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头顶亏损压力也要抢“地王” 万宇清能否带保利置业“狂飙”?

吴磊 2026-08-10 09:01
吴磊 2026/08/10 09:01

邦小白快读

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本文核心讲保利集团旗下上市房企保利置业2026年的经营现状与扩张动作,核心干货信息如下:

1. 经营数据:2026年上半年保利置业实现合同销售额232亿元,同比下滑13%,仅完成全年500亿元目标的46%,预计上半年股东应占亏损7-8亿元,是15年来首次中期亏损,公告发布后次日股价大跌5.59%。

2. 扩张动作:2026年前7个月保利置业已通过发债融资40亿元,另有98.26亿元公司债发行申请获受理,所有融资均用于借新还旧;同时豪掷百亿抢地,拿下上海、武汉、深圳三地的地王,其中深圳地王楼面价达10.87万元/平方米,溢价率150.74%,前7月权益拿地金额位列行业第10位。

3. 背景:保利集团有保利发展、保利置业两个地产上市平台,保利置业规模仅为保利发展的五分之一,历任董事长都有千亿规模目标,目前由万宇清带队扩张,近期新增三位财务背景董事进入董事会。

本文给地产及相关行业品牌商提供了行业调整期的扩张案例与经验参考,核心干货如下:

1. 行业与消费趋势:当前国内楼市整体处于调整周期,市场量价承压,居民购房需求疲软,项目库存去化难度大,行业整体毛利率下滑,多数企业面临利润压力。

2. 可参考策略:背靠央企信用的品牌,可以依托低成本融资优势,逆势抢占核心城市核心地块,抢占市场份额,保利置业发债票面利率仅2.46%,成本优势明显,核心布局一二线优质区位符合行业长期趋势。

3. 风险提示:过去行业上行期“借新还旧+拿地扩张”的模式,在下行期风险极高,容易出现销售下滑、利润转亏的问题,品牌扩张需要平衡规模、利润与现金流安全,一味冲规模容易引发经营危机。

本文给地产行业卖家梳理了当前市场的机会与风险,核心干货如下:

1. 市场机会:当前核心一二线城市的优质地块仍然供不应求,央国企房企扎堆竞争,核心区位地块溢价率最高可达150%以上,说明核心城市的房产需求仍然有支撑,核心区位项目是未来的增长市场,卖家可以重点布局这类区域。

2. 风险提示:借新还旧腾挪资金拿地的旧扩张模式已经不适配当前行业环境,保利置业一年内到期的有息负债高达143亿元,上半年已经出现7-8亿的亏损,流动性风险持续积累,卖家扩张需要警惕现金流断裂风险。

3. 可借鉴点:依托央企信用可以获得更低成本的融资,拓宽融资渠道,优化债务结构,能够为扩张提供支撑,同时优质核心地块的长期价值仍然被行业看好,符合企业长期发展需求。

本文给地产产业链上游工厂梳理了下游需求变化与商业机会,核心干货如下:

1. 产品生产与设计需求:当前头部房企拿地集中在核心一二线城市的核心区位,拿地后多会开发高品质住宅项目,对应上游工厂需要调整产能,加大高端建材、高品质家居配套产品的生产供给,匹配下游房企的产品开发需求。

2. 商业机会:当前多数民企已经退出核心土地市场竞争,央国企成为拿地主力,保利置业前7月权益拿地金额已经排到行业第10位,仍然保持逆势扩张,头部央国企的供应链需求稳定,是上游工厂值得重点拓展的客户群体。

3. 风险提示:当前地产行业整体处于调整期,下游房企已经出现利润亏损、销售下滑的情况,工厂在和房企合作时,需要重点防控应收账款坏账风险,优化自身现金流管理,避免被下游风险传导。

本文给地产相关服务商梳理了行业发展趋势与客户痛点,核心干货如下:

1. 行业发展趋势:当前地产行业集中度持续提升,民企逐步退出土地市场和开发环节,央国企成为行业的主力玩家,头部央国企仍然有规模扩张的需求,服务头部央国企将成为未来地产服务商的核心业务方向。

