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赚1334万、分红1.04亿!陈建军掌舵大亚圣象6年 利润缩水98%

王亚静 2026-06-25 15:52
王亚静 2026/06/25 15:52

邦小白快读

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本文核心披露了国内知名地板品牌大亚圣象掌舵人陈建军掌权6年后的企业发展现状,干货信息如下:

1. 核心经营数据:2020年陈建军接任后,公司归母净利润从6.26亿元缩水至2025年的1334万元,累计缩水98%,2025年扣非净利润亏损1761万元;营收从巅峰87.51亿元跌至45.75亿元,接近腰斩,截至2026年6月总市值仅30亿元,远低于同行。

2. 经营现状:核心主业地板、人造板受房地产调整影响,2025年营收分别下滑16.11%、18.26%;跨界新能源电池箔项目进展缓慢,总投资21.4亿元的项目仅完成一期60%,未产生收益,也未披露合作客户。

3. 值得投资者警惕的信号:任职18年的财务总监连续2年减持套现超120万元,还计划连续3年减持;陈建军2025年拿236.96万元高薪,占高管总薪酬61%,公司净利润仅1334万元却豪分1.04亿元红利,陈建军家族拿走超4800万元。普通投资者投资要避开这类存在实控人套现、主业下滑、转型不靠谱标的。

本文通过大亚圣象的发展案例,给家居建材品牌商提供了多方面的经验教训,干货内容如下:

1. 周期风险应对:依赖房地产产业链的品牌要警惕行业周期传导风险,大亚圣象作为头部品牌都出现营收腰斩、利润近乎清零的情况,品牌不能过度依赖单一主业,需要提前布局第二增长曲线,对冲周期风险。

2. 跨界转型提醒:转型不能盲目追市场热点,大亚圣象跨界新能源和原有地板主业无关联,项目进度远低于预期,还引发深交所炒概念质疑,反而打击市场信任,转型需要贴合自身原有资源储备。

3. 企业传承提醒:家族品牌要提前做好创始人传承和股权规划,大亚圣象创始人去世未留遗嘱,均衡继承模式引发多年家族内斗,持续消耗企业资源,直接拖累业绩增长。

4. 品牌信任管理:实控人和核心高管的异常行为会直接影响品牌市场信任,连续减持、反常高分红会引发市场担忧,进而导致品牌估值下滑,需要做好公众信任管理。

本文披露的行业信息,给家居建材相关卖家提供了风险提示和机会参考,干货如下:

1. 行业风险提示:房地产深度调整已经充分传导到下游地板、人造板领域,头部企业都出现业绩大幅下滑,依赖地产相关业务的中小卖家要警惕主业下滑风险,提前调整业务结构,降低单一业务依赖。

2. 转型避坑提示:新能源是当前热点,但跨界转型需要匹配自身资源和能力,大亚圣象拿到7000多万政府补助后项目进度仍然远低于预期,盲目蹭热点不仅无法带来增长,还会消耗企业现有资金,浪费发展机会,卖家转型需保持谨慎。

3. 合作投资风险提示:如果企业出现核心高管连续减持、实控人大比例质押股权、利润下滑反而大手笔分红的异常情况,往往是企业发展前景不佳的信号,卖家在合作、投资相关标的时要注意提前规避风险。

4. 市场机会:当前头部家居企业业绩承压,行业出清加速,中小卖家可以抓住市场份额重新洗牌的机会,深耕细分赛道抢占市场。

本文内容对传统家居建材生产工厂的发展有诸多参考价值,干货整理如下:

1. 生产端调整参考:受房地产市场调整影响,下游对地板、人造板的需求持续下滑,头部企业两大核心业务营收下滑均超过16%,工厂需要提前调整产能布局,优化产品结构,避免产能过剩带来的经营压力。

2. 转型参考:传统工厂跨界新赛道需要结合自身资源稳步推进,大亚圣象虽然早年有铝箔业务基础,但跨界新能源电池箔仍然进展缓慢,投产之后未获得稳定客户,说明即便有相关基础,跨界新领域仍有较高门槛,不能盲目跟风上马大项目。

