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一纸28亿对赌 压垮老牌巨头

陶辉东 2026-08-24 11:37
陶辉东 2026/08/24 11:37

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本文核心讲述了老牌“彩电大王”康佳集团因一笔28亿股权转让的隐形对赌暴雷,陷入退市危机的完整过程,核心重点信息如下:

1. 事件发展:康佳上市34年,曾经占据国内彩电市场15%份额,连续多年位居销量第一,是一代人的集体记忆,后因错过液晶技术转型窗口、盲目多元化扩张失败,四年累计亏损近200亿,资不抵债。2021年康佳转让旗下易平方70%股权获28亿,私下和投资方签了隐形对赌协议,要求易平方2025年前完成IPO,失败则康佳按本金+年化6%-8%单利全额回购股权。目前对赌期限已到,易平方连IPO辅导都未进入,五家投资方起诉康佳,涉案金额合计7.58亿,康佳已被深交所实施退市风险警示,2026年净资产仍为负将直接终止上市。

2. 后续进展:目前康佳控股股东已变更为华润,手中尚有康佳光电、康芯威、新飞等核心资产,华润计划推进保壳重整,最终结果半年内就会揭晓。

康佳陷入退市危机的案例,给各类传统品牌的发展、转型、资本运作都带来了深刻的警示,核心干货如下:

1. 战略转型层面:康佳在全球显示技术从CRT向液晶迁移的关键节点,放弃核心技术投入转而大举投资房地产,彻底错过转型先机,最终主业逐步掉队,说明品牌发展必须紧跟行业技术迭代趋势,核心主业的技术升级不能缺位,盲目跨界非优势领域会带来毁灭性风险。

2. 资本运作层面:康佳为了美化当期财报、掩盖主业亏损,签署隐形对赌协议转让股权,短期增厚了利润,最终对赌失败引发债务连环暴雷,说明品牌做资本运作不能只看短期账面利益,带有刚性回购义务的隐形对赌会留下巨大的债务隐患。

3. 新业务布局层面:康佳布局易平方推进“硬件+内容”转型,但其业务完全依赖自身电视出货流量,缺乏独立核心竞争力,最终无法满足上市要求,说明品牌转型新业务必须培育独立的核心能力,才能应对市场变化。

康佳的案例给家电行业及相关领域卖家带来了明确的风险提示和机会参考,核心内容如下:

1. 规则与风险层面:当前A股退市规则执行严格,净资产为负、连续亏损会直接触发退市风险,同时上市公司必须合规披露所有协议,隐形对赌协议属于违规隐患,会引发连锁债务危机,卖家开展资本运作必须合规操作,警惕隐性风险。

2. 行业环境层面:目前国内电视市场已经进入加速萎缩阶段,2025年零售量同比暴跌10.4%,整体存量竞争激烈,传统主业增长见顶,盲目跨界多元化扩张会放大亏损风险,卖家需要警惕非相关多元化的陷阱。

3. 机会层面:当前汽车智能化、国产替代浪潮下,半导体显示、嵌入式存储芯片等细分赛道存在明确的政策和市场机会,康佳布局相关赛道已经积累了核心专利技术,只是缺乏资金推进规模化,相关卖家可以关注这类赛道的合作和发展机会。

康佳的发展历程,给传统制造工厂带来了诸多关于生产、转型、发展的启示,核心干货如下:

1. 生产技术层面:传统制造工厂的核心竞争力永远是紧跟技术迭代的研发投入,康佳就是在CRT转液晶的关键产业升级节点,错配资金投入房地产,没能提前布局液晶技术,最终逐步退出行业第一梯队,说明制造工厂必须在产业升级关键期敢于投入核心技术,错过先机就很难追赶。

2. 数字化转型启示:康佳想要做“硬件+内容”的数字化转型,打造易平方平台,但业务完全依附自身电视出货的流量,没有培育独立的核心竞争力,最终转型失败,说明传统工厂推进数字化转型,需要打造独立的业务能力,不能完全绑定原有硬件流量。