2. 核心客户痛点:当前房企普遍存在大额到期债务兑付压力,保利置业仅一年内到期的有息负债就高达143亿元,大规模的债务置换融资需求旺盛;同时房企普遍面临项目去化难、利润下滑的问题,部分企业正处于战略调整阶段,需要财务梳理、战略规划相关服务。

3. 业务方向参考:服务商可以针对房企需求,优化债务置换融资服务、库存去化营销服务、财务咨询与战略咨询服务,精准匹配当前房企的核心需求,开拓业务增量。

本文给地产相关平台商梳理了行业需求与风险防控方向,核心干货如下:

1. 当前市场对平台的核心需求:一方面房企有大量的债务置换融资需求,保利置业短短7个月就完成40亿元融资,还有近百亿元的发债申请待审核,融资平台的需求旺盛;另一方面房企对核心城市优质地块的需求强烈,优质土地交易的活跃度仍然较高,土地交易平台的核心需求稳定。

2. 风险防控提示:部分扩张中的房企已经出现利润亏损、销售下滑、现金流压力大的问题,平台在开展融资业务、土地出让业务时,需要加强对房企资质和现金流健康度的审核,规避房企违约带来的风险。

3. 运营方向参考:当前央国企是行业拿地和融资的主力,信用资质更好,平台招商和运营可以重点倾斜央国企客户,匹配这类客户的业务需求,稳定平台的业务基本盘。

本文给地产行业研究者提供了新的研究案例与产业动向,核心干货如下:

1. 产业新动向:当前地产行业调整期,土地市场进一步向央国企集中,头部央国企依托低成本融资优势,逆势抢占核心城市核心地块,扩张趋势明显;过去房企常用的“借新还旧+拿地扩张”模式,在行业下行期已经暴露出明显风险,保利置业就因此出现15年来首次中期亏损。

2. 行业新问题:同一控股集团下双地产上市平台的发展困境凸显,保利置业长期规模仅为同集团保利发展的五分之一,想要冲规模突围就会牺牲利润,不冲规模就无法获得发展空间,千亿目标多次落空后重启扩张再次遭遇亏损,定位模糊的问题凸显。

3. 研究启示:研究者可以围绕集团多地产平台战略的合理性、下行期房企规模扩张与风险平衡的路径开展进一步研究,为地产行业转型发展提供更多参考结论。

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Quick Summary

This article focuses on the operating status and expansion moves of Poly Property, a listed real estate developer owned by China Poly Group Corporation, in 2026. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Operational performance: In the first half of 2026, Poly Property recorded contracted sales of RMB 23.2 billion, a 13% year-on-year decline, completing only 46% of its full-year target of RMB 50 billion. It expects a net loss attributable to shareholders of RMB 700 million to RMB 800 million, marking its first interim loss in 15 years. Its share price plummeted 5.59% the trading day after the loss announcement.

2. Expansion moves: In the first seven months of 2026, Poly Property has raised RMB 4 billion via bond issuances, with another RMB 9.826 billion corporate bond offering pending regulatory review. All proceeds from these financings will be used to refinance existing debt. Meanwhile, the company has spent over RMB 10 billion acquiring top-tier land parcels in Shanghai, Wuhan and Shenzhen. The Shenzhen site, a city-level "land king", carries a floor price of RMB 108,700 per square meter with a premium rate of 150.74%. By equity-weighted land acquisition value, Poly Property ranked 10th among all Chinese developers in the first seven months of 2026.

3. Background: China Poly Group operates two listed real estate platforms: Poly Development and Poly Property. Poly Property is only one-fifth the size of Poly Development. Every consecutive chairman of Poly Property has set a target of reaching RMB 100 billion in annual sales. Currently led by Wan Yuqing, the company has restarted expansion, and recently added three directors with financial backgrounds to its board.

This article provides real estate and related industry brands with an expansion case and actionable insights during the current industry adjustment period. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Industry and consumer trends: China’s overall property market is in an adjustment cycle, with pressure on both transaction volume and prices. Housing demand remains weak among consumers, project inventory digestion is difficult, industry-wide gross margins are declining, and most developers are facing severe profit pressure.

2. Referential strategy: Brands backed by central state-owned enterprise (SOE) credit can leverage their low-cost financing advantage to snap up core land parcels in top-tier cities and gain market share against the downturn. Poly Property’s recent bond issuance carried a coupon rate of only 2.46%, giving it a clear cost advantage, and its focus on high-quality locations in first- and second-tier cities aligns with the industry’s long-term trend.