3. 企业治理参考:家族工厂要提前做好传承规划,避免股权分配不合理引发内斗,大亚圣象因为创始人未留遗嘱,均衡继承引发多年家族内斗,持续消耗企业资源,直接导致业绩连年下滑,就是典型的反面案例。

4. 机会提示:有相关资源积累的工厂可以布局新能源上游材料赛道,但要做好资金规划,控制推进节奏,避免资金链压力。

本文披露了传统家居制造企业发展转型中的各类问题,给服务于制造企业的服务商提供了不少干货,整理如下:

1. 行业趋势:传统地产下游家居制造行业整体处于下行周期,头部企业都面临业绩大幅下滑压力,行业出清加速,服务商可以抓住企业转型、行业洗牌的机会拓展自身业务。

2. 客户需求与痛点:一是传统家族制造企业普遍存在股权规划、公司治理的痛点,大亚圣象因创始人去世未安排传承引发多年内斗,消耗企业资源,服务商可以针对性推出家族企业股权设计、公司治理咨询服务。

二是传统制造企业跨界新赛道普遍缺乏运营经验和客户资源,大亚圣象新能源项目投产后无法披露客户信息、进度缓慢,说明这类企业有转型咨询、资源对接的需求。三是下行周期中企业面临市值管理和公众信任建设的痛点,大亚圣象因异常行为引发信任危机、股价大跌,相关企业有公关和市值管理服务需求。

本文内容对泛家居产业平台、资本市场平台都有参考价值,干货整理如下:

1. 风险管控:平台要关注上市企业核心人员的异常行为信号,核心高管连续减持、企业利润大幅下滑反而反常高分红、实控人大比例质押股权,都是典型的风险信号,平台要及时提示风险,保护参与者利益。

2. 招商管理:泛家居产业平台招商要警惕企业蹭热点炒概念的行为,对于跨界转型和主业完全无关赛道的企业,要核查项目真实性和推进进度,筛选真正有转型实力和落地能力的企业,避免劣币驱逐良币。

3. 运营管理:对于家族控股的企业,要重点关注其股权结构和治理风险,提前披露股权纠纷可能带来的经营风险,帮助参与者判断企业真实价值。

4. 业务拓展:当前地产产业链相关企业普遍面临转型压力,平台可以推出转型辅导、资源对接服务,帮助企业对接新能源领域的客户、技术资源,既助力企业真实转型,也能丰富平台自身业务生态,提升平台价值。

本文以大亚圣象为案例,呈现了传统制造企业转型和家族企业治理中的新问题,给产业研究者提供了丰富的研究素材,干货整理如下:

1. 产业层面新问题:后地产时代,传统家居头部企业面临转型两难,主业受周期拖累大幅下滑,跨界热门赛道又因资源不匹配、运营经验不足进展缓慢,这种转型困境是当前大量传统制造企业面临的共性问题,具备较高的研究价值。

2. 公司治理层面新问题:家族企业创始人突然离世未做传承安排,均衡股权分配引发长期内斗,股权统一后实控人通过高薪、高分红套现,这种现象丰富了家族企业治理、上市企业实控人行为的研究案例。

3. 监管研究方向:当前不少传统企业借跨界新能源之名炒概念、套取政府补助,大亚圣象拿到7000多万政府补助后项目进展缓慢,这种现象值得深入研究,可为完善跨界转型监管政策提供参考。

4. 商业模式研究:大亚圣象的转型失败案例,为研究传统制造企业如何开辟第二增长曲线、如何平衡主业与新业务的关系,提供了典型的反面研究样本。

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Quick Summary

This article discloses the current state of China's leading flooring brand Dare Santouch (Daya Shenxiang) after six years of leadership by Chen Jianjun, the company's controlling shareholder. Key takeaways are as follows:

1. Core operating metrics: After Chen took over in 2020, the company's net profit attributable to shareholders shrank from 626 million yuan to just 13.34 million yuan in 2025, a cumulative drop of 98%. Its net profit after non-recurring items fell into a deficit of 17.61 million yuan in 2025. Revenue also nearly halved, dropping from a peak of 8.751 billion yuan to 4.575 billion yuan. As of June 2026, the company's total market capitalization stands at only 3 billion yuan, far lower than its industry peers.