3. 商业机会参考:当前市场环境下,深耕成熟制造领域依然能获得稳定收益,康佳收购的新飞冰箱,依托原有制造能力和渠道基础,就能为企业提供稳定的现金流,而半导体显示、国产芯片等新兴赛道符合产业趋势,但需要足够的资金和时间才能实现盈利,工厂可以根据自身情况选择布局方向。

从康佳的案例中,可以梳理出当前行业的发展趋势、客户痛点和相关机会,核心内容如下:

1. 行业发展趋势:传统家电行业已经进入存量萎缩阶段,大量老牌制造企业面临主业衰退、转型困难、债务高企的问题,对于战略咨询、债务重整、资产处置、资本运作的专业服务需求大幅增长,相关服务商可以布局这一领域的业务。

2. 新技术服务需求:当前Micro LED、国产嵌入式存储芯片是国内技术突破的核心方向,康佳已经在Micro LED巨量转移技术上积累了全球最多的专利,相关技术正处于产业化初期,需要大量的产业化、市场化服务支持,服务商可以跟进这类新技术领域的服务需求。

3. 客户痛点梳理:当前困境传统企业的核心痛点是主业亏损、债务爆雷、保壳重整,服务商可以针对这类痛点开发从战略梳理到资产重组、再到资本对接的整体解决方案,满足这类企业的核心需求,未来这类需求会持续增加。

康佳的案例给各类平台带来了风险规避和运营管理的相关启示,核心内容如下:

1. 资本市场平台:康佳隐瞒对赌协议长期未披露,最终引发债务爆雷,说明平台需要强化上市公司信息披露的审核监管,对于资本运作中的隐形协议需要督促企业及时披露,防范隐性风险;同时需要严格执行退市规则,对于连续亏损、资不抵债的企业及时做好风险提示,维护市场秩序,规避系统性风险。

2. 招商运营层面:平台在引入传统企业合作或者招商的时候,需要做好尽调,关注企业是否存在隐形债务、隐形对赌等潜在风险,避免风险传导到平台。

3. 机会层面:当前大量老牌困境企业有保壳、重整的需求,平台可以针对性推出相关的服务,比如对接重整资本、提供资产处置的相关支持,既可以帮助企业化解风险,也可以拓展平台自身的业务边界。

康佳从初代行业龙头到退市边缘的发展历程,是研究传统制造企业转型的典型样本,有诸多值得研究的核心内容,如下:

1. 产业新动向:当前越来越多主业亏损的传统上市公司,会通过转让子公司股权、签署隐形对赌协议的方式美化短期财报,这种模式会积累大量的隐性债务,一旦对赌失败就会引发连环暴雷,这种隐形对赌爆雷已经成为产业界新的风险点,值得深入研究。

2. 产业新问题:传统老牌家电企业转型过程中,普遍存在战略决策短视、核心技术投入不足、盲目多元化扩张的问题,叠加行业萎缩、经济环境变化,很容易引发资不抵债的债务危机,这是传统产业转型中需要解决的共性问题。

3. 政策与商业模式启示:目前上市公司对赌协议的信息披露制度仍存在漏洞,需要完善相关规则,防范隐性风险;同时注册制下对拟上市企业科创属性的审核趋严,会倒逼企业培育核心技术,这一趋势对产业发展的影响也值得持续跟踪研究。