3. Risk warning: The traditional "refinance old debt + land acquisition expansion" model that worked during the industry’s upcycle carries extremely high risk in a downturn, and can easily lead to sales declines and turning profits into losses. Brands need to balance scale growth, profitability and cash flow safety when expanding; blind pursuit of scale can easily trigger operational crises.

This article sorts out current market opportunities and risks for real estate developers. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Market opportunities: High-quality land parcels in core first- and second-tier cities still face undersupply, with central and local SOE developers clustered in bidding competitions. Premium rates for core locations can exceed 150%, indicating that housing demand in core cities remains supported, and core-location projects will be the future growth market. Developers can prioritize布局 in these regions.

2. Risk warning: The old expansion model of using refinancing to free up capital for land acquisition is no longer suitable for the current industry environment. Poly Property has as much as RMB 14.3 billion in interest-bearing debt maturing within one year, and posted a RMB 700-800 million loss in the first half of 2026, with liquidity risks continuing to build up. Developers need to guard against cash flow break risks when expanding.

3. Key takeaways: Backing by SOE credit enables access to lower-cost financing, broader financing channels and optimized debt structures, which can support expansion. Meanwhile, the long-term value of high-quality core land parcels is still widely recognized by the industry, which meets enterprises’ long-term development needs.

This article sorts out downstream demand changes and business opportunities for upstream factories in the real estate industry chain. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Product production and design demand: Currently, leading developers are focusing their land acquisitions on core locations in first- and second-tier cities, and most will develop high-quality residential projects on these parcels. Accordingly, upstream factories need to adjust production capacity, increase output of high-end building materials and high-quality home furnishing products to match the product development needs of downstream developers.

2. Business opportunities: Most private developers have withdrawn from competition for core land parcels, leaving SOEs as the main land buyers. Poly Property ranked 10th in the industry in equity-weighted land acquisition in the first seven months of 2026, and continues to expand against the downturn. The supply chain demand of leading central SOEs is stable, making them a key client group for upstream factories to prioritize expansion into.

3. Risk warning: The overall real estate industry is currently in an adjustment period, and downstream developers are already facing profit losses and sales declines. When cooperating with developers, factories need to focus on preventing accounts receivable bad debt risks, optimize their own cash flow management, and avoid being impacted by downstream risks.

This article sorts out industry development trends and client pain points for real estate-related service providers. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Industry development trends: Industry concentration is continuing to increase in China’s real estate sector. Private developers are gradually withdrawing from the land market and development business, leaving SOEs as the industry’s main players. Leading SOEs still have demand for scale expansion, so serving leading SOEs will become the core business direction for real estate service providers going forward.

2. Core client pain points: Most developers currently face pressure to repay large amounts of maturing debt. Poly Property alone has RMB 14.3 billion in interest-bearing debt maturing within one year, creating strong demand for large-scale debt refinancing. At the same time, developers generally face challenges of difficult inventory digestion and falling profits, and many are in the middle of strategic adjustment, creating demand for financial sorting and strategic planning services.

3. Reference for business direction: Service providers can optimize their offerings of debt replacement financing services, inventory digestion marketing services, and financial and strategic consulting services to precisely match the core current needs of developers and open up new business growth.

This article sorts out industry demand and risk prevention directions for real estate-related platform operators. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Core market demand for platforms: On one hand, developers have strong demand for debt replacement financing. Poly Property completed RMB 4 billion in financing in just seven months, with another nearly RMB 10 billion in bond applications pending approval, indicating strong demand for financing platforms. On the other hand, developers have strong demand for high-quality land parcels in core cities. Transaction activity for high-quality land remains high, so core demand for land trading platforms remains stable.

2. Risk prevention tips: Some expanding developers are already facing profit losses, sales declines and heavy cash flow pressure. When conducting financing business and land transfer business, platforms need to strengthen review of developers’ qualifications and cash flow health to avoid risks from developer defaults.

3. Reference for operational direction: SOEs are currently the main players in land acquisition and financing, with better credit qualifications. Platforms can prioritize SOE clients in investment attraction and operations, match the business needs of this client group, and stabilize the platform’s core business base.