2. Current operations: Its core businesses—flooring and wood-based panels—have been hit by China's real estate downturn, with 2025 revenue down 16.11% and 18.26% respectively. The company's cross-border new energy battery foil project, with a total planned investment of 2.14 billion yuan, has only completed 60% of its first phase, has yet to generate any revenue, and has not disclosed any cooperating clients.

3. Red flags for investors: The company's CFO, who has served for 18 years, has cashed out more than 1.2 million yuan via share reductions for two consecutive years and plans to continue reducing holdings over three more years. Chen Jianjun took home an annual salary of 2.3696 million yuan in 2025, accounting for 61% of total executive compensation. Despite a net profit of just 13.34 million yuan, the company paid out 104 million yuan in dividends, with Chen's family taking more than 48 million yuan. Retail investors are advised to avoid stocks with controlling shareholder cash-outs, declining core businesses and unviable transformations.

This article draws key lessons from the Dare Santouch case for home building materials brands, as follows:

1. Managing cyclical risk: Brands relying on the real estate industry chain must be alert to the transmission of sector downturn risk. Even a leading player like Dare Santouch saw revenue halved and profits nearly wiped out. Brands should not over-rely on a single core business and must lay the groundwork for a second growth curve in advance to hedge against cyclical volatility.

2. Avoiding blind cross-sector transformation: Companies should not chase market hotspots blindly. Dare Santouch's new energy pivot is completely unrelated to its core flooring business, has fallen far behind schedule, and drew accusations of concept-stock hype from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, damaging market trust. Transformations should align with a company's existing resource reserves.

3. Succession planning for family-owned brands: Family brands must complete founder succession and equity planning well in advance. After Dare Santouch's founder passed away without a will, an equal inheritance model triggered years of internal family infighting that continuously drained corporate resources and directly dragged down performance growth.

4. Managing brand trust: Abnormal behavior by controlling shareholders and core executives directly erodes market trust in a brand. Consecutive share reductions and反常 high dividend payouts trigger market concerns and ultimately pull down brand valuation. Companies must prioritize proactive public trust management.

The industry insights disclosed in this article offer risk alerts and opportunity references for home building materials sellers, as follows:

1. Industry risk warning: The deep correction in China's real estate market has fully transmitted to downstream flooring and wood-based panel sectors, with even leading players seeing sharp performance declines. Small and medium-sized sellers relying on real estate-related businesses should be alert to core business downside risk, adjust their business structure early, and reduce dependence on a single business line.

2. Pitfalls to avoid in transformation: While new energy is a current market hotspot, cross-sector pivots must align with a company's own resources and capabilities. Even after receiving more than 70 million yuan in government subsidies, Dare Santouch's project still falls far behind schedule. Blindly chasing hotspots not only fails to drive growth but also drains existing capital and wastes development opportunities. Sellers should approach transformation with caution.

3. Cooperation and investment risk warning: Abnormal behaviors such as consecutive share reductions by core executives, large-scale share pledges by controlling shareholders, and large dividend payouts amid plummeting profits are often signals of poor business prospects. Sellers should screen for these red flags in advance when entering partnerships or making investments.

4. Market opportunities: As leading home enterprises face performance pressure and industry consolidation accelerates, small and medium-sized sellers can capitalize on market share reshuffling by focusing on deep cultivation of niche segments to grab market share.

This article offers valuable insights for traditional home building materials manufacturing factories, summarized as follows:

1. Reference for production-side adjustments: Driven by the real estate correction, downstream demand for flooring and wood-based panels continues to decline, with the two core businesses of the leading player Dare Santouch both posting revenue drops of more than 16%. Factories should adjust production capacity布局 early, optimize product structure, and avoid operating pressure from overcapacity.

