taste more like fruity tea with alcohol; the format is 500ml cups; winter seasonal limited editions such as winter brew ease the low season. This shows that low alcohol, beverage-like formats and seasonal limited editions are clear design directions.

2. Production and operation must be simplified to the extreme: stores start at 15 square meters, with almost no dine-in, mainly takeaway, and processes simplified to the point that anyone who can open a tap can pour beer. For upstream players, this means smaller, foolproof equipment; standardized, easy-to-store ingredients; and stable output.

3. Business opportunities: fresh beer supply chains, beer machine equipment, and ingredient combinations of tea, fruit and malt; Fulu Jia opened 1,800 stores in seven months, covering more than 300 cities, and one German wheat beer sold 100 million jin a year—such expansion speed will directly amplify supply-side demand.

4. Digital implications: Guming displays product information and drinking reminders in its mini-program, and stores use the mini-program ordering system to handle new products; collect sales, repeat purchase and payback data at a single store before deciding whether to scale, avoiding one-time capacity loading.

Summary: Customer pain points are clear, and solutions have already been proven.

1. Industry trend: tea stores had a net decrease of 43,200 in a year, with a closure rate of 16.2%; store opening is slowing; new products do not drive sales; brands are expanding into alcohol and coffee, and tea-coffee-alcohol integration is becoming a direction.

2. Customer pain points: from 6pm to closing, rent is still paid, staff are still present and lights are still on, but no sales are generated; repeat purchase is low and new customer acquisition is increasingly expensive; the standalone bistro format requires separate space, staff and consumption habits, making the model hard to validate; alcohol sales compliance, equipment and storage management are added burdens.

3. Solution: enter in the lightest way, testing one beer machine in existing stores and reusing space, staff and ordering systems; make alcohol low-alcohol, low-price and beverage-like, priced at RMB 6–10 and tasting like fruity tea with alcohol; use seasonal limited editions to ease the winter low season.

4. Deliverable methodology: after a single store works, spin off an independent brand to take on supply chain and franchising, forming a two-stage structure that separates demand validation from expansion. Judge results by only three numbers: the share of milk tea customers among beer customers, the number of repeat customers a week after trial, and the payback period of the beer machine.

Summary: The article's reminders for platform tenant recruitment and operations management are light models, complexity control and avoiding seasonal pitfalls.

1. Brands' needs from platforms: a low-cost place to test new categories, a way to fill idle traffic at night, and incremental products that reuse existing customer traffic, staff and equipment rather than opening another format.

2. Latest platform approaches for reference: use single-store pilots instead of heavy investment; Guming installed two draft beer taps in only one store, with a beer machine and mini-program display; Chayan tested with more than ten standalone stores for two and a half years and then shut them down, at a much higher cost.

3. Tenant recruitment and operations management: prioritize replicable light models—start at 15 square meters, with almost no dine-in, mainly takeaway, operations simplified to the point that anyone who can open a tap can pour beer, and pricing at RMB 6–10; also control store complexity—equipment, ingredients, licenses and operating hours each add a burden with every new category, menus get longer, but store mind capacity is limited.

4. Trend risk avoidance: the peak seasons for tea and draft fresh beer both concentrate from March to October, and winter is a low season for both; beer can fill a day's gap but not a year's low season; hot drinks and coffee still carry the low season; alcohol compliance and drinking reminders must be put upfront, and one monetization should not be mistaken for a second growth curve.

Summary: This is a typical sample of cross-category alcohol under stock competition in tea beverages; both new trends and new problems are clear.

1. New industry trends: Chayan Yuese closed more than ten standalone bistros, declaring the standalone format unproven; Guming piloted draft beer at one Hangzhou store; Mixue acquired 53% of Fulu Jia for RMB 297 million in October 2025, and stores grew from about 1,200 to more than 3,000 in seven months, covering more than 300 cities, with one German wheat beer selling 100 million jin annually. The tea beverage market had a net decrease of 43,200 stores in a year, with a closure rate of 16.2%.

2. Business model divide: heavy bets on standalone formats versus light addition of categories to stores; the validated model fully beverageizes alcohol—low-alcohol 2.3%–6% tea beer and fruit beer account for more than 60%, pricing is RMB 6–10, stores are 15-square-meter takeaway outlets, and operations are extremely simple—following a three-stage script of validating demand, spinning off a brand, and taking on supply chain and franchising.

3. New problems: store mind capacity is limited; after adding tea, coffee and alcohol, incremental gains diminish while complexity rises linearly; the peak seasons for fresh beer and tea highly overlap from March to October, so beer can add intraday capacity but cannot offset the annual low season.

4. Research implications: beer is closer to monetizing existing assets than to a second growth curve; whether it improves the single-store model depends on three unpublicized numbers—the share of milk tea customers among beer customers, weekly repeat purchase after trial, and the beer machine payback period; Chayan did not disclose revenue or profit, and Guming did not disclose pilot sales data, so insufficient disclosure itself is a research obstacle; alcohol sales compliance and drinking reminders deserve policy discussion.