This article provides new research cases and industry trends for real estate industry researchers. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. New industry trends: During the current industry adjustment period, the land market is increasingly concentrated in the hands of SOEs. Leveraging their low-cost financing advantage, leading SOEs are snapping up core land parcels in core cities against the downturn, with a clear expansion trend. The traditional "refinance old debt + land acquisition expansion" model commonly used by developers has exposed obvious risks in the industry downturn, as seen in Poly Property’s first interim loss in 15 years linked to this strategy.

2. New industry issues: The development dilemma of dual listed real estate platforms under the same controlling group has become prominent. Poly Property has long been only one-fifth the size of sister platform Poly Development within the same group. Pursuing scale growth to break out comes at the cost of profits, while forgoing scale expansion leaves no room for development. After its RMB 100 billion scale target was missed multiple times, its restarted expansion has once again led to losses, highlighting the problem of vague positioning.

3. Research implications: Researchers can conduct further research on the rationality of group-level multi-platform real estate strategies and the path to balancing scale expansion and risk for developers in a downturn, to provide more reference conclusions for the transformation and development of the real estate industry.

Disclaimer: The "Quick Summary" content is entirely generated by AI. Please exercise discretion when interpreting the information. For issues or corrections, please email run@ebrun.com .

I am a Brand Seller Factory Service Provider Marketplace Seller Researcher Read it again.

每逢月底,就到了房企“月考”的交卷时刻。

据中指院数据,2026年前7月,保利发展以1500亿元的全口径销售额位居行业第一,但和“第二名”中海的差距已经缩小至5.4亿元,继续卫冕地产销冠的压力不言而喻。

另一边,同属保利系的保利置业集团有限公司(以下简称“保利置业”)也在地产市场加速“厮杀”,一边豪掷上百亿在深圳、上海、武汉等城市抢地,另一边又向市场抛出一轮又一轮的融资计划。

但身处楼市“寒冬”之中,保利置业似乎也有些力不从心。2026年上半年,公司累计实现合同销售额232亿元,同比下滑13%,尚不到全年500亿元销售目标的一半。

7月2日,公司更是发布盈利预警,预计2026年上半年股东应占利润亏损7亿元至8亿元,直接由盈转亏,且迎来近15年来的首次中期亏损。

一边在土地市场狂飙,一边“流血”亏损的保利置业,还能否实现曾经的“千亿梦”?

01 左手百亿融资,右手抢“地王”

今年以来,保利置业一直活跃在融资市场。

7月22日,保利置业宣布,全资附属公司保利置业集团有限公司(由于与上市平台同名,为区分简称为:上海保利置业)成功发行一笔中期票据,金额为10亿元,票面年利率为2.46%。

这已经不是上海保利置业首次发债。据「子弹财经」不完全统计,4月,其发行了15亿元的公司债券;1月则发行了两笔中期票据,金额分别为10亿元、5亿元。

短短7个月时间,上海保利置业就已经融资40亿元,而这些资金全部用来置换其偿还往期融资工具的自有资金。

而其融资行动远不止于此。7月16日,上海保利置业一笔公司债券发行申请获得上交所受理,拟发行金额不超过98.26亿元(含),计划全部用于偿还到期或回售的10笔公司债券。

「子弹财经」梳理发现,这10笔公司债券本金余额为103.26亿元,到期或回售日期在2026年9月至2028年4月之间。

而这不过是冰山一角。截至2026年3月末,上海保利置业的有息负债余额为561亿元,其中一年内到期的高达143亿元。

保利置业一边加速“以新债换旧债”,另一边又在土地市场“厮杀”。

5月29日,上海第四批次集中供地迎来收官之战,当日浦东新区南码头片区近十年来首次出让宅地,吸引了中海、保利置业、华润置地、越秀、绿城、金茂等多家头部房企竞逐。

经过上百轮竞价后,保利置业、绿城进入到最后的「竞高品质和第二轮竞价」环节,保利置业最终以34.88亿元斩获土地,楼面价8.21万元/平方米,溢价率高达40.04%。