2. Guidance for transformation: Traditional factories pursuing new sector expansion should advance steadily based on their own existing resources. Although Dare Santouch had early experience in aluminum foil production, its new energy battery foil project is still progressing slowly and has yet to secure stable customers even after commissioning. This shows that even with relevant foundational experience, cross-sector entry still carries high barriers, and companies should not rush to launch large projects by blindly following trends.

3. Reference for corporate governance: Family-owned factories must complete succession planning in advance to avoid internal conflict caused by unreasonable equity allocation. Dare Santouch, where the founder passed away without a will and equal inheritance triggered years of internal infighting that drained resources and led to consecutive years of falling performance, is a clear cautionary tale.

4. Opportunity提示: Factories with relevant accumulated resources can enter the upstream new energy materials track, but must make sound capital planning, control the pace of progress, and avoid excessive pressure on cash flow.

This article outlines the various challenges encountered by traditional home manufacturing enterprises in transformation and development, offering key takeaways for service providers serving manufacturing firms, as follows:

1. Industry trends: The traditional home manufacturing sector downstream of real estate is in a full downcycle, with even leading players facing sharp performance declines and accelerated industry consolidation. Service providers can capitalize on the wave of enterprise transformation and industry reshuffling to expand their own business.

2. Client needs and pain points: First, traditional family-owned manufacturing enterprises commonly face pain points in equity planning and corporate governance. The years of infighting and resource drain at Dare Santouch, triggered by a lack of succession planning after the founder's death, means service providers can develop targeted offerings for family businesses including equity structure design and corporate governance consulting.

Second, traditional manufacturing enterprises pivoting to new sectors generally lack operational experience and client resources. Dare Santouch's slow project progress and inability to disclose client information for its new energy project shows these firms have demand for transformation consulting and resource matching services. Third, during a downcycle, enterprises face pain points in market capitalization management and public trust building. Dare Santouch's trust crisis and sharp share price drop triggered by abnormal corporate behavior proves there is unmet demand for public relations and market capitalization management services.

This article offers valuable reference for both pan-home industry platforms and capital market platforms, summarized as follows:

1. Risk control: Platforms should monitor abnormal behavior signals from core personnel of listed companies. Consecutive share reductions by core executives,反常 large dividend payouts amid plummeting profits, and large-scale share pledges by controlling shareholders are all classic red flags. Platforms should issue timely risk alerts to protect the interests of platform participants.

2. Investment recruitment management: Pan-home industry platforms should guard against firms hyping concepts to capitalize on market hotspots when onboarding new members. For enterprises pivoting to sectors completely unrelated to their core business, platforms should verify project authenticity and progress, and screen for enterprises with actual transformation capabilities and execution capacity, to avoid bad money driving out good.

3. Operation management: For family-controlled enterprises, platforms should prioritize monitoring equity structure and governance risks, proactively disclose operational risks stemming from equity disputes, and help participants assess the true value of the enterprise.

4. Business expansion: At present, most enterprises along the real estate industry chain face transformation pressure. Platforms can launch transformation coaching and resource matching services to help enterprises connect with clients and technical resources in the new energy sector. This not only supports genuine enterprise transformation but also enriches the platform's own business ecosystem and enhances platform value.

This article uses Dare Santouch as a case study to present new issues in traditional manufacturing transformation and family business governance, offering rich research material for industry researchers, as follows:

1. New industry-level issues: In the post-real estate boom era, leading traditional home enterprises face a transformation dilemma: core businesses are dragged down by cyclical downturns with sharp declines, while pivots to popular high-growth sectors progress slowly due to mismatched resources and lack of operational experience. This transformation dilemma is a common challenge facing a large number of traditional manufacturing enterprises today, and carries high research value.

2. New corporate governance issues: The sudden passing of a family business founder without a succession plan, long-term internal conflict triggered by equal equity distribution, and controlling shareholder cash-out via high salaries and large dividends after equity unification, this case enriches research on family business governance and the behavior of controlling shareholders of listed companies.