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Quick Summary

This article details the full story of how Konka Group, the once-dominant "King of Color TVs" in China, has fallen into a delisting crisis after a hidden performance bet tied to a RMB 2.8 billion equity transfer imploded. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Timeline of the crisis: 34 years after going public, Konka was once a household name that held a 15% share of China’s color TV market and topped domestic sales for years. However, it missed the window for transitioning to LCD technology and failed after reckless diversification, accumulating nearly RMB 20 billion in losses over four years and leaving it with more liabilities than assets. In 2021, Konka sold a 70% stake in its subsidiary Yipingfang for RMB 2.8 billion, and privately signed a hidden bet agreement with investors requiring Yipingfang to complete an IPO before 2025. If it failed, Konka would be obligated to repurchase all the equity at the original principal plus a 6%-8% annual simple interest. Now that the bet deadline has passed, Yipingfang has not even entered IPO counseling, and five investors have sued Konka for a total of RMB 758 million. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange has already issued a delisting risk warning for Konka; if its net assets remain negative in 2026, it will be delisted immediately.

2. Next developments: China Resources has become Konka’s new controlling shareholder. Konka still holds core assets including Konka Optoelectronics, Konxinwei and Xinfei, and China Resources plans to push forward with restructuring to keep the company listed. The final outcome will be revealed within six months.

Konka’s descent into delisting risk offers profound lessons for traditional brands across development, transformation and capital operations. Key insights are as follows:

1. Strategic transformation: At the critical inflection point when the global display industry shifted from CRT to LCD technology, Konka abandoned investment in its core technology to pour massive capital into real estate, completely missing the transition window and eventually falling behind in its core business. This demonstrates that brands must keep pace with industry technology iteration; technology upgrades for core businesses cannot be neglected, and blind expansion into unfamiliar, non-core areas carries catastrophic risk.

2. Capital operations: To polish its near-term financial statements and cover up core business losses, Konka transferred equity with a hidden performance bet. While this boosted short-term profits, the failed bet ultimately triggered a cascade of debt defaults. This shows that brands should not prioritize short-term book returns when conducting capital operations; hidden bets with rigid repurchase obligations leave massive long-term debt risks.

3. New business development: Konka launched Yipingfang as part of its "hardware + content" transformation, but the business was entirely dependent on traffic from its own TV shipments and lacked independent core competitiveness, leaving it unable to meet listing requirements. This proves that brands building new transformation businesses must develop independent core capabilities to adapt to market changes.

Konka’s case provides clear risk warnings and opportunity references for sellers in home appliances and related industries. Key insights are as follows:

1. Rules and risks: China’s A-share market now enforces delisting rules strictly: negative net assets and consecutive losses directly trigger delisting risk. Listed companies must also disclose all agreements in compliance; hidden bet agreements are non-compliant hazards that can trigger cascading debt crises. Sellers must operate in compliance when conducting capital operations and stay alert to hidden risks.

2. Industry landscape: China’s TV market is now shrinking at an accelerated pace, with retail volume plummeting 10.4% year-over-year in 2025. The market is locked in fierce存量 competition, growth in traditional core businesses has peaked, and unrelated blind diversification amplifies loss risk. Sellers should guard against the trap of non-related diversification.

3. Growth opportunities: Amid the current waves of automotive intelligence and domestic substitution, niche tracks including semiconductor display and embedded memory chips offer clear policy and market opportunities. Konka has already accumulated core patents in these areas, but lacks capital to scale up. Relevant sellers can explore cooperation and development opportunities in these tracks.

Konka’s growth trajectory offers many insights into production, transformation and development for traditional manufacturing factories. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Production technology: The core competitiveness of traditional manufacturing factories always lies in R&D investment that keeps pace with technology iteration. At the critical industrial upgrade inflection point from CRT to LCD, Konka misallocated capital to real estate and failed to pre-position LCD technology, eventually dropping out of the industry’s first tier. This demonstrates that manufacturing factories must dare to invest in core technology during key industrial upgrade periods; missing the head start makes catching up extremely difficult.

2. Digital transformation lessons: Konka sought digital transformation via a "hardware + content" model with the Yipingfang platform, but the business was entirely dependent on traffic from its own TV shipments and never developed independent core competitiveness, leading to transformation failure. This shows that traditional factories pursuing digital transformation need to build independent business capabilities, rather than relying entirely on existing hardware traffic.