同一天,保利置业以8.02亿元竞得武汉市武昌区七医院地块,楼面价2.11万元/平方米,溢价率31.04%,成为武昌区“单价新地王”。

仅仅时隔一周(6月5日),深圳南山区一宗地块进行出让,由于地处腾讯、阿里、字节等企业总部所在的“世界第一街道”——粤海街道,华润置地、中海、招商蛇口、建发、越秀、保利置业六大央国企扎堆抢地。

最终经过291轮线下竞价,保利置业以57.72亿元胜出,溢价率高达150.74%,楼面价约10.87万元/平方米,直接刷新深圳涉宅用地楼面价纪录,成为深圳“新地王”。

据中指院数据,2026年前7月,保利置业权益拿地金额107亿元,位列行业第10位。

房企“借新还旧”,再把置换出来的自有资金砸向土地市场,本就是房企过去惯用的扩张打法。

而这套模式运转的条件是,房企需要持续保持融资、资金不断流,在行业上行期,不少房企用这种方式得以冲进“千亿规模俱乐部”,但在楼市调整期融资无以为继,直接触发了流动性危机,风险不言而喻。

02 两代董事长冲刺规模,“千亿梦”还做吗?

央企巨无霸保利集团旗下有两个地产上市平台——保利发展、保利置业。其中,保利发展总部位于广州,而保利置业的总部却在上海。

这与保利置业的发展历史有关。

2001年,保利集团和保利科技共同出资300万元,成立了「保利旅游投资有限责任公司」;2003年,公司注册地从北京迁移至上海,并更名为「保利上海集团有限公司」。

此后,公司又历经变更名称、股权和经营范围,「保利置业集团有限公司」诞生(即上文的上海保利置业),主营业务也变更为房地产

而这些地产资产陆续被装入保利集团旗下的上市平台「保利香港」;2012年,「保利香港」正式更名为「保利置业集团」,全称「保利置业集团有限公司」与上海保利置业同名。

而上文所提及的上海保利置业正是「保利置业集团」在境内的主要经营平台,以及核心发债主体。

截至2026年3月末,保利置业、保利发展的实控人同为保利集团。

虽同是保利集团的地产平台,但双方差距悬殊——2025年,保利发展实现合约销售额2530亿元,连续3年蝉联行业第一;保利置业仅502亿元,不到保利发展的五分之一。

长期活在保利发展的“阴影”之下,保利置业对规模扩张充满渴望。

在2020年业绩会上,保利置业时任董事会主席张炳南高调提出:“十四五规划”期间,起始目标是1000亿元,每年增速15%;若按照当时较高的增速计算,能做到1300亿元。

换言之,按照张炳南的计划,到2025年时,保利置业的销售目标要达到千亿以上,约是2020年销售额(521亿元)的2倍,被称为“再造一个保利置业”。为此,张炳南将2021年的销售目标锁定在620亿元。

但行业下行周期没给张炳南机会。2021年,公司实现合同销售额566亿元,只完成目标的91%。当年10月,张炳南就因工作安排,辞去董事会主席及执行董事之职。

很快,接棒董事会主席的万宇清重申了千亿目标。在2021年的业绩会上,万宇清表示:“保利置业可能前些年走得慢了一点,所以希望在下一轮当中我们能够快起来,而且越来越快。”

于是,他将2022年保底目标定为650亿元,但当年合同销售额仅实现了502亿元,同比减少11%,目标再度落空,距离千亿规模也越来越远。

自此之后的2023年至2025年,保利发展似乎放弃了“千亿叙事”,口径多为“维持500亿元规模”,而其合同销售额也一直在500亿元至550亿元之间徘徊。

那么,千亿目标是否已经彻底放弃?万宇清所提及的加快速度,是否还会坚持?如何平衡规模、利润和安全?对此,「子弹财经」试图向保利置业方面进行了解,但截至发稿仍未获回复。

进入2026年,保利置业的销售压力逐渐爆发。6月,公司合同销售额仅36亿元,同比暴跌25%;上半年累计实现合同销售额232亿元,同比下滑13%。按照年初设下的500亿元全年目标计算,上半年仅完成了46%。