3. Direction for regulatory research: Currently, many traditional enterprises hype new energy transformation concepts to obtain government subsidies. Dare Santouch's slow project progress after receiving more than 70 million yuan in subsidies is a phenomenon worthy of in-depth study, and can provide reference for improving regulatory policies for cross-sector transformation.

4. Business model research: Dare Santouch's failed transformation provides a typical cautionary case for research on how traditional manufacturing enterprises can build a second growth curve and balance the relationship between core business and new ventures.

Disclaimer: The "Quick Summary" content is entirely generated by AI. Please exercise discretion when interpreting the information. For issues or corrections, please email run@ebrun.com .

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完成2025年分红近一个月后,大亚圣象高管陈钢快速抛出了减持计划。

在大亚圣象,陈钢已担任财务总监长达18年,自然十分熟悉企业的财务、经营情况,而他计划连续三年减持的行为,让资本市场深感不安:大亚圣象到底怎么了?

大亚圣象当前以人造板、地板为主业,旗下拥有「圣象」地板和「大亚」人造板,品牌价值合计上千亿,公司巅峰时期营收一度超过87亿元。

但到了2025年,公司营收只剩下45.75亿元,几乎回落到近20年前的水平——早在2006年,其营收就已有42.19亿元。

在资本市场,大亚圣象的股价更是“跌跌不休”。截至2026年6月24日,其股价报收5.51元/股,较今年1月的高点7.79元/股跌去约29%,总市值仅剩30亿元,被投资者吐槽“现在估值还没同行的零头”。

但这并不影响陈建军家族拿走大额分红。2025年,在公司归母净利润只有1334万元的情况下,大亚圣象豪掷1.04亿元分红,股利支付率高达780%。作为持有大亚圣象46.44%股权的控股股东,陈建军家族间接控制的大亚集团拿走超4800万元分红。

在业绩承压、股价下滑之下,陈建军家族加速“收割”现金的举动难免加剧市场担忧:大亚圣象究竟能否重回增长正轨?

1

财务总监套现上百万,

归母净利润6年缩水98%

2026年6月9日收盘后,大亚圣象发布公告披露,因个人资金需求,公司高管陈钢拟减持不超过5.06万股公司股票。若顶格减持,这些股票约占其所持股份的1/4。

这已经不是陈钢第一次抛出减持计划。2024年,陈钢减持9万股,套现71.55万元;2025年,再次减持6.75万股,套现50.42万元,2年累计套现超120万元。

「子弹财经」注意到,上述所减持股票皆是陈钢获得的股权激励股份,而在过去两年减持之时,陈钢每次都选择将无限售条件股份全部清仓。

在大亚圣象,陈钢的地位并不一般。2025年财报披露,2008年5月至今,陈钢任公司财务总监,2019年12月起出任董事,2020年6月起又兼任副总裁,是公司的“老臣”。

2024年和2025年,陈钢每年的薪酬都超过70万元,这一薪资水平仅次于公司董事长兼总裁陈建军。

既然如此,陈钢为何自2024年以来连续减持套现?两次清仓无限售股份后,接下来是否会全部清仓所持股权?是否对公司未来发展缺乏信心?对此,「子弹财经」试图向大亚圣象方面进行了解,但截至发稿仍未获回复。

对资本市场而言,近三年来,陈钢计划“每年减持一次”的节奏似乎在传递“消极信号”,尤其是公司业绩已连续下滑多年。

将时间倒回至2020年,这一年是大亚圣象的一个重要转折点。

2020年5月31日,公司时任董事长陈晓龙因病去世;6月,陈晓龙的哥哥陈建军出任董事长一职。

陈建军接手第一年,大亚圣象就交出了一份营收、利润双下滑的“成绩单”:2020年,公司营收同比减少0.46%至72.64亿元,时隔3年再次下滑;归母净利润的下挫幅度则达到13.07%。