3. Commercial opportunity reference: In the current market environment, focusing on mature manufacturing can still deliver stable returns. Xinfei Refrigerator, acquired by Konka, generates steady cash flow for the group relying on its original manufacturing capacity and channel base. Emerging tracks such as semiconductor display and domestic chips align with industrial trends, but require sufficient capital and time to turn a profit. Factories can choose their layout direction based on their own conditions.

Konka’s case makes it possible to map current industry trends, client pain points and relevant opportunities for service providers. Key insights are as follows:

1. Industry trends: The traditional home appliance industry has entered a stage of contraction and存量 competition, and a large number of legacy manufacturing firms face declining core businesses, difficult transformations and high debt levels. This has driven sharp growth in demand for professional services including strategic consulting, debt restructuring, asset disposal and capital operations. Relevant service providers can expand their布局 in this segment.

2. New technology service demand: Micro LED and domestic embedded memory chips are core focus areas for China’s technological breakthrough. Konka has accumulated the world’s largest patent portfolio in Micro LED mass transfer technology, which is still in the early stage of industrialization and requires extensive industrialization and marketization support. Service providers can pursue service opportunities in these new technology areas.

3. Client pain point mapping: The core pain points for troubled traditional enterprises are core business losses, debt defaults and restructuring to maintain listing status. Service providers can develop end-to-end solutions addressing these pain points, from strategic alignment to asset restructuring and capital connection, to meet the core needs of these enterprises. Demand for such solutions will continue to grow in the future.

Konka’s case offers lessons on risk mitigation and operations management for all types of platforms. Key insights are as follows:

1. Capital market platforms: Konka’s long-term concealment of its bet agreement, which eventually led to a debt explosion, shows that platforms need to strengthen review and oversight of listed company information disclosure, and force firms to disclose hidden agreements in capital operations in a timely manner to prevent latent risks. Platforms also need to enforce delisting rules strictly, issue timely risk warnings for firms with consecutive losses and negative net assets, maintain market order and avoid systemic risk.

2. Investment attraction and operations: When partnering with or recruiting traditional enterprises, platforms must conduct thorough due diligence to check for hidden risks including undisclosed debt and hidden performance bets, to avoid risk spillover to the platform.

3. Opportunity development: A large number of troubled legacy enterprises currently have demand for delisting avoidance and corporate restructuring. Platforms can launch targeted services, such as connecting restructuring capital and providing support for asset disposal. This not only helps enterprises resolve risks, but also expands the platform’s own business scope.

Konka’s trajectory from initial industry leader to the brink of delisting is a typical case for research on the transformation of traditional manufacturing enterprises, with multiple core areas worthy of study:

1. New industry risks: A growing number of listed traditional companies with loss-making core businesses are now using equity transfers of subsidiaries and hidden performance bets to polish short-term financial statements. This model accumulates large volumes of hidden debt, and a failed bet can trigger a cascade of defaults. Hidden bet blowups have emerged as a new risk point in the industry that merits in-depth research.

2. Common industry problems: Traditional legacy home appliance enterprises普遍 suffer from short-sighted strategic decision-making, insufficient investment in core technology and reckless diversified expansion during transformation. When combined with industry contraction and changing economic conditions, this easily leads to a debt crisis where liabilities exceed assets, which is a common problem to be addressed in the transformation of traditional industries.

3. Policy and business model implications: Gaps remain in the current information disclosure rules for performance bet agreements among listed companies, requiring improved regulation to prevent hidden risks. Meanwhile, under the registration-based IPO system, scrutiny of the sci-tech innovation attributes of prospective listed firms has tightened, forcing enterprises to develop core technology. The impact of this trend on industrial development also warrants continued tracking and research.

Disclaimer: The "Quick Summary" content is entirely generated by AI. Please exercise discretion when interpreting the information. For issues or corrections, please email run@ebrun.com .