以此来看,即便背靠央企,万宇清也很难带着保利置业在楼市“寒冬”中奔跑。

03 上半年预亏7至8亿,三位财务背景董事加入

销售一降再降的压力,终究是落到了财报上。

7月2日晚间,保利置业发布盈利预警,预期2026年上半年公司拥有人应占亏损为7.0亿元至8.0亿元,而2025年同期为盈利2.08亿元,直接由盈转亏。

而投资者迅速“用脚投票”。次日(7月3日),保利置业股价大跌5.59%,报收1.52港元/股。

在动辄亏损数十亿、上百亿的房企中,保利置业的亏损规模并不算大,但资本市场仍感到恐慌,一定程度上来源于利润转亏的信号意义。

Wind数据显示,这是自2012年正式更名「保利置业集团」后,公司15年(2012年至2026年)来首次出现中期利润亏损。

对于亏损,公司给出的解释是:今年上半年交付项目减少,导致收入出现阶段性下降。此外,市场量价持续承压令毛利率下跌,而部分长库存项目去化,进一步拖累毛利率水平。

简而言之,一方面房子不好卖,另一方面卖出去的房子也不太赚钱。

此时此刻,外界更关心的是,保利置业的亏损是暂时的,还是长期的?如若无法快速扭转亏损的局面,如何保证现金流安全?有保利发展在前,集团的资源是否会向其倾斜?若长期业绩不佳,未来是否存在被保利发展“收编”的可能?

对此,「子弹财经」试图向保利置业方面进行了解,但截至发稿仍未获回复。

销售下滑、利润转亏的同时,保利置业的董事会还在经历一场“换血”。

7月2日,保利置业宣布,刘文生获委任为非执行董事。

据悉,刘文生在保利系任职多年,现任保利集团专职外部董事以及上海保利置业董事,此前历任广州保利实业财务部财务经理、保利(武汉)房地产副总经理兼财务总监、保利发展副总经理、保利联合党委书记兼董事长,在财务、管理方面经验丰富。

2个月前(5月18日),张毅因到退休年龄辞任非执行董事等职,梁秀芬、黄家伦同时辞任独立非执行董事等职,林秀凤、臧蕴智接任独立非执行董事等职。

其中,林秀凤曾出任德勤·关黄陈方会计师行合伙人,还在上市公司德祥地产担任过执行董事兼财务总监,负责财务及会计相关业务;

臧蕴智2001年获得清华大学的会计学学士学位,自2015年7月起担任香港科技大学会计学系副教授。

短短两个多月,三位具有深厚财务管理背景的专业人士集体进入保利置业董事会,这安排的背后是否另有深意?是准备对融资策略进行调整,还是对往期财务进行全方位排查,亦或是集团计划对亏损进行调查?

对于这些疑问,「子弹财经」试图向保利置业方面进行了解,但截至发稿仍未获回复。

过去几年,保利置业就像一匹“黑马”逆势崛起,从名不见经传到顺利进入行业TOP20行列。但在销售下滑、利润转亏、董事会“换血”并行的当下,保利置业若继续在土地、融资上狂飙,万宇清还能否在风浪中稳住这艘巨轮?

注:文/吴磊,文章来源:子弹财经,本文为作者独立观点,不代表亿邦动力立场。

文章来源:子弹财经

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FAQ回顾

保利置业2026年上半年经营情况怎么样?

2026年上半年保利置业累计实现合同销售额232亿元,同比下滑13%,仅完成全年500亿元销售目标的46%;同时发布盈利预警,预计上半年股东应占利润亏损7至8亿元,为2012年更名以来首次中期亏损。

保利置业2026年拿地情况如何?

2026年前7月保利置业权益拿地金额107亿元,位列行业第10位,先后在上海、武汉、深圳等地高价拿地,其中深圳粤海街道地块以57.72亿元竞得,楼面价约10.87万元/平方米,刷新深圳涉宅用地楼面价纪录。

保利置业提出过千亿销售目标吗?

保利置业原计划在“十四五”期间实现千亿销售额目标,2021年万宇清接任董事会主席后也曾重申该目标,但2023到2025年其合同销售额一直徘徊在500至550亿元之间,之后未再提及千亿规模相关表述。

保利置业近期董事会有哪些人事调整?

2026年5月到7月,保利置业先后聘任拥有德勤财务背景的林秀凤、香港科技大学会计学副教授臧蕴智为独立非执行董事,聘任保利系资深财务管理人员刘文生为非执行董事,三人均有深厚财务背景。

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