2021年,陈建军终于将大亚圣象的营收拉回增长,达到历史巅峰的87.51亿元,但并未同步带动净利润修复,当年归母净利润同比下滑4.86%至5.95亿元。

此后,恰逢上游房地产“遇冷”,压力快速传导至主营地板的大亚圣象。从2022年开始,大亚圣象的营收一降再降,到2025年时只剩下45.75亿元,较巅峰时期接近“腰斩”。

在陈建军掌舵的6年时间(2020年至2025年)里,公司归母净利润从2020年的6.26亿元逐年下滑到2025年的1334万元,累计缩水约98%。

即便是这样的利润表现,还要依赖政府补助、金融资产升值等一次性收益的助力,若扣除非经常性损益,其2025年扣非后归母净利润已经转入亏损,亏损金额达到1761万元,同比大跌115.98%。

2

主业地板明显承压,

跨界新能源进展缓慢

在一定程度上,大亚圣象可以看作是「大亚」和「圣象」两个品牌的集合。

大亚集团的历史可以追溯至1978年。当时,集团的前身丹阳县埤城城南农机抛光厂产品没有市场,经营举步维艰。在村支书的邀请下,陈兴康放弃南京的“铁饭碗”,带着全部7000元积蓄回到家乡,作为创业启动资金投入到农机抛光厂。

此后,陈兴康又进军铝箔市场。1999年,陈兴康将「江苏大亚新型包装材料股份有限公司」送上深交所,主营烟酒、医药、食品等包装用的铝箔复合纸和卡纸,烟用滤嘴材料聚丙烯丝束等产品。

为了撬动“第二增长曲线”,陈兴康在2002年决定收购圣象集团60%股权;2009年,大亚圣象(时称:大亚科技)又收购了圣象集团剩余40%的股权,将圣象集团完全收入囊中。

由于圣象有“中国强化地板之父”的称号,品牌价值上千亿,于是大亚2016年融合圣象品牌,形成了现在的大亚圣象,地板和人造板逐渐成为两大核心主业。

其中,「圣象」品牌有强化木地板、三层实木地板、多层实木地板等;人造板业务主要产品有「大亚」中高密度纤维板和刨花板等。

时至今日,房地产市场仍处于深度调整期中,家居行业也受到影响。在大亚圣象,两大核心产品的表现不甚理想。2025年,木地板营收同比下滑16.11%、中高密度板则同比下滑18.26%。

面对主业的颓势,大亚圣象选择了一条令市场意外的道路——跨界新能源。

2023年12月底,公司宣布计划在广西百色市投资新建年产12万吨厚度低于0.5mm铝板带,以及4万吨电池箔项目,项目总投资约21.4亿元。其中,一期铝板带预计2024年建成投产、二期电池箔预计2025年建成投产。

据悉,电池箔下游消费以动力电池、储能电池、数码电子产品三大领域为主,确实属于市场热点,但这与大亚圣象的地板主业并无关联,这也导致深交所快速下发了关注函,质疑公司“是否存在炒概念、蹭热点的情形”?而大亚圣象对此予以否认,并坚称投资项目合理、可行。

但现实情况是,大亚圣象计划投资项目的进展相当缓慢,完全落后于预期。

2025年财报显示,广西铝板带项目已累计投资4.21亿元,进展只有60%,未实现任何收益,而电池箔项目的具体进展甚至都没有出现在财报之上。

在2026年4月举行的业绩会上,大亚圣象管理层表示广西铝板带项目已投产,二期电池箔项目正在有序推进中。至于投资者追问的新能源合作客户具体情况,管理层则避而不答。

「子弹财经」注意到,在宣布计划于广西百色市投资之后,公司于2024年1月收到政府补助的专项资金7196.92万元。

那么,公司在收到巨额专项资金之后,为何推进项目的进度如此缓慢?铝板带项目投产之后,开拓了哪些领域的客户?大亚集团深耕铝箔市场,是否为公司拓展客户牵线搭桥?预计铝板带项目何时能产生收益?电池箔项目预计何时落地?2025年财报为何没有披露电池箔的具体进展?