I am a Brand Seller Factory Service Provider Marketplace Seller Researcher Read it again.

上市34年的康佳,已经走到了退市的悬崖边上。压死康佳的最后一根稻草,很可能会是五年前的一纸对赌协议。

8月15日,康佳又公告披露了一起股权回购诉讼。喜粤新媒二号股权投资基金要求康佳集团履行股权回购义务,支付1.21亿元——这是易平方对赌失败后,第五家把康佳告上法庭的投资方。在此之前,海南辉龙投资索赔2亿元,盐城康慧、盐城东方和江苏黄海金控组成的联合体索赔4.24亿元,湖南玖玥和湖南玖诚各索赔671万元。五起诉讼合计,涉案金额已攀升至7.58亿元。

至此,康佳的债务危机已呈现出失控之势。由于2025年末的归母净资产为负且连续三年扣非净利润为负。深交所已于4月30日正式对康佳实施退市风险警示,股票变更为"*ST康佳A"。

根据深交所规则,若康佳2026年的经审计期末净资产仍为负值,公司将直接终止上市。

康佳的名字是不少90后、80后的童年记忆,它巅峰时期曾经占据中国彩电市场15%份额,很多人家里买的第一台彩电就是康佳。这家曾经的"彩电大王",这次还能活下去吗?

一场28亿交易背后的“抽屉协议”

故事从2021年说起。

那年11月,康佳集团做了一笔看起来相当漂亮的交易:将旗下互联网运营平台——重庆市易平方科技有限公司70%的股权,以28亿元的对价转让给17家投资机构组成的联合体。

易平方成立于2015年,是康佳集团旗下专注于智能电视终端跨屏运营、内容分发与互联网广告营销的核心数字平台。在互联网电视生态概念最火热的那几年,易平方被康佳视为从传统硬件制造向"硬件+内容"双轮转型的关键棋子。

当时的智能电视大屏生态被视为流量蓝海,OTT广告市场方兴未艾。易平方的股权吸引了颇为豪华的投资方阵容,其中包括B站关联方上海幻电信息科技有限公司,还有重庆国资背景的昆域创新智能私募基金、深圳侨易数字化科技等。

这笔交易在当时的财报上看起来堪称完美:康佳收到全部28亿元股权转让款,一次性确认了约17.9亿元的股权处置收益,大幅增厚了当期的账面盈利。要知道,2021年康佳的归母净利润不过9.05亿元,如果没有这笔交易,康佳这一年就会出现近10亿元的巨亏。彼时,外界也把这笔交易解读为康佳"盘活存量资产、推动业务转型"的标杆操作。

没有人知道,这笔交易的帷幕之下,藏着一份"魔鬼协议"。直到2026年4月29日,在诉讼的倒逼之下,康佳才通过一纸补充公告将它公之于众。

原来,在易平方股权的公开挂牌交易之外,康佳集团还私下与其中11家投资方签署了附带刚性回购义务的补充协议。核心条款直指IPO:若易平方未能在2025年底之前完成首次公开发行股票并上市,投资方有权要求康佳以"投资本金+年化6%至8%单利"的价格全额回购股权。

这是一份典型的"对赌"协议。一切顺利的时候,可以当它不存在。而一旦上市失败,当年被康佳收入囊中的股权转让款就会转化为一笔巨额债务。

而直到现在,易平方甚至连IPO辅导备案都没能进入。

这个结局并不令人意外。易平方的业务根基是OTT,也就是依托智能电视终端做内容分发和广告营销。大家都知道,2021年之后中国电视市场加速萎缩,2025年的零售量同比暴跌10.4%,只剩2763万台。易平方依赖康佳的电视出货量维系的流量增量,自然也就陷入停滞。再加上,在A股全面注册制下,对拟上市企业的"科创属性"和"业务独立性"审核趋严,一个模式偏传统广告代理、缺乏核心底层技术的“互联网广告”公司,上市可谓是难于登天。

2025年12月31日,对赌期限届满,投资方迅速行动。

2026年4月,海南辉龙率先起诉,索赔2亿元;5月,盐城康慧联合体跟进,索赔4.24亿元;7月,长沙玖玥和湖南玖诚分别起诉,各索赔671万元。8月,喜粤新媒二号加入战局,索赔1.21亿元。五起诉讼全部集中在深圳,目前均处于一审审理阶段。

而这5家投资方索赔的7.58亿元还远不是全部。康佳在2026年4月进行了“前期会计差错更正”,将这笔对赌作为金融负债追溯入账。公告显示,该项对赌累计影响上市公司利润高达-13.26亿元。其中直接冲减2025年当期损益约-10.17亿元,追溯调整以前年度损益约-3.09亿元。

实际上,这不是康佳第一次对赌暴雷了。2018年,康佳向阿里巴巴转让子公司"开开视界"股权时,也签署了类似的未披露的IPO对赌协议。开开视界上市失败后,阿里巴巴于2024年提起了诉讼,使得康佳在2025年被迫支付巨额回购款。

对赌的连环引爆,将本就深陷巨亏的康佳彻底被逼入了死角。

一个时代的落幕:从"彩电大王"到被ST

康佳如今的窘境,非常令人唏嘘。要知道,它是中国改开后首批中外合资电子企业之一、深圳的初代标杆。早在1992年,康佳A、B股就同时在深交所上市,迄今已经当了34年的上市公司。

1998年,康佳超越了另一老牌电视厂商四川长虹,登顶了全国彩电销售额的第一。2003年至2007年,康佳彩电更是连续五年蝉联中国零售销量冠军,市场占有率一度达到15%。“买电视选康佳”几乎是那个年代中国家庭的一项集体记忆。

然而,在随后的二十年里,康佳却风光不再,不仅逐渐掉出了一线电视品牌的行列,甚至连上市地位都要不保。

回溯历史,康佳在最辉煌的时候,犯了一个迄今让很多人为之叹息的错误。在2007年前后,全球显示技术从CRT向液晶平板迁移。TCL斥巨资押注华星光电,打通上游面板制造;海信在画质芯片和激光显示上持续深耕。而康佳却在这个关键节点,将大量资金投入房地产,错过了液晶转型的黄金窗口。直到2008年末,康佳才在昆山建起液晶模组工厂,但先机已失。

到2016年,康佳彩电出货市场份额已降至9%,被挤出第一梯队。而后乐视、小米、华为等“互联网电视”崛起,又进一步挤压了康佳的生存空间。

从2018年开始,彩电主业节节败退的康佳转而选了另一条“赌味”很浓的路——跨界。康佳宣布向"投资控股平台"转型,业务版图急剧扩张至供应链工贸、环保水务、半导体、产业园区开发等多个领域。

多元化的确在短期内带来了高额的营收增长。以工贸业务为例,2021年贡献了296.83亿元营收,占到康佳当年总营收的60.45%。

然而,从2022年开始康佳的主营业务开始陷入持续的巨额亏损。2022年-2025年,康佳的营业利润分别为-22.21亿元,-26.81亿、-41.15亿、-105.08亿,四年亏掉近200亿。在主营业务持续亏损的情况下,康佳不得不通过转让子公司股权,甚至是出让土地厂房来回笼资金。

到2025年末,康佳的净资产已经下降到-60.83亿元,严重的资不抵债。

康佳还有什么底牌?