对此,「子弹财经」试图向大亚圣象方面进行了解,但截至发稿仍未获回复。

3

左手高薪右手高分红,

陈建军加速"薅羊毛"?

在业绩表现之外,大亚圣象还曾因激烈的家族内斗而成为市场焦点。

2015年4月,时年70岁的陈兴康因意外摔倒去世,但生前未订立遗嘱。同年8月27日,大亚圣象披露,陈兴康配偶戴品哎在率先分得50%夫妻共同财产后,又与三个子女陈巧玲、陈建军、陈晓龙平均继承了陈兴康留下的遗产。

这种"均衡分配"的继承模式,也为后来的家族内斗埋下了隐患。

继承遗产前的2015年8月25日,陈兴康次子陈晓龙被正式增补为大亚圣象董事;7天后(9月1日),又被选举为董事长。作为哥哥的陈建军在2015年10月才开始出任子公司圣象集团的总裁,直到2017年5月才开始出任大亚圣象的董事,兄弟二人的职位差异悬殊。

2018年至2019年,公司曾爆发多轮股权与管理层纠纷:陈晓龙、陈建军在各自控制的公司“罢免”对方职位、双方陷入“公章争夺战”、戴品哎将所持绝大部分股权转让予长子陈建军……

直到2019年12月底,陈建军才重回大亚圣象董事会;2020年5月31日,陈晓龙突发疾病去世;次月(2020年6月),陈建军出任大亚圣象董事长。

在掌舵大亚圣象期间,陈晓龙从未在公司拿取薪酬,而是从关联公司获得报酬。上任董事长伊始,陈建军也延续了这一传统。

直到2024年,陈建军突然转向,当年从大亚圣象获得高达195.5万元的薪资;2025年又进一步提高至236.96万元,占当年公司支付董事和高管总薪酬的61%。

不仅如此,在2025年归母净利润同比暴跌90.41%至1334万元之时,大亚圣象却派发了1.04亿元现金分红,占当期归母净利润的780%。

这建立在公司积累的丰富利润之上。截至2025年末,公司未分配利润达到55亿元。但Wind数据显示,自1999年上市至2023年,大亚圣象的分红比例从未超过50%。自2024年开始出现明显上升,当期股权支付率达到70%以上。

作为持有大亚圣象46.44%股权的控股股东,陈建军家族间接控制的大亚集团2025年拿走超4800万元分红。在这背后,间接持有大亚集团股权比例最高的陈建军获利最丰。

在业绩说明会上,有投资者直接提出质疑:“公司2025年反常大手笔分红是(出于)什么考虑?”而管理层表示,公司积极实施现金分红政策,以增强投资者信心。

但在业绩说明会上,投资者明确提及公司市值低,也在询问能否回购,而更多的投资者选择“用脚投票”。

于2026年6月24日,大亚圣象的股价报收5.51元/股,较今年1月的高点7.79元/股跌去约29%,总市值仅剩30亿元,被投资者吐槽“现在估值还没同行的零头”。

同日,同行企业菲林格尔的股价报收54.21元/股,总市值约193亿元;德尔未来收于9.89元/股、总市值约79亿元。

在利润承压之时,公司为何突然提高分红比例?为何陈建军从2024年开始突然在公司拿着约200万元的高薪?当前大亚集团已将所持大亚圣象超70%股票质押,为何如此缺少资金?大亚集团此前曾发生过借款逾期,如今是否又陷入了资金链危机?

对此,「子弹财经」试图向大亚圣象方面进行了解,但截至发稿仍未获回复。

当核心主业被房地产拖累、跨界新能源前途未卜之时,大亚圣象又被“高分红”拖入新的舆论战场。外界更关注的是,当控股权与管理权高度集中,陈建军最终会将大亚圣象带向何方?

注:文/王亚静,文章来源:子弹财经(公众号ID:Mzg5OTkwMzM0Ng==),本文为作者独立观点,不代表亿邦动力立场。

文章来源:子弹财经

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