2026年4月30日,深交所对康佳实施了退市风险警示。康佳要想避免退市,必须要在2026年末让净资产转正,也就是要把60.83亿元的窟窿填上。

这个难度本来就堪比登天。雪上加霜的是,被ST之后对康佳的起诉书正在像雪片一样飞来,回购、索赔。2026年上半年的业绩预告显示,康佳的归母净利润预计为-1.3亿元至-1.8亿元,窟窿还在扩大。

在康佳满目疮痍的报表之下,康佳手中仍然值钱的资产并不多了。

其中含金量最高的,可能是子公司康佳光电。这是康佳2019年联合重庆璧山国资平台设立的半导体显示企业,2022年9月正式投产,已建成了从MLED外延芯片、巨量转移到模组封装的全制程产线。

Micro LED产业化的核心瓶颈在于"巨量转移"——将数以百万计的微型LED芯片精准转移到基板上。康佳光电自主开发的"印章+激光+检测修复"全流程技术,将巨量转移综合良率提升至99.999%以上,具备单次修补超千颗微芯片的工程化能力。截至目前,康佳光电累计完成超1900件全球有效知识产权提案,近三年在Micro LED巨量转移技术领域的公开专利数量位居全球第一。

不过,技术亮点不等于商业成功。这块业务仍处于产业化初期,持续亏损,MLED芯片目前主要供应康佳电视内部自用,外部客户拓展有限。技术储备与规模化盈利之间,仍隔着一道需要时间和资金填平的鸿沟。

另一个值得关注的子公司是康芯威。康芯威成立于2018年,专注于嵌入式存储主控芯片的自研设计。其首款eMMC 5.1主控芯片(KS6581A)已实现量产,可适配智能电视、手机、车载电子和IoT终端。在汽车智能化和国产替代浪潮下,这颗自研芯片具备战略价值,但距离规模化营收仍有距离。

还有就是新飞了,这也是一个曾经称得上家喻户晓的品牌,所谓“新飞广告做得好,不如新飞冰箱好”。2018年,康佳以4.55亿元竞得破产重整的河南新飞电器100%股权,将新飞旗下90项商标、293项专利和生产基地收入囊中。"康佳+新飞"双品牌运作下,新飞在变频制冷、商用冷柜和深冷冷链领域仍有稳定的制造能力和渠道基础。这是一块能够提供稳定现金流的传统资产,虽然并不性感。

另外,康佳现在有一个实力雄厚的大股东。2025年7月,华侨城集团将所持康佳全部29.999997%股份无偿划转至中国华润旗下。康佳的控股股东变更为华润。华润入主后,给康佳开出了从紧急输血到刮骨疗毒的组合药方,力求尽快扭转公司的形势。市场普遍期待华润后续将通过“永续债 + 资产处置 + 债转股”等方式推进康佳的保壳与重整。康佳到底是涅槃重生还是黯然落幕,答案在半年之内就会揭晓。

注:文/陶辉东,文章来源:投中网(公众号ID:China-Venture),本文为作者独立观点,不代表亿邦动力立场。

文章来源:投中网

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FAQ回顾

康佳为什么会被实施退市风险警示?

康佳因2025年末归母净资产为负且连续三年扣非净利润为负,深交所于2026年4月30日正式对其实施退市风险警示,股票变更为"*ST康佳A",若2026年末经审计的期末净资产仍为负值,公司将直接终止上市。

康佳易平方对赌协议的核心条款是什么?

2021年康佳以28亿元对价转让子公司易平方70%股权时,私下与11家投资方签署附带刚性回购义务的补充协议,约定若易平方未能在2025年底前完成IPO,康佳需按投资本金加年化6%至8%单利全额回购股权。

康佳目前还有哪些具备价值的核心资产?

康佳当前核心价值资产包括:掌握Micro LED巨量转移核心技术、相关专利数量全球领先的康佳光电,自研嵌入式存储主控芯片的康芯威,具备稳定现金流的白电品牌新飞,以及控股股东华润的资源支持。

巅峰时期的康佳在彩电行业地位如何?

康佳是国内首批中外合资电子企业、深圳初代标杆企业,1998年登顶全国彩电销售额第一,2003至2007年连续五年蝉联中国彩电零售销量冠军,市场占有率一度达到15%,是很多80、90后的童年记忆